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REFLECTION AND FAITH IN SØREN KIERKEGAARD

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

REFLECTION AS A DIALECTICAL EXPRESSION FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THREE DEFINITIONS OF FAITH IN SØREN KIERKEGAARD

Few thinkers of recent history have investigated the Christian's act of faith with as much intensity and originality as Søren A. Kierkegaard. Although his writings reach into domains apparently unrelated or only remotely connected with the Christian faith-experience, these probes are almost exclusively regulated by his quest for the illumination of the question: What does it mean to be a Christian? That his passionate preoccupation with the Christian act of faith begins with his earliest writings and is sustained to the end is evidenced by Kierkegaard's analysis of his own voluminous literature. "I am and was a religious author, the whole of my work as an author is related to Christianity, to the problem 'of becoming a Christian'."[1]

The Interrelationships between Three Central Definitions of Faith

From the energetic, incisive and religiously oriented mind of the Danish thinker, we might expect a number of multifaceted descriptions of the act of faith and, in this respect, Kierkegaard does not disappoint us. Scattered throughout his works are declarations about the character of faith that not only range from the succinct to the elaborate, but sometimes appear to be unrelated or positively divergent. Despite this variety, Kierkegaard's explicit pronouncements on faith fall into specifiable categories. One such class evolves from his concern for the relationship of the faith-act to the cognitive experience of "understanding," "reasoning"

or "reflection." Kierkegaard's preoccupation with this theme is sustained through almost all his writings and spans most of his lifetime.[2]

The statements depicting the relation of the Christian faith-act to the rational experience are mainly controlled by Kierkegaard's view of the object of Christian faith which is, of course, Jesus Christ.[3] Faith is infinitely interested in, and profoundly dependent upon the reality of its object.[4] But for the prospective believer, this object is apprehended in cognition as an absolute paradox or the absurd.[5] It is exactly this cognitive appraisal of the faith-object that distinguishes, as a separable category, many statements on faith dispersed through Kierkegaard's works.

However, the faith-affirmations made within this class do not appear to be entirely coherent. Not infrequently we find descriptions of the relation of the faith-act to the cognitive character of its object which, on the surface at least, are conflicting. Consider, for example, the following pair of propositions. "Faith always relates itself to what is not seen."[6] "Faith must not rest content with unintelligibility."[7] The first assertion claims that the object of faith is the unknown, perhaps the unknowable and unintelligible, while the second appears to imply that the task of faith is to remove unintelligibility. But raising the faith-object to the level of intelligibility would destroy faith as it is described in the first proposition.

The apparent divergency of Kierkegaard's affirmations about faith in this class are still further accentuated when he claims, on the one hand, that "Faith is not a form of knowledge"[8] while, on the other, "Reflection intensifies the pathos with which one continues to be a Christian."[9] If faith has nothing to do with knowledge, one is inclined to wonder how reflection can, in any way, aid or be constitutive of the passion required to sustain Christian faith.

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In these contrasting declarations, the relationship between faith and the cognitive experience of faith's object emerges as a problematic. The issue is more specifically defined in our final pair of faith-assertions. In 1850, Kierkegaard wrote into his Journal:

> A true sentence of Hugo de St. Victor. "In things which are above reason faith is not really supported by reason, because reason cannot grasp what faith believes; but there is also a something here as a result of which reason is determined, or which determines reason to honour faith which it cannot perfectly understand." That is what I explained (e.g. in the Final Postscript).[10]

Kierkegaard concurs with Hugh of St. Victor's contention that faith's object is beyond the reach of reason. But here neither thinker claims that this object, when it encounters reason, violates its principles. On the contrary, reason holds the imponderable, but not repulsive, object in esteem -- reason "honors" faith. Therefore the faith-object transcends reason but is not opposed to it. Moreover, Kierkegaard explains that all this was just what he attempted to demonstrate in the Postscript. But in that volume faith's object does not seem merely to transcend reason but to directly oppose it: "Christianity also requires that the individual risk his thought, venturing to believe against the understanding."[11]

These apparently conflicting texts, and others like them, circumscribe more precisely the problematic controlling the diversity of statements made by Kierkegaard regarding the relation of the faith-act to the cognitive apprehension of its object. Now the essential questions are: Does the object of faith transcend rational powers or does it directly vitiate the principles of reason? -- and -- Is it possible that the faith-object both transcends and opposes cognitive powers? Closely associated with these problems is whether or not Kierkegaard's descriptions of faith leave him open to the charge of irrationalism.

These questions, generated by the apparent discord of texts in

this category, have spawned much controversy among Kierkegaardian scholars.[12] When dealing with this set of faith-statements, they most frequently take, as their point of departure, the definitions of faith offered by the pseudonym, Johannes Climacus, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. In this work, the two central formulas for faith are: "Objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation-process of the most passionate inwardness;"[13] and "Instead of objective uncertainty, there is here a certainty, namely that objectively it is absurd; and this absurdity, held fast in the passion of inwardness, is faith."[14] That Kierkegaard's commentators address these definitions when grappling with the relation between faith's object and cognition is not surprising. Both definitions directly refer to the objective aspect of faith and imply a relation to intelligibility in terms of objective uncertainty and objective certainty. Indeed the only significant difference between the two definitions is in the way the objective element is phrased in each. Since the first definition describes the faith of paganism[15] and the second, Christian faith,[16] the relation of intelligibility (objective uncertainty -- objective certainty) to faith's object is the line of demarcation between pagan and Christian faith. Now the importance of Climacus' definition becomes clear: it speaks to the problem of the relation between Christianity's faith-object and the cognitive experience in so direct a fashion that it immediately raises the essential questions which give at least problematical unity to the discrete faith-statements in this category. No exegesis of the relation between reflection and faith in Kierkegaard can be complete without including the Climacean definition of Christian faith.

There is another group of faith-descriptions, different from the first, but just as liberally disseminated through Kierkegaard's works. These deal with the subjective side of the act of faith and variously refer to it

as a certain, passionate, internal decision of subjectivity.[17] Climacus' definition of Christian faith, through its subjective component, can also serve to unify these somewhat diverse pronouncements since they are all related to "the passion of inwardness." Thus an analysis of the Climacean definition embraces not only the rather fragmentary faith-assertions pertaining to the object's intelligibility, but also those referring to the activity of subjectivity in this act of religion.

Although both subjective and objective constituents of the act of faith are expressed in Climacus' definition, this pseudonym emphasizes the objective aspect. He first exhibits the nature of the contradiction comprising the object of faith itself and its implications for objective thought and only then relates that object to an appropriating subjectivity. The objective contradiction stressed here is not an essential feature of Kierkegaard's dialectic of existence, which is not fundamentally concerned with objective contradiction but is rather the relationship of the incommensurables, subjectivity and objectivity, the self and its other. Since Kierkegaard's thought is regulated and unified by the dialectic of incommensurables, the coherence of the Climacean definition within Kierkegaard's central vision cannot be ascertained, and the definition stands as an unrelated appendage to the Dane's fundamental thinking, unless it is located within this dialectic. Moreover the consolidation of the various, succinct descriptions of faith embraced by Climacus' formula is lost if the Postscript's definition does not find a place within the dialectic of existence.

This brings us to another category of statements in Kierkegaard's works, namely, those pertaining to the dialectical character of faith. When the dialectic is fully expressed three terms are operative: the self, the self's finite other and the self's absolutely other -- the individual person, the world and God. No one element of the triad can be translated or

measured in terms of any other. In that sense, each factor is incommensurable or discontinuous with the other; so if a term is considered finite, its other is infinite and if one is free the other is determined. But this does not mean that the terms fall into mutual indifference or unrelatedness; on the contrary, it is exactly the relationship of these incommensurables that constitutes the dialectic of collision in existence. "Faith . . . is always in peril of life, in this collision of finite and infinite."[18]

Kierkegaard's writings are generally governed by some form of relationship between these qualitatively different terms. In Repetition, for example the central point is that the self, lost in its incommensurable other, can only be regained by establishing a relationship with God, the self's absolutely other.[19] Similarly, the theme of Fear and Trembling is essentially guided by recovery of the finite other, dispossessed by infinite resignation, through a faith-relationship with God.[20] Indeed Abraham is characterized as the self who, with Issac, the finite other -- his other, not only in flesh but in the promise of God -- obediently resigns himself to the sacrifice of his son while simultaneously hoping to retain him through his faith-relationship with the absolutely other. In The Concept of Dread, these dialectical relationships are also present, not in order to explicitly articulate the structure of the faith-consciousness, but to describe the posture of the awakening consciousness when it dreadfully anticipates its own freedom as sin or faith. We shall see below[21] how Kierkegaard, through the pseudonymous Haufniensis, expresses the emergence and growth of the dreadful consciousness first according to the relationship of the self with its finite other and then through the relationship of the self with its absolutely other.

The alternatives, sin or faith, dreadfully anticipated only in the

trammeled consciousness of freedom in The Concept of Dread are treated in The Sickness unto Death as the exclusive options, not only for the slowly stirring spirit but also for every explicitly constituted consciousness. Both the despairing sinful consciousness and the wholesomely integrated faith consciousness are explicated as the dialectic of incommensurables. But in this mature work of Kierkegaard, the full scope of the dialectic is brought to bear on many forms of consciousness discussed in previous works. Where earlier pseudonyms stressed the relationship of either self and finite other or self and absolutely other -- or merely sketched the interrelationship of all three terms, The Sickness unto Death meticulously delineates first, the relationship between the self and the world, then between the self, God and the Christ figure, and finally consolidates the entire triadic relationship in a concise formula: "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it. And this formula again, as has often been noted, is the definition of faith."[22] Because these dialectical relationships, controlling and unifying almost all of Kierkegaard's thought, are most completely expressed in The Sickness unto Death, the definition of faith worked out there can serve as a model for measuring the place of his other faith-statements within the dialectic of existence.

If this is the case, then the definition of faith appearing in the Postscript ought to be brought into relationship with that of The Sickness unto Death. But it is now not entirely clear that the former definition has any significant connection with the latter. Indeed the interpreter of despair's sickness is none other than Climacus' opposite pseudonym, Anti-Climacus. At this point, it is possible to conjecture that Kierkegaard, through Anti-Climacus' definition of faith, is repudiating the Climacean formula. If

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so, then all the fragmentary descriptions of faith embraced by Climacus can have no real coherency within Kierkegaard's basic dialectic. On the other hand, if Climacus can be incorporated within the dialectic through Anti-Climacus' faith-statement, the full meaning and scope of the former's definition can be therein exhibited. However only by attempting to relate Climacus' description of Christian faith to that of Anti-Climacus can this problem be resolved. To that end, we have chosen, as our second definition, Anti-Climacus' statement: "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it. And this formula, as has often been noted, is the definition of faith."[23]

There is still another class of faith-statements that occur in the majority of Kierkegaard's writings. Any reference to the act of faith which proclaims that it is not a first immediacy but a second or new immediacy falls into this category.

From his earliest pseudonymous work[24] to at least as late as five years before his death,[25] the term, "immediacy," is employed by Kierkegaard, not only to refer to the faith-act, but also to describe the dispositions of consciousness in existence-spheres outside of faith.

That this term has enough elasticity for incorporation within expressions describing the whole range of existence suggests that the statements in which it appears embody Kierkegaard's fundamental vision -- the dialectic of existence. If this is true, then the descriptions of faith expressed in terms of immediacy, can be coordinated with Anti-Climacus' definition which, as we have seen, is Kierkegaard's most sophisticated dialectical expression for faith. Optimism for the consolidation of these two types of faith-statements is fortified by the fact that Anti-Climacus frequently employs the

term, immediacy, to explicate the various forms of despair which culminate in his definition of faith.[26]

When Kierkegaard refers to faith in terms of immediacy, it is generally to deny that faith is a first immediacy[27] and to affirm that it is rather a new, second immediacy.[28] The first immediacy primarily refers to "aesthetic emotion".[29] As an aethetic mode of existence, it includes "feelings", "urges", "inclinations", involuntary "passions",[30] and "instincts of the heart".[31] In general, first immediacy is an uninhibited, natural spontaneity[32] associated with enthusiastic youthfulness.[33] Within the realm of aesthetic existence, the self is exhausted in finite determinations and does not make the movement of disengagement from finitude required for the act of faith. First immediacy then is identifiable with the finite other which is one of the rudimentary terms of the dialectic of existence.

The act of faith is a new immediacy and this presupposes that the first immediacy has been transcended or that the self has become conscious of itself as differentiated from finite immediacy. In order for the faith-act to be possible, the self must confront its finite other as a discrete realm. Two terms of Kierkegaard's basic dialectic thus emerge as incommensurable. Once released from the immediacy of finite existence, the self is free to enter into a faith-relationship with God, its absolutely other and so the third term of the dialectic of existence is introduced. Only through the faith-appropriation of the absolutely other can the self's finite other be re-appropriated and transformed into a new immediacy.[34]

Now it becomes evident that the relationship between the three terms comprising Kierkegaard's fundamental dialectic governs, not only Anti-Climacus' definition of faith, but also those statements expressing faith in terms of the first and second immediacies. But the latter do not needlessly duplicate

the former. There is a concise definition of faith that can serve as a paradigm embracing all those statements within this category and which also introduces the element most pertinent to our central theme. It is found, explicitly stated, in a Journal entry dated 1848, the same year in which the manuscript for The Sickness unto Death was completed:[35] "Faith is immediacy after reflection."[36] In this definition, the two immediacies are implied -- an immediacy before reflection, (the first immediacy) and the immediacy after reflection, (the new immediacy). But the crucial term included here is "reflection." Although both the Anti-Climacean and the Journal definitions are regulated by the dialectic of existence, the latter provides a way of relating the former to Kierkegaard's meaning of reflection. More precisely, it appears that Kierkegaard's notion of reflection binds together these two faith descriptions and can possibly serve to express the internal operation of the dialectic which controls both definitions.

The terms, immediacy and reflection, making up the Journal definition are widely used to explicate various positions in the very volume where Climacus' definition of faith appears.[37] We have seen that the emphasis of Climacus' definition is on the relation of the faith-object to the cognitive experience of it and does not directly reveal the dialectic of existence. However Kierkegaard frequently uses the term, reflection, to signify rational processes or movements of thought.[38] In so far as reflection refers to cognitive determinations, it would appear that the Journal's definition of faith, which explicitly uses this term, is relatable to the Postscript's formula. Moreover, since the Journal description is regulated by the dialectic of existence, the successful connecting of these two definitions through the meaning of reflection should aid in locating Climacus' definition within the dialectic. Finally, if Kierkegaard's meaning of reflection is an intrinsic dynamism of the dialectic

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itself, and if Anti-Climacus' definition is a rigorous expression of that same dialectic, then the notion of reflection opens the way, not only for demonstrating the relationships between the Journal and Postscript definitions of faith, but also between these two and the description found in The Sickness unto Death.[39] Therefore through Kierkegaard's notion of reflection, we will attempt to determine the relationships between these three definitions of faith:1) "Absurdity, held fast in the passion of inwardness, is faith." 2) "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it." 3) "Faith is immediacy after reflection."

Reflection and the Dialectic of Incommensurables

Kierkegaard frequently uses the term, reflection, to refer directly to processes of thought and occasionally associates it with objective cognition.[40] Yet Kierkegaard's analyses of the nature and function of thought is not for the sake of simply illuminating these thought processes for themselves. A purely speculative concern for cognitive activity is foreign to the entire spirit of his authorship. Kierkegaard's intent, in the examination of the character of thought, is to determine the disposition of subjectivity with regard to its thought activity.

> While objective thought is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker is an existing individual essentially interested in his own thinking, existing as he does in his thought. His thinking has therefore a different type of reflection, namely the reflection of inwardness, of possession, by virtue of which it belongs to the thinking subject and to no one else.[41]

The theme of this passage is the relationship between thought and subjectivity, "inwardness" or the self. In "objective thought," subjectivity remains disengaged or "indifferent." On the other hand, the "subjective thinker," in interest, engages his thought and exists in it. Engagement and disengagement are two diverse orientations of subjectivity with regard to its thought activity.

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It follows that subjectivity cannot be simply reduced to thought. Since thought cannot exhaust the meaning of subjectivity, the thinking or noetic subject cannot be ultimate subjectivity.

The inability of thought to fully reveal subjectivity indicates a discontinuity between them. This disassociation is most evident in the relationship between subjectivity and "objective thought." When subjectivity is disengaged from its thinking, it polarizes thought which is then considered to be objective. Thus Kierkegaard expresses the activity of thought in terms of the relationship between the disparate poles, subjectivity and objectivity. "While objective thought is indifferent to the thinking subject and his existence, the subjective thinker is an existing individual essentially interested in his own thinking."

The discontinuity between subjectivity and objectivity, between self and other can be expressed as their incommensurability. "Subjectivity is incommensurable with reality."[42] Subjectivity cannot be measured in terms of objectivity and the converse is also true. To become objective is to cease to be subjective; to become subjective is to move away from objectivity. "For an objective reflection the truth becomes an object, something objective, and thought must be pointed away from the subject. For a subjective reflection the truth becomes a matter of appropriation, of inwardness, of subjectivity, and thought must probe more and more deeply into the subject and his subjectivity."[43] Subjectivity and objectivity are qualitatively different incommensurables. The incommensurables and the relationship between the incommensurables (subjectivity-objectivity, self-other) provide Kierkegaard with a framework for the articulation of the dialectic of existence -- a dialectic of incommensurables. They also suggest a latent meaning of reflection which is not merely equatable with thought processes but which can serve to elucidate the dialectic of collision.

The disseverance of subjectivity and objectivity, of self and other,

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suggests a meaning of the term "reflection" taken in its root sense: re-flectere, to bend back. If subjectivity and objectivity are qualitatively different, and the former cannot be reduced to the latter, then subjectivity can be said to re-flect from to bend back from, objectivity. An expression for the radical incommensurability of these two terms is their mutual re-flectivity. Each is re-flected from the other and this is their incommensurability, their qualitative difference.

The terms, subjectivity-objectivity, self-other, are not simply separated by their incommensurability. They do not fall into the bare indifference of unrelatedness. It is the relationship of incommensurables that provides the tension in the dialectic of collision.[44] Here again, the root meaning of reflection is indicated. The terms that are reflected from one another are reflected back again in their relationships and this double reflection controls the "qualitative dialectic."[45]

Kierkegaard's frequent application of the term "reflection" to the activity of thought does not conflict with its meaning as re-flectere, but the latter meaning has a wider scope. In Kierkegaard's view, the act of thinking does bend subjectivity away from objectivity by opening up a distinguishing difference between them. Until thought begins, there is only an unreflected, brute immediacy wherein no distinctions are discernible.[46] The activity of thought ruptures the simplicity of immediacy and bifurcates it into the differentiated terms that are required for the dialectic.[47] The fundamental terms disclosed by the act of thinking are ideality-reality, thought-existence, objectivity-subjectivity. For Kierkegaard, these are radical distinctions,[48] for the terms are in no way reducible to one another. They are incommensurable or qualitatively different. The act of thought expressed in speech[49] reflects or bends back subjectivity from objectivity, disengages subjectivity from immediate existence,

and generates the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity.

Consciousness is not yet fully constituted in the mere dichotomy that is effected by thought, but an essential ingredient for a fully constituted consciousness is a thought process which, in splitting the homogeneity of brute immediacy, disengages or re-flects subjectivity from objectivity and thereby sets up the terms for a further reflective relation. Thus reflection has a meaning that is not restricted to the bare act of thought nor to the characteristics of thought processes themselves. On the contrary, thought's activity can be referred to as reflection in the sense of "bending back" in order to locate the function of thought in the colliding dialectical reflectivity of subject and object. In this way the term, reflection, relates thought processes to the dialectic of incommensurables. Reflection therefore embraces more than encapsulated thought movements. This broader meaning of reflection is faithful to one of Kierkegaard's central concerns -- not with thought processes in themselves but with the way in which thought processes posture subjectivity toward objectivity in the re-flective dialectic of their collision.

Reflection and the Movement of Subjectivity in the Dialectical Constitution of Consciousness

The simple statement of the reflection of subjectivity and objectivity does not fully describe the tension of consciousness in the dialectic of incommensurables. There is a third element that must be present and must be assumed in the description of consciousness. That factor is the interest of subjectivity in the contradictions that it discovers. In the concluding section of the posthumously published treatise, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, Kierkegaard addresses the question : "How Must Existence be Constituted that Doubt can be Possible?" Here he analyzes the requisites for a consciousness that is fully constituted in doubt and contrasts the truly doubting

consciousness with objective doubt. In this analysis, Kierkegaard illustrates that, in relation to its object, a special movement of subjectivity is required for the total constitution of consciousness. This discussion clarifies further the relationship between reflection as the dialectical "bending back" of the incommensurables, subjectivity-objectivity, and reflection as mere thought process.

Throughout this section, Kierkegaard uses reflection to refer directly to objective thought.[50] The reflection of objective thought reflects or bends back subjectivity from objectivity and separates them out of their indistinguishability in first immediacy. But this distance between the terms of the contradiction does not describe a completely developed consciousness. The contradiction in the terms revealed by the reflection of objective thought is only the possibility of a thoroughly established consciousness. Consciousness emerges in the relationship of the terms. "Reflexion is the possibility of relationship, consciousness is the relationship."[51]

The function of the reflection of objective thought is to exhibit dichotomies. These "in reflection impinge on each other in such a way that relationship becomes possible."[52] The polarizing activity of thought's reflection is only the possibility of the relationship and not the relationship itself because this form of "reflection is disinterested."[53] It contains contradiction and opposition but regards them with only a speculative eye. When the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity which is evoked by objective thought is merely contemplated by objective thought, consciousness remains indifferent and unborn. That is why it is a misunderstanding to refer to the mere speculative contemplation of objective contradiction as a doubting consciousness. "It is sheer nonsense to speak of objective doubt; for objective doubt is not doubt but deliberation."[54] The noetic subject that simply thinks contradiction has not yet reached full consciousness. The reflection of objective thought by itself is a kind of cognition

which is simply juxtaposing opposites precedes full consciousness. "Consciousness, therefore, presupposes reflexion."[55]

There can be no real doubting consciousness in simply arranging contradiction in objective thought. "Had nothing else but dichotomies been created, there would have been no doubt."[56] The reflection of objective thought is dichotomatic,[57] but consciousness is trichotomatic. The third element is produced by subjectivity itself and is its interest or concern for its object.[58] In the context of doubt, consciousness is fully constituted in the interest (the inter-esse), the "being between" the opposing dualities supplied by objective thought.[59] To be between the dichotomies presented by objective thought is to be in passionate interest. The interest of subjectivity in the objective contradiction establishes the relationship between subject and object and this relationship is consciousness.[60]

Although doubt is basically a movement of subjectivity, the function of objective thought is essential to real doubt. It is true that the juxtaposition of contradictories does not, with necessity, generate a doubting consciousness. However, it does provide the possibility for the emergence of a consciousness characterized as doubtful. Given a doubting consciousness, the contradictions of objective thought must be present.[61] "Doubt arises because there is a relationship between two things. The two things must exist for the relationship to take place, but doubt, as the higher term, comes before the relationship and does not result from it."[62]

There are several elements in Kierkegaard's discussion of doubt that bear on the meaning of reflection in its broader reference to the dialectic of incommensurables. Kierkegaard makes it clear that there is no strict causal nexus between the deliberation of the polarity of subject-object and the constitution of the real doubting consciousness. The presentation of this contradiction by objective thought does not of itself coerce the interest of subjectivity. Subjectivity may reside within that contradiction in interest

and so be fully constituted as a doubtful consciousness, or it may remain cooly disengaged from it. The possibility of speculative indifference or interested engagement in the face of objective contradiction indicates that such contradiction cannot with necessity generate the passionate movement of subjectivity required for the doubting consciousness. "It cannot, therefore, be said that reflexion produces doubt."[63] There is clearly a discontinuity between the activity of objective thought and the movement of subjectivity.

The cleavages between subjectivity and objective thought in Kierkegaard's discussion of doubt again reveal the dialectical significance of the term, reflection. The inability of objective thought to thoroughly evoke the movement of subjectivity indicates that subjectivity is not reducible to objectivity. For Kierkegaard, such irreducibility always bespeaks incommensurability. The term "reflection" understood as "bending back from" properly expresses the incommensurable duality of subjectivity and objective thought. Since the dialectic of collision involves the relationship of incommensurables, and reflection expresses the incommensurability of differentiated terms, this root meaning of reflection places the dichotomy of subjectivity and objectivity within the framework of Kierkegaard's dialectic of collision.

Kierkegaard's discussion of doubt also discloses the dialectical import of reflection from the side of objectivity. Since the activity of objective thought cannot of itself explain doubt, the real origin of the doubting consciousness is the interest of subjectivity. The cause of the subjective movement of passionate interest is subjectivity itself. The movement is self-moving; subjectivity is self-causing. In so far as subjectivity is self-causing, it is unconditioned by objectivity and this implies independence. Since the movement of subjectivity is independent of objectivity, it cannot be measured by it. Subjectivity therefore is incommensurable with objectivity. The incommensurability of these poles -- now revealed through the self-causing passion of

subjectivity -- can be referred to, and incorporated within Kierkegaard's dialectical formulations through the fundamental meaning of reflection.

Kierkegaard's discussion of doubt, illustrates the reflection of incommensurables from the side of subjectivity as well as from the side of objective thought and this form of reflection is one of mutual disengagement. Subjectivity and objectivity are revealed as dichotomies, reflected away from one another through the activity of thought and the self-moving passion of subjectivity. Yet the entire movement of the dialectic of collision is not comprised by reflective disengagement. The authentic doubting consciousness requires the engagement of subjectivity with the objectively exhibited contradiction. In real doubt, subjectivity engages its object in its own proper way. Subjectivity thereby establishes the consciousness-relationship between itself and its incommensurable other. The engaging relationship of the incommensurables discovered in the reflection of disengagement supplies the tension of the dialectic of collision. The relationship of encounter can properly be described as the reflecting back again of the self on its incommensurable other.

Kierkegaard, in this treatise, makes two points that are important for a description of consciousness in terms of the dialectical reflectivity of subject and object, self and other. First, any description of consciousness in dialectically reflective dichotomous terms must assume an engagement of subjectivity with its incommensurable other. Secondly, the function of objective thought in the constitution of the doubting consciousness is to reveal opposition and contradiction. Thought does not mediate the dichotomies. Kierkegaard's emphasis on these two elements in his description of consciousness is a reaction against an explanation of consciousness that mediates subject and object -- a notion which he attributes to Hegel and Hegelianism.

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Hegel's Notion of Consciousness : The Dialectical Mediation of Subject and Object

Kierkegaard's discussion of doubt in Johannes Climacus is polemical. His target is the Hegelian system which, to his mind, begins in doubt with the optimistic intent of systematically resolving it. "It is an inconsistency which has moved modern philosophy to try to overcome doubt methodically by the System."[64]

Kierkegaard distinguishes his meaning of doubt from his interpretation of the Hegelian notion of this same phenomenon through his analysis of the structure of consciousness. His explication of the fundamental anatomy of consciousness is a radical departure from Hegel's judgments on this theme. But because Hegel's concept of consciousness is thoroughly interwoven with, and dependent upon the dialectic of reflective mediation, Kierkegaard's disagreement with the Hegelian notion of consciousness involves repudiation of the mediating dialectic and the articulation of the new dialectic of collision. The contrast between the two dialectics provides a distinguishing reference for the latent meaning of reflection in Kierkegaard. We will first illustrate how Kierkegaard's description of the structure of consciousness contrasts with that of Hegel (pp. 21-26). Then we will show that this contrast is conditioned by the difference in their respective dialectics (pp. 27-34). Finally we will exhibit how the contrast between the two dialectics highlights the meaning of reflection in Kierkegaard (pp. 34-36).

A motive for Johannes Climacus' attack on the Hegelian systematic resolution of doubt is found in that pseudonym's statement in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. "If doubt is capable of overcoming itself, if one may find the truth in doubt simply by doubting everything, without breach of continuity, and without an absolutely new point of departure, not a single Christian category can be sustained, and Christianity is ipso facto abolished."[65]

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If doubt is capable of resolving itself into certainty, then it is implied that certainty is presupposed in doubt.[66] Doubt contains its opposite, the seed of its own destruction because certainty is immanent in it. The movement from doubt to certainty is simply the unveiling of the certainty precontained in doubt. Doubt is only a moment in the systematic movement to clarity, and the movement from doubt to certainty is a self-mediating movement. Such a process requires no recourse to elements that are discontinuous with the closed circle of self-mediation. There is no need for "an absolutely new point of departure." But Kierkegaard insists that passionate activity is sui generis and therefore discontinuous with the self-enclosed mediating process; the Hegelian movement of mediation would render superfluous the transcending activity of passionate subjectivity.

Kierkegaard regards the mediating progression from doubt to certainty as peculiar to a mode of objective thought which threatens every Christian category because it supports gnosticism.[67] It is a form of thought that ignores real subjectivity by mediating it into immanental identity with objectivity. "Knowing stands in direct and immanent relation to its object and the knower, not in inverse and transcendent relationship to a third object."[68] In this form of objective thought, the tension in the opposition between subjectivity and objectivity is mollified precisely because the knowing subject is immanent with respect to its object -- subject is contained within object and object within subject. Their mutual inclusion expresses their consanguinity or their mutual commensurability. "All knowledge must evoke what is proper to it or remain without effect."[69] Kierkegaard attributes the Hegelian notion of the immanental commensurability of subject and object to its principle of mediation which in his view, effects the abstract identity of subject and object.[70] Hegel himself ascribes the development of consciousness to this activity of

mediation in his Phenomenology of Mind.

Kierkegaard's discussion of consciousness in Johannes Climacus is strongly reminiscent of Hegel's description of consciousness in his Phenomenology of Mind.[71] This is not meant to imply either that Kierkegaard read the Phenomenology or that he endorses the explanation of consciousness contained in it. Although Kierkegaard refers to this work,[72] his allusions are such that one can conclude that he was certainly aware of its existence but not that he was directly exposed to its contents. One may also say that it is rather probable that Kierkegaard was indirectly exposed to this important book through the lectures of H. N. Clausen and H. Martensen at the University of Copenhagen. Whether or not Kierkegaard had direct exposure to the Phenomenology is not crucial. He frequently attributes directly to Hegel the mediation into identity of subjectivity and objectivity. "The identity of subject and object posited through an application of the principle of mediation merely carries us back to where we were before, to the abstract definition of truth as an identity of thought and being."[73] The constitution of consciousness as the mediation of subjectivity and objectivity is fully expressed by Hegel in his Phenomenology of Mind. A brief investigation of the pertinent sections of this work will serve to contrast the two thinker's descriptions of consciousness within the framework of their diverse dialectics.

For Hegel, subjectvity emerges, not specifically in consciousness of an object, but in consciousness of the self or self-consciousness. The vacuous expression for self-consciousness is self-intuition.[74] This is the self's grasp of itself without reference to what is not self or without consideration of the self's other. The self without an object is pure subjectivity and a subjectivity which does not dialectically incorporate its objective pole is devoid of all content.[75] In its immediate grasp of itself without the mediation

of its other, pure subjectivity is unmediated, undialectical abstraction. The self can only become concretely conscious of itself in some dialectical relation to its other.

In the Phenomenology, Hegel delineates several modes of self-consciousness that emerge in dialectical relation to the self's other. In desire for an external object, the self has itself outside itself in that other and so experiences itself as split. Its impulse is to reintegrate itself by cancelling the otherness of its alien-being and making it into itself.[76] In satiety, the fulfillment of desire, the self is conscious of itself as having mediated itself and its other-being in identity. Here self-consciousness is for-itself-being as individual.[77]

A higher stage of self-consciousness arises within the sphere of inter-subjectivity. Two selves, conscious of themselves as individuals for themselves, confront one another. Each sees the other as like itself; that is, as another self. Yet each is an independent, physically extant and discrete object. In so far as the self abstractly intuits itself in the other self which has its own independence, it again has itself outside itself.[78] Each has the impulse to cancel the other-being of the other and thus mediate it with himself. The cancellation of the other's independent alien-being can be accomplished when one recognizes the independence through submission. In this event, the tension of conflict between two independent beings-for-themselves as individuals is released. One becomes the master, the other, the slave. In this relationship, the master is conscious of himself as a victorious will, while the slave, who cannot abstract from his sensuous, extant being,[79] is aware of himself as a self that is cancelled.[80] The master has mediated his other being into identity with himself -- the will of the slave reflects his will. The slave too has mediated his self with his other being, for in submission to the master, the will of the master becomes the will of the slave.

Self-consciousness transcends the master-slave relation when a self is conscious of itself neither over against another self nor in the mediated relationship of victor and vanquished but rather in and through the other self.[81] Each self has its own self in the other because recognition is mutual. The independence of each is had in the acknowledgment of the independence of the other. Here self-constitution is properly mediated. Each self is conscious of itself when reflecting its not-self, its other. When the self correctly mediates its other in the consciousness of itself, its subjectivity is constituted as love, friendship and the like.[82]

Self-consciousness can be further mediated and more fully constituted in Reason. Reason is the synthesis of the dialectic of self-consciousness and consciousness of object. Hegel's description of the consciousness of object is an analysis of the development of consciousness from the side of its object. The objective consciousness moves through the stages of sensation, perception and understanding. From sensation to understanding, there is a progressive widening of the objective consciousness -- from the sensuous grasp of the object in its discrete moments of time and space to a grasp of the thing in its universal law by the understanding.[83] In so far as the law is attributed to the thing it is objective, but in so far as it also belongs to consciousness, it suggests the dawning of self-consciousness.[84] Reason is the dialectical union of the two: consciousness of object and self-consciousness, objectivity and subjectivity. In Reason, the self, universally mediated through other self-consciousnesses, is conscious of itself as <u>positing</u> a content which contains the in-and-for-itself existing essence of objects and possesses objective reality.[85] In Reason, Hegel distinguishes between subjective certitude and certitude which is had in unity with being. The knowing of Reason is therefore not mere subjective certitude but also truth, because truth consists in the harmony or unity of

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certitude and being or of certitude and objectivity.[86] Mere subjective certainty is the self's verification of itself in the simple consciousness of itself. But this is not the truth because it is not mediated by objectivity. Truth is had in the dialectical harmony of self-consciousness and consciousness of object. Reason is therefore an exalted form of consciousness because in it subjectivity is profoundly mediated with objectivity.

The Contrast between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's Descriptions of Consciousness

It now becomes clear that Kierkegaard's description of consciousness in Johannes Climacus is a striking contrast with that of Hegel. For Hegel, as subject and object are more deeply mediated through several stages, consciousness is more profoundly constituted. In reason, subject and object are dialectically mediated in identity. Kierkegaard's refusal to accept the principle of mediation differentiates his view of consciousness from that of Hegel.

Kierkegaard regards mediation to identity as a principle of speculation.[87] In speculation, that which is viewed stays at a distance from the viewer. The two form a duality such that the fundamental subjectivity of the viewer remains at an unconcerned remoteness from the viewed. In this manner the mediation principle stands over against subjectivity.[88] Hegel's entire systematic description of the constitution of consciousness in terms of the mediation of subject and object falls into the category of objectivity.

The terms, subjectivity-objectivity, are for Kierkegaard also speculative when they are involved in mediating activity. The self when viewed speculatively becomes objective. "That is to say, the existing subjectivity has vanished, in that it has made an attempt to become what in an abstract sense is called subjectivity, the mere abstract form of an abstract objectivity."[89] The subjectivity which is mediated into identity with objectivity is itself objective.

Subjectivity, objectivity and their mediating relationships are all a function of objective speculative thought.

The subjectivity of objective thought is only a knowing or a noetic subject, and the noetic subject is not ultimate subjectivity. From the perspective of the height of human subjectivity, the subject that thinks objectively is objective and is no real subjectivity. Hegel's description of consciousness cannot be valid because it does not include authentic subjectivity. The mediation of subject and object is a Hegelian form of objective thought that does not describe a fully constituted consciousness.

Kierkegaard's description of consciousness in Johannes Climacus is different from that of Hegel in two related respects. 1) In Johannes Climacus, subject and object are not mediated by the reflection of objective thought as they are by Hegel through the activity of Reason. The role of the reflection of objective thought, in Kierkegaard's view, is simply to present dichotomies and contradictions. The reflection of objective thought splits the simplicity of immediacy into subject and object which are not further mediated by thought into identity. 2) Kierkegaard sees that the mediation of subject and object into identity by thought would reduce subjectivity and consciousness to the immanence of thought, and such a reduction would render superfluous any further movement of subjectivity that might transcend the reflection of objective thought. His contention that the legitimate activity of objective thought discloses the subject-object polarity as resistable to rational mediation prepares the way for a movement of subjectivity which is not generated by the mediating power of objective thought. Consciousness is therefore not constituted by the immanental mediation of subject and object but by the tension resulting from the passionate activity of subjectivity engaging its incommensurable object. "It is passion that gives tension to the contradiction, and when passion is

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taken away the contradiction becomes a mere pleasantry, a bon mot. An existential problem is pathetic and dialectic at one and the same time."[90] Passionate subjectivity is the discontinuous element of transcendence in the dialectic between subjectivity and objectivity.[91]

Thus Kierkegaard's view of the constitution of consciousness is distinguished from his interpretation of Hegel's description: 1) by the difference in the function of the reflection of objective thought and 2) by the passionate activity of subjectivity in the constitution of consciousness.

The contrast between Kierkegaard's and Hegel's descriptions of consciousness is inherently determined by the difference between their dialectics. Kierkegaard views this diversity as the difference between quantitative and qualitative dialectics. "Everything turns on making the distinction absolute between quantitative dialectic and qualitative dialectic. All logic is quantitative dialectic or modal dialectic, for everything is and the whole is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic belong to existence."[92] The Hegelian dialectic is quantitative because it allows for no qualitative differences, no resolute contradictions in its terms, and no incommensurability. "The Hegelian philosophy holds that there is no justified concealment, no justified incommensurability."[93] The tension expected in quality, difference, variety, opposition and contradiction is relaxed and resolved in the dialectical mediation of these terms. For Hegel, this is effected through the special activity of reflection. Kierkegaard implicitly recognizes that the mediation of polarities is conditioned by a specific activity which Hegel assigns to reflection. "Every movement of infinity comes about by passion, and no reflection can bring a movement about. This is the continual leap in existence which explains the movement, whereas mediation is a chimera which according to Hegel is supposed to explain everything."[94] Kierkegaard relegates the dialectic of reflective mediation to the sphere of

logic as a form of the reflection of objective thought. He differentiates his qualitative dialectic from Hegel's dialectic of reflective mediation by maintaining that the former addresses the contradiction inherent in human existence. "The view which sees life's doubleness (dualism) is higher and deeper than that which seeks unity or 'pursues studies toward unity' (an expression from Hegel about all the endeavors of philosophy)"[95] This distinction provides a contrasting reference between the meaning of reflection in Hegel's dialectic of mediation and the latent meaning of reflection in Kierkegaard's dialectic of existence.

The Activity of Reflection in Hegel's Dialectical Mediation of Polarities

In Hegel, the progressive mediation of subjectivity and objectivity that describes the constitution and the development of consciousness is a function of the reflection that pervades his entire dialectic. Hegel's discussion of reflection appears in his Science of Logic within the "Doctrine of Essence." The activities of reflection are expressed in the relationships between essence and show. Within these relationships, reflection is characterized as positing, presupposing, external and determining.

Essence comes out of immediate being and opposes it.[96] The latter is the unessential or essenceless being; it is "show".[97] Show, lacking essence, is nothing or negativity.

The reflectivity of show can be given impulse by the question: what is show? As essenceless being, show is nothing. The being of show is precisely its nothingness; it is not. In the response, the movement is from show to show, from negativity to negativity. This movement is the re-flection, the "bending back" from show to show, from negativity to negativity.

The self-relating reflection of show to show, or negativity to negativity is the self-identity of negation. Self-identity is immediacy.[98] But it is not

a brute immediacy; that is, it is not primitively given. It is rather an immediacy which has been effected in a return; an immediacy which is reflected in the self-relation of identity. The in-itself immediacy of self-identity is its stability. The firmness accorded to the immediacy of self-identity is posited, not by the thing-in-itself, but by reflection. This is the activity of "positing reflection."

The reflective return of negation to negation results in immediacy. But that immediacy and its negativity are immediately transcended.[99] The return of negation to negation, the coinciding, immediate self-identity of negation is also the abrogating or transcending of negation. It is transcended due to the character of positing reflection. The self-identity of show with show, negation with negation is not simply a dead tautology. The reflective affirmation that show is nothing, declares that it is. It is essentially nothing -- essentially essenceless. Essence thus rises to the surface in the very activity of self-relation effected by positing reflection. Here essence is not explicitly posited by positing reflection, for the latter posits the immediacy of self-relating negation. Rather, essence is presupposed in positing reflection. This is what Hegel terms "presupposing reflection." It is submerged but active in positing reflection. In Hegel's concise phrasing : "In presupposition, Reflection determines the return to itself to be its own negative (i.e., immediacy), or that the transcendence of which is Essence."[100]

Positing reflection which arrives at immediacy has the transcendence of immediacy built into it. The transcendence of this immediacy through the negation of negativity reveals the presupposition of essence. Reflective negation of negation annuls negation and thereby abrogates or transcends the immediacy of self-identical negation. The transcendence of this immediacy through negation of negativity is the arrival of essence at itself. The activity of negating show

to search out its being discloses essence as in itself, self-identical. "Transcended immediacy is return to self, the arrival of essence at itself, Being simple and self-identical."[101] Positing reflection contains the presupposition of essence and the whole is intro-reflection. "The return of Essence is thus its own self-repulsion. Or, intro-Reflection is essentially the presupposing of that out of which it is the return."[102]

Positing reflection delivers the immediacy of self-identity -- negativity is negativity. Presupposing reflection transcends immediacy in the recognition of the differentiation within this identity -- it is what it is not, essentially essenceless. It thereby presupposes essence. When these two reflective movements are considered as independent of one another, external reflection emerges.

On the one hand, external reflection considers the immediacy of positedness to be an external other because immediacy exercises its independence over against it. Thus external reflection meets posited immediacy as something extrinsic to it and "as something from which it begins."[103] On the other hand, external reflection is presupposing. It always presupposes essential being as a substrate -- therefore, "Reflection is determinate; and since in this determinateness it has a presupposition and begins from the immediate as from its Other, it is External Reflection."[104]

External reflection views the immediate as the other. In this sense, the other is in itself and this is an expression for its independence or indifference. It exercises an original unrelatedness to any other other. The "relation" of one determinate in-itself immediacy to another is their unrelatedness. "One Determinate Being and another are posited as falling apart."[105]

External reflection is geared to "thing thinking" where a radical otherness prevails. Contradictions stand fast through this perspective. "But the customary tenderness for things, whose only care is that they shall not

contradict one another, forgets here as elsewhere that this is not the solution of the contradiction, which is merely planted elsewhere, namely, into subjective or external reflection."[106] External reflection is a foreshortened, subjective reflection that is responsible for irreconcilable differences and contradictions.

Determining reflection is the mediation of positing and external reflection -- it is a mediating reflection. "But now Positing is in unity with External Reflection; in this unity the latter is absolute presupposing, that is, the self-repulsion of Reflection, or the positing of determinateness as itself."[107]

Positedness, again, is the immediate determinateness of the self-relation of negation. Positing reflection is transcended in the presupposing of essence. When essence is presupposed, positing and presupposing reflections are intro-reflected. However, while external reflection considers the two reflective movements as separate, determining reflection reaches a wider level of perspective by envisioning the two moments of reflection not as separated but as mediated. That is, the immediate determinateness delivered by positing reflection is seen to be the positing of determinateness as the reflectivity of essence, not as divorced from its other determinatness, but as the reflection of essence itself. Show is now considered as the necessary manifesting face of essence. Without show as the expression of essence, essence itself cannot be. Conversely, show is not without the essence it reveals. Show is no longer self-reflected into immediate determinateness which gives it its independence and essence no longer arrives at itself as an in-itself presupposition. Now show is the reflected determinateness of essence.[108] The two moments of positing reflection and presupposing, intro-reflection taken separately by external reflection are now mediated in determining reflection. Hegel explains succinctly.

> In so far then as it is positedness which also is intro-Reflection, the reflection-determinateness is the relation to its other-being in itself. -- It is not a determinateness which is, and rests, and is related to an Other in such manner that the related term and its

> relation are different one from another, the former being a Being-in-Self, a Something which excludes its other and its relation to this Other from itself. On the contrary, the Reflection-Determination is in itself the determinate side and the relation of this determinate side as determinate.[109]

The other of essence and the other of show are no longer fossilized in exclusive rigidity. The other of essence is what essence is not -- its negation as show. The other of show is what show is not, namely essence. As the other of each other, essence is the reflection of its manifesting determinateness and the latter is the mediating expression of essence. Otherness, from this vantage point, is not a radical, exclusive otherness but a mutually complementing distinctness. A broader vision is always achieved when relation is seen as more primary than in the procedure where terms are first considered in excluding isolation and only subsequently related. Since reflection is the expression for relation between terms, the primacy awarded to relation renders reflection central for any authentic perspective. It is determining reflection that overcomes the myopic perception of the total, mutual exclusivity of otherness. "Determination of Reflection on the other hand has re-absorbed its other-being. It is Positedness or negation, which negation however, bends back into itself relation to other -- negation which is self-identical, the unity of itself and its Other."[110]

Hegel traces the movement of reflection through its determinating phases. Besides identity, these phases include difference -- which further determines itself into variety and opposition -- and contradiction. All these stages are determinations or reflections of essence itself. Essence begins as self-identical immediacy and reflectively differentiates itself from itself in difference, variety, opposition and contradiction. Through its last stage, contradiction, essence returns to itself in self-identity. Essence, which at first is immediately in itself, thus reflectively mediates itself, or distances itself from itself through its determinations and returns to itself as the ground

of its determinations. The mediation of contradiction through the activity of determining reflection is the last stage in the reflective return of essence to itself.

The mediation of contradiction will highlight the contrast in Hegel's meaning of reflection in the dialectic of mediation, and the latent meaning of reflection in Kierkegaard's dialectic of colliding contradiction.

The Reflective Mediation of Contradiction

Contradiction is a specific form of opposition. The fundamental terms of opposition are the positive and the negative. One term is positive in as much as it is what it is. Its opposing term is negative because it is not what the given term is. Any term is opposing and positive only through the term that opposes it -- a term which it is not. The conceptualization of any side of opposition, at once, contains itself and its opposing other.

The sides of opposition are independent. Positive and negative are each independent because each is whole. That is, the other of each is within and constitutive of each. Each is its not being. As containing its other, each is complete and not dependent on its other. On the other hand, the other, considered by externalized reflection as positedness is being and has indifferent persistence.[111] Thus each is itself and "excludes the determination which is negative to it."[112] That which is constitutively included is excluded. When the included is simultaneously excluded in the same respect, opposition becomes further determined as contradiction.

Contradiction, a determination of opposition, is the contradiction of positive and negative. In contradiction, the positive is self-relation. It is therefore a posited self-identity that excludes its other. But in excluding its other, the negative, it becomes itself the negative of that which is excluded.[113]

Furthermore that excluded other becomes intro-reflected. That is, it is disengaged from the excluding positive and is itself excluding. This is the mutual exclusivity of contradiction. "Exclusive reflection is the positing of the Positive as excluding the Other in such a manner that this positing is immediately the positing of its Other, which excludes it."[114] This is the absolute contradiction of the positive which is the same contradiction as the negative.

Putting it more simply: contradiction is exclusive and inclusive in the same respect. It is exclusive since the contradictory term, as self-identical, excludes its other. But this exclusivity is not bland, unrelated indifference. The contradictory term is only a contradictory due to its relation of exclusion. It is not a contradictory term without the other which excludes it. The relation of exclusion constitutes it precisely as a contradictory term. Thus the excluded term is included in the same respect -- its inclusion is exactly its exclusion. This is what constitutes the contradictory term and the contradiction itself.

Contradiction is resolved in nothing or in the "Nought". The positive and negative, taken only from the side of their mutual exclusivity, are independent in themselves. Yet their independence is transcended in their relation of exclusivity. Each has its being, as contradictory, in the other. They thereby leave themselves and transfer into their excluding other. In this self-transcending relation each passes over into the other and is there dissolved. They become Nought.[115]

The Nought of the reflectivity of contradiction is not simply an empty nothingness. It is, on the contrary, an intro-reflection, a presupposition. The negation effected in contradiction is the presupposed affirmation of self-identical essence. It marks the terminus of essence's reflective journey

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through the determinations of identity, difference in variety and opposition, and finally contradiction, to essence in itself. Essence then remains the ground of its reflective determinations.

The fuel for the entire movement of this journey of essence through its determinations is provided by the activity of reflection which is its own power. Reflection is mediating self-movement. This self-moving, reflectively mediating activity is fundamentally demonstrated in the mutually inclusive reflection of positing and presupposing, intro-reflections. Positing reflection relates a term to itself and posits it as self-identical. But its self-identity which posits it also negates it and reaffirms its opposite as presupposed. For example, when difference is posited, it is self-related into identity. It appears to be what it is. But to affirm that difference is difference is to assert the identity of difference which is the opposite of difference and is presupposed by it. Every identity scatters into difference which is pre-contained and presupposed by it. In terms of essence and its manifesting determinatenesses, the former leaves its self-identity, shows itself and returns to its self-identity. But essence cannot be without its manifesting other. Essence reflects its other and in turn is reflected by it. The reflective circle is closed and the movement of mediating reflectivity is sui generis.

For Hegel, this mediating reflective self-movement wherein a term distances itself from itself, returns to itself and is in turn repulsed from itself, is the sine qua non of all philosophizing.

> It is of the greatest importance to recognize this quality of the Determinations of Reflection which have been considered here, that their truth consists only in their relation to each other, and therefore in the fact that each contains the other in its own concept. This must be understood and remembered, for without this understanding not a step can really be taken in philosophy.[116]

The Contrast in the Meaning of Reflection in the Dialectics of Kierkegaard and Hegel

There can be no doubt that in Hegel the mediation of polarities is the function of a specific activity of reflection. Mediation is effected by the reflective "bending back" and "bending back again". But this reflective activity does not allow for incommensurability. On the contrary, reflection discloses conceptual immanence and mutual dialectical commensurability. "Each contains the other in its own concept." To declare that every concept contains its other implies the simultaneous double movement of reflection. The other, as other, is what the concept is not. This is the reflective distance of "bending back from". But since every concept is its other and cannot be without it, that other is always in an essential constituting relationship to it. This is the reflection of "bending back again". Every reflective distancing is at once a reflective return. This simultaneous double movement of reflection expresses the mediation of all polarities. The activity of reflection is at the heart of Hegel's self-moving dialectic of mediation.

Kierkegaard's emphatic opposition to the dialectic of mediation is an implicit rejection of the function of reflection which is essential to dialectical mediation. The Danish thinker is nevertheless a dialectician expressing the relationship of polarities. The qualitative dialectic affirms the fundamental irreducibility of the poles -- incommensurable polarity. Thus there is a new meaning of reflection in the qualitative dialectic. Reflection does not mediate polarities but rather expresses their contradictoriness. Reflection, at first, is the dichotomizing activity of "bending back from" which expresses the incommensurability, the qualitative distance of difference between the opposing terms. Reflection as "bending back again" signifies the relationship between the incommensurables emerging in the first reflection. Since the reflective

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relationship is between incommensurables, the qualitative dialectic is a dialectic of collision. Again, it must be emphasized that the colliding reflective relationship is produced not by an objective self-movement which is generated by the immanence of opposites, but by the self-moving passion of subjectivity.

It is clear now that Kierkegaard's opposition to a notion of consciousness as the mediated identity of subject and object, such as that illustrated in Hegel's Phenomenology, is implicitly an opposition to a specific meaning of reflection. For Hegel, consciousness is fully constituted when subjectivity and objectivity are united as dual terms of a single relationship which he calls reflection.[117] The mediation of subjectivity and objectivity in the formation of consciousness is one aspect of the all-inclusive activity of reflection in Hegel's dialectic. The qualitative dialectic, on the other hand, reflectively evokes the incommensurability of subject and object and requires the further movement of passion for their reflective relation in a fully constituted consciousness. Kierkegaard's opposition to the Hegelian notion of reflective activity provides a contrast that distinguishes and highlights the meaning of reflection in Kierkegaard's description of consciousness. Within the qualitative dialectic of subject and object, this differentiated meaning of reflection can be employed to describe the several postures of consciousness which fall under Kierkegaard's scrutiny.

The act of faith determines a specific posture of consciousness. As such, it can also be described in terms of the reflection of subjectivity and objectivity in the qualitative dialectic. Indeed one of the definitions of faith to be considered is explained by Kierkegaard in just these terms. "The absurd is precisely by its objective repulsion the measure of the intensity of faith in inwardness."[118] Another of our definitions explicitly uses the term, "reflection". -- "Faith is immediateness after reflection." Finally, Anti-Climacus'

definition expresses the relationship between the self -- understood as the dialectical tension of itself and its other -- and the "Power" as the absolutely other. Our thesis is not only that each of the definitions of faith can be articulated through the reflectivity of subjectivity-objectivity, self-other, in reflection's wider reference to Kierkegaard's dialectic of incommensurables, but also that the relationships between the definitions can be understood in just this framework.

Our first definition of faith -- "absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness" -- is offered by the pseudonymous Johannes Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript. Climacus is admittedly not a Christian.[119] He stands outside Christianity and describes the Christian requirement. As a nonbeliever, he is stationed at a distance of uncommitment from that which he investigates. Not having appropriated the requisites for being a Christian, his definition of faith is objectively oriented. The faith "object" is described as the absurd -- an objective contradiction. Climacus' position of disengagement from the objectively exhibited contradiction is similar to the posture of the ironist that Kierkegaard describes in The Concept of Irony. The ironic consciousness also remains aloof from, and indifferent to the contradictions it objectively proposes. A special movement of reflection that reveals subjectivity as incommensurable with objective contradictions is achieved by irony. Moreover the objective contradictions are discovered by a process of objective thought. The reflection of ironic subjectivity therefore locates the status of objective thought relative to subjectivity. This relation of the activity of thought, whose task is the discovery of objective contradictions, to the reflection of subjectivity is essential for an understanding of the Climacean formula. An analysis of ironic reflection will prepare the ground for a thorough understanding of this definition of faith.

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CHAPTER II

REFLECTION AND SUBJECTIVITY: IRONY

Irony: A Central Component in Kierkegaard's Polemic with the Reflective Mediation of Reason

Kierkegaard's frequent attacks on the principle of mediation stem from his conviction that this principle sublates faith and relegates it to an imperfect form of knowledge. If subjectivity is concretely constituted only when it is reflectively mediated with its other, the discontinuity between the self and its other is removed. Thus consciousness is commensurable with its object. The dissolution of incommensurability affects not only the relation between the self and finite other but also the dialectic of self and absolutely other. Hegel does in fact mediate consciousness with the absolute. Through this reflective mediation, consciousness has an inherent affinity for the absolute. Faith, then, becomes an imperfect form of relation to the absolute because its consciousness has not yet reached the vision of its full reflective commensurability with the absolute. Kierkegaard, in order to preserve the discontinuity between the self and the absolute, attempts to prevent the mediation of subjectivity with its finite other. If he can endow subjectivity with validity when it is in collision with its finite other in the "lower" dialectic, he will have released consciousness from the inevitability of reflective mediation with the absolute in the "higher" dialectic. In this case, faith need not be an imperfect form of relation to the absolute but rather the only possible form of such relation.

Success in awarding subjectivity its own validity when it is disengaged

from its other emphatically breaks the dialectical mediation of Reason wherein subjectivity is concretely reflected in objectivity. Kierkegaard's subsequent task is the full articulation of a dialectic of collision where subjectivity is constituted in reflecting an other that remains unmediated.

Kierkegaard's Magister's dissertation, The Concept of Irony, is a subtle attempt to free consciousness from mediation in the lower dialectic in order to release subjectivity for entrance into reflected collision with the absolutely other in a higher dialectic. He finds that the subjectivity arising out of ironic reflection -- which, in his view, is a form of sceptical reflection -- is a suitable point of departure for his task.

The historical figure whom Kierkegaard considers to be the embodiment of irony is Socrates. His dissertation on irony is a constant reference to Socrates and Socratic irony. However Hegel himself had earlier written an interpretation of the Socratic figure. His exposition is conditioned by his own all-encompassing dialectic of mediation. Socrates, too, becomes sublated in the reflection of mediation. Kierkegaard, in order to break the mediating dialectic through the reflected subjectivity of irony and scepticism must come to grips with both Hegel's exegesis of Socrates and Hegel's meaning of scepticism. Hegel treats the figure of Socrates and the sceptical consciousness in his Lectures on the History of Philosophy from which Kierkegaard quotes extensively in his dissertation. An understanding of Hegel's interpretation of scepticism is required to discern the way in which Kierkegaard differentiates the ironic reflection from that of Hegel.

Hegel's Notion of Scepticism

The Range of Scepticism's Nihilating Activity

Hegel offers a concise description of Scepticism. "Sceptical self-consciousness thus discovers, in the flux and alteration of all that would stand

in its presence, its own freedom, as given by and received from its own self. It is aware of being this ataraxy of self-thinking thought, the unalterable and authentic certainty of self."[1]

Hegel interprets historical scepticism as negative in its nihilating of "all that would stand secure in its presence." The "secure" refers to anything which has the character of permanence. That which is self-validating or which has its justification in itself has the quality of permanence. The "secure" possesses the attribute of the determinate in counterdistinction to the indeterminate. Scepticism's nihilating activity is the de-struction of fixed, determinate structures.[2]

The sceptical consciousness deliberately announced the "flux and alteration of all that would stand secure in its presence." Flux and alteration are expressions for the fickleness of the phenomenon. Scepticism points out the transience and contradictoriness of all that is purported to have permanence, to show the evanescence of all that is said to possess fixity of essence, to replace Being with phenomenon and then to triumph over the phenomenon. "Scepticism completed the subjectivity of all knowledge by the fact that in knowledge it universally substituted for Being the expression appearance."[3] The sceptical consciousness replaces Being, or what is, with ever vanishing appearance, that is with non-being.

For Hegel, "all that would stand secure" in the presence of the sceptical consciousness is equivalent to world. He enumerates the elements constituting the world that the sceptic negates, thus effecting "the disappearance of all that is objective, all that is held to be true, existent or universal, all that is definite, all that is affirmative."[4] Any articulation of human experience deriving from the objective side of such experience is negated by the sceptic. Hegel, measuring scepticism from his own model, views the function of scepticism as negating the objective consciousness which includes the sensing, perceiving and understanding consciousnesses. Its nihilating activity runs from the

sensuous to the notional.[5] All that is affirmed to be existent, true, to have universality of application and justification within this objective phase of self-consciousness, is annulled by the sceptic. The sceptic voids the world considered exactly in this sense. It is this nihilation, constitutive of the sceptical consciousness, that effects the withdrawal from the world. This is the objective side of the sceptical epochē.

The Subjectivity of Scepticism

The negative activity of scepticism, although directed at the world, is nonetheless an expression for subjectivity. Scepticism "not only has comprehended thought and outside of it a universe in its entirety, but the result positively expressed is that self-consciousness is reality."[6] The negating function of scepticism does not leave a total vacuum without residue. On the contrary, it makes the positive statement that the self is not so caught up in the world as to be indistinguishable from it. The negating of the world differentiates the self from the world, the self from its other. "Scepticism makes its end the doing away with the unconscious servitude in which the natural self-consciousness is confined, the returning into its simplicity."[7] "Unconscious servitude" is an expression for being totally and undialectically caught up in and fused with the world. The "returning into its simplicity" is the mark of a movement of the self into itself which makes up the subjective pole of the dialectic of scepticism.

The subjectivity that emerges in scepticism cannot be defined. That is, it cannot be expressed in terms that deliver a positive intelligible content. The sceptic's negation of all positive, determinate content precludes a definition in such terms. However, sceptical subjectivity can be described in terms that elude positive determinations. A proper term for depicting a subjectivity that arises in the destruction of all objective content is, "vacuous." Sceptical

subjectivity, untenanted by positive cargo, is empty or vacuous. The subjectivity of the sceptic can also be adequately described as independent, free, absolute and individual.

With the objective destruction of world, the self of the sceptic is independent. Since its other is objectively negated, the self owes its self-possession to nothing other than itself. Consequently the self is not dependent on an other and this is exactly the expression for independence. In this sense, the subjectivity of scepticism is free. It discovers "its own freedom, as given by and received from its own self." That which is at once self-given and self-received is again undetermined by another; it is causa sui. Moreover the undetermined is unconditioned which is an essential mark of absoluteness. Sceptical subjectivity is properly described as vacuous, free, independent and absolute. It can also be characterized as individual.

Due to its activity of negating all otherness the sceptic's withdrawal from the world in a return to self is a return in individuality.[8] The sceptic negates the truth of the objective. As objective, truth is sharable, communicable and therefore has the character of universality. In this nihilation of universality, the sceptic achieves and rests in individuality. "Scepticism is, in fact such paralysis -- an incapacity for truth which can only reach certainty of self, and not of the universal, remaining merely in the negative, and in individual self-consciousness."[9]

The Certainty of Scepticism

The return of the self to itself in difference from a world which is objectively negated or with indifference to a world which has been negated, this reversion is an expression for the self-possession of self. It is this self-identity which constitutes "the ataraxy of self-thinking thought" and delivers the "unalterable and authentic certainty of self."

The sceptical withdrawal from the world does not characterize the sceptical consciousness as doubtful. For Hegel, it is only an emasculated, modern scepticism which is suffused with doubt.[10] The meaning Hegel gives to doubt here is "uncertainty, irresolution, indecision, the thought which is opposed to something held to be valid. Doubt proceeds from the fact of there being two; it passes to and fro between two or more points of view, so that we neither rest at one nor the other."[11] Doubt, in this sense, does not belong to the sceptical consciousness. "According to this, the function of scepticism is wrongly termed the inculcation of proneness to doubt."[12]

The sceptic is certain, resolute and decisive. A difficulty that arises here is the precise nature of the sceptic's certainty. The possibilities appear to be reducible to two: the sceptic is either subjectively certain or objectively certain. Certainty is subjective when it is grounded in subjectivity; it is objective when it is anchored in a principle that has its validity in itself independently of subjectivity. Hegel's exegesis of scepticism stresses the subjectivity of its certainty. However, his critique of scepticism appears to be weighted toward its objective certainty.

Hegel considers two points in his portrayal of the sceptical consciousness that indicate the subjectivity of scepticism's certainty. One point claims that the sceptic's certainty is a self-certainty while the other affirms that the sceptic's objective assertions do not terminate in an objective result.

In the exegesis, the certainty of the sceptic is a subjective determination. This certainty is constituted in the self's transparency to itself in difference or disengagement from the world or the other. The return of the self to itself, besides a distancing from the other, is an expression for the self-possession of the self. It is this self-identity which provides the "unalterable and authentic certainty of self." Self-possession attains a subjective certainty

which, unlike doubt, has the quality of "rest and security."[13] "This is the standpoint of the imperturbability of Scepticism."[14] It is the sceptical "immovability and security of mind, this imperturbability in itself."[15] Self-clarification in the return to self furnishes the "ataraxy of self thinking thought" which establishes self-certainty in opposition to objectivity.

A second outstanding indication of the subjectivity of sceptical certainty is revealed by Hegel's statements that the sceptic does not arrive at an objective result nor do the sceptic's assertions express objectively grounded truths. "Scepticism", he affirms, "deduces no result nor does it express its negation as anything positive."[16] The propositions stated by the sceptic to nihilate the objectivity of dogmatism are not themselves objectively grounded. The sceptic's declarations of negation are self-cancelling. Hegel correctly understands Sextus Empiricus' explanations of sceptical propositions when the former claims "that the proposition, everything is false, asserts that itself as well as the others is false."[17] The sceptic's propositions are self-negating, and so one cannot say he adheres in his assertions, to an objective, terminating ground. Since objective certainty demands a terminating ground that secures the in-itself truth, the sceptic's certainty cannot be objective and must be subjective.

When Hegel moves from an analysis to a critique of scepticism, his interpretation of the character of its certainty inclines to shift toward the objective side. This emphasis arises when Hegel, from the perspective of his own mediating dialectic, views scepticism and dogmatism as unmediated and conflicting determinatenesses. The determinateness of scepticism implies that its thought activity is terminated in an objective result. Hegel is clear in this matter. "The sceptics remain at the result as negative saying, 'this and this has an internal contradiction, it thus disintegrates itself, and consequently does not exist.' But this result as merely negative is itself again a one-sided determinateness."[18] The implication here is that the objective activity of

scepticism, however negative, is objectively terminated. Indeed the passage suggests the objective principle grounding sceptical assertions. If contradiction cannot be entertained but must be discarded, adherence to the principle of non-contradiction is implied. The self-evidency of this principle is its validity in-itself which implies an independence from subjectivity. The principle is objective. It objectively terminates, grounds and secures the sceptic's assertions, and accounts for sceptical certainty. Here sceptical certainty appears to be objective. Kierkegaard, in his discussion of irony, will take issue with this interpretation of sceptical certainty.

The Activity and Character of Thought in Scepticism

The fact that the posture of scepticism is generated by subjectivity itself does not imply that scepticism has nothing at all to do with objectivity and objective forms of thought. An indifference of bare neutrality is not implied by the sceptical withdrawal from the world. Its insouciance is aggressive when its subjective ataraxy is objectively defended. "Scepticism on its side corresponds . . . to the negative attitude toward otherness."[19] There is a need to leave no one objective truth standing because a single unassailable objective truth suffices -- from the side of objectivity -- to uproot the objective side of the posture. Consequently its apologetic takes on the character of universality. "As conscious, it must prove, as universal it must extend the untruth of the objective to everything."[20] The sceptical consciousness does not, in unconcerned indifference, turn its back on the world but rather "with consciousness accounts for the nullity of that which is asserted to be reality."[21] The activity of sceptical thought is negative and aggressive because its task is universal negation. The destructive activity of scepticism is "an elaborately thought out annihilation of everything."[22]

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The sceptic attempts to nihilate objectivity, but his thought processes are just as objective as those of the dogmatist. The proofs that the sceptic proposes for the untruth of objectivity are themselves objective. His demonstrations are sharable and communicable; they can be regarded, looked upon, analyzed. They too can "stand in the presence" of the sceptical consciousness although not as truth.[23] In his polemic with dogmatism, the sceptic meets his foe on the common ground of objective thought.

The subjective indifference that is peculiar to the sceptic has its objective side. This objective facet of scepticism is comprised in a painstaking enterprise which, manipulating determinate forms of objective thought, demonstrates that "each reason is confronted by another which holds equally good."[24] Since an antithesis can be juxtaposed to every thesis, consciousness is allowed the self-justification of the suspension of objective judgment.

Hegel applauds the vigorous, intellectual negativity of ancient scepticism and awards it the "honor of having obtained this knowledge of the negative, and having so definitely thought out the forms of negativity."[25] He sees scepticism as meeting the objective dogmatist on his own determinate ground and objectively demonstrating the untruth of determinate objectivity.

The Reflection of Scepticism

Reflection in its "root" sense "bends back". Such reflection implies a double movement: a bending back <u>from</u> which is simultaneously a movement <u>toward</u>. The movement away is expressed by the objective negation of the world; this is the opposing or colliding phase of the dialectic. Simultaneous with the opposing movement occurs the movement toward the self, the self returning to itself, the self finding itself -- self-consciousness. The sceptical reflection is a bending back of the self upon itself which is manifested in the opposition of negating the world. "With the reflexion of self-consciousness into the simple,

pure thought of itself, independent existence or permanent determinateness has, in contrast to that reflection, dropped as a matter of fact out of the infinitude of thought."[26]

The double movement of reflection produces a contradiction whose terms are subjectivity and objectivity. The distinction between self and other is revealed by the movement of reflection. A peculiarity of sceptical reflection is that no sooner is the subject-object polarity revealed than one of the poles, objectivity, is negated. Sceptical reflection discloses the contradiction between subjectivity and objectivity and rests in subjectivity while nihilating objectivity.

A reflection which not only discerns the duality of subjectivity and objectivity but also struggles to annul the latter, underlines the profound opposition between these two terms. The mediation of the polarities that emerge in reflection is thus disallowed by sceptical reflection. Once subjectivity is reflected from objectivity it is not reflected again in and through its other. On the contrary, the subjectivity produced by the reflection that nihilates objectivity is found over against the other.

The opposition between self and other effected by sceptical reflection can be expressed as incommensurability. It is clear that a subjectivity reflected from the other in the denial of that other is not so caught up in the world that it is exhausted by it and indistinguishable from it. On the contrary, the opposition manifested in sceptical negation implies that subjectivity is discontinuous with the world, transcends it and is not measurable by it. With regard to the world, the objective, the other, sceptical reflection reveals a subjectivity that is incommensurable.

Incommensurability is an expression for the freedom of scepticism. The sceptic's freedom is not mediately reflected; that is, his freedom is not had

in and through the other. A freedom whose positive content reflects the other is disallowed by the discontinuity of incommensurability effected by sceptical reflection. Sceptical freedom is negative freedom.

The sceptic's reflection is, according to Hegel's distinction, external and abstract. It is external because the subjectivity revealed by it is not mediated by objectivity. Objectivity is not envisioned as a positive moment in the constitution of subjectivity. The collision, incommensurability and negative freedom effected in sceptical reflection is witness to the fact that subjectivity has been endowed with a viability of its own and stands outside objectivity. Its reflection is therefore external. For the same reason, it is abstract. In Hegel, that which is external is not mediated and is therefore abstracted (ab-trahere) or unwarrantedly drawn out of the dialectic of mediation.

The Relation of Scepticism to the Hegelian Absolute

Hegel attempts to survey the entire history of Philosophy, not to exhibit that which is to be repudiated, but to demonstrate that various philosophical developments are truncated phases which culminate in his own system. His discussion of the unexplicitized, inherent consciousness of the absolute within the sceptical enterprise is conditioned by this systematic perspective. It is precisely his own meaning of "absolute Notion" which he brings to bear in the statement: "Against the Notion as Notion, i.e., against the absolute Notion, Scepticism does not in any way proceed; the absolute Notion is rather its weapon of defence, though Scepticism has no consciousness of this."[27] Hegel views scepticism's defensive activity as an indication of the presence of a trammeled consciousness of the Hegelian absolute Notion. The "absoluteness" of this Notion indicates that it is not simply an in-itself determinate but has the dialectical character of the in-and-for-itself. It is consciousness of this, submerged and peripheral, to which Hegel allots the effectiveness of the sceptical polemic

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with dogmatism. Nonetheless, because the absolute notion is not explicitated, the sceptical result becomes as determinate and one-sided as the dogmatism which is its target. Hegel explains at some length:

> The finitude of all conceptions of truth can be shown, for they contain in themselves a negation, and consequently a contradiction. The ordinary universal and infinite is not exalted over this, for the universal which confronts the particular, the indeterminate which opposes the determinate, the infinite which confronts the finite, each form only the one side, and, as such, are only a determinate. Scepticism is similarly directed against the thought of the ordinary understanding which makes determinate difference to appear ultimate and existent. But the logical Notion is itself this dialectic of Scepticism, for this negativity which is characteristic of Scepticism likewise belongs to the true knowledge of the Idea. The only difference is that the sceptics remain at the result as negative saying, "This and this has an internal contradiction, it thus disintegrates itself, and consequently does not exist." But this result as merely negative is itself again a one-sided determinateness.[28]

The "universal", the "indeterminate", the "infinite", indeed the absolute itself are made determinate and consequently finitized by the "ordinary understanding". It is consciousness of this which gives scepticism its polemical elasticity and betrays a notion of the absolute which is not so finitized and which is submerged within its consciousness; that is, scepticism's polemical activity acquires resiliency in the consciousness that the determinate cannot be an in-itself absolute. This truth is precisely the truth of Hegel's absolute which reflectively mediates the indeterminate with the determinate and cannot be simply reduced to the latter. Yet since the sceptic remains in the negative and does not recognize this negative as the necessary dialectical side of the positive, he arrives not at the in-and-for-itself absolute prescribed by Hegel but at another determinateness. The sceptic thereby does not arrive at absolute truth but rather at the universality of untruth.

Although implicitly armed with the Hegelian absolute, the sceptic remains in the negative, and becomes as determinate as the positivism of the dogmatist. Again it is evident that the sceptic, from Hegel's perspective, performs a

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reflectivity which is external. His reflection is external because it remains in the negative, and thus becomes determinate and "one-sided". He does not see the negative as a dialectical constitutive of the positive any more than dogmatism sees the positive as dialectically constitutive of the negative. Neither scepticism nor dogmatism performs the internal, mediating reflection which Hegel requires for authenticity.

Kierkegaard's Concept of Irony

As early as 1840, Søren Kierkegaard attempts to revitalize a type of sceptical reflection that will not simply serve the Hegelian purpose of polarizing the positivism of the dogmatist, as though it were a preparatory stage for Hegel's mediating synthesis, but will constitute a point of departure from the entire Hegelian system.[29] Kierkegaard's Magister's dissertation, formally entitled, The Concept of Irony with Constant Reference to Socrates, envisages irony as a form of scepticism and deals with it essentially in terms of Hegel's discussion of scepticism.[30]

> I have often remarked in the foregoing that irony is a determination of personality. It has the movement of turning back into itself which is characteristic of personality, of seeking back into itself, terminating in itself -- except that in this movement irony returns empty-handed. Its relation to the world is not such that this relation is a moment in the content of personality. Its relation to the world is never at any moment to be in relation to the world, its relation is such that at the moment this is about to commence, it draws itself back with a sceptical closedness (ἐποχή). But this reserve is the reflex of personality into itself that is clearly abstract and void of content. The ironical personality is therefore merely the outline of a personality. Hence one sees that there is an absolute dissimilarity between Socrates and Christ; for in Christ dwelt the immediate fullness of the godhead, and this relation to the world is an absolutely real relationship, so that the Church is conscious of itself as the members of his body.[31]

It is clear that the sceptical posture described by Hegel is similar to the ironic consciousness portrayed here by Kierkegaard. For him, not only irony but also humor and poetry have their scepticism.[32] Scepticism is a broad category which embraces several postures which consciousness can take; more

precisely, out of the reflectivity of scepticism, there emerges a subjectivity which can be further qualified in various ways. In this passage, Kierkegaard is concerned with the reflection which constitutes the self as ironic and briefly compares it to the constitution of the self as Christian.

The Range of Irony's Nihilating Activity

Irony, resembling scepticism, negates all that would stand in its presence claiming fixity of essence. Essence is an expression for the substantiality of being, the permanence of that which is.[33] Appearance or phenomenon is not essence;[34] it has no substantiality and no permanence. Phenomenon is flux, ever evanescent and so never really is. If phenomenon is not, it is nothing. Irony transforms essence into phenomenon and triumphs over phenomenon.[35] It thereby reduces being to non-being. Thus irony exhibits the nothingness of all being.

Irony is infinite. It "is infinite because it negates not this or that phenomenon",[36] but every phenomenon and the phenomenon in general. Irony's negativity is aimed at all existence. Irony "directs itself against the whole of existence."[37] The scope of irony's negating activity includes a world that presents itself as having its own validity in itself and thereby possessing its own viability. Like scepticism, irony also produces the epochē.

The Subjectivity of Irony

The ironic destruction of the world does not leave total devastation. Irony is negative in that it is a nihilation of the world but that negation is simultaneously a bending back of the self upon itself. The negation of the world announces the birth of subjectivity as distinct from the world. Similar to scepticism, "irony is the incitement to subjectivity."[38] "Irony is the being-for-itself of subjectivity."[39]

The negative function of irony indicates that its subjectivity is not

constituted by a world which is a "moment in the content of personality." Therefore the ironic subjectivity lacks content and is without concreteness. Since the reflection of the self into itself is expressed by opposition to the world,[40] the ironic self is characterized as vacuous. Its vacuity is also its absoluteness.

The ironic consciousness "is absolute because it negates by virtue of a higher which is not."[41] The absolute, by means of which the ironist negates, is precisely nothingness. "The absolute is nothingness,"[42] and delivers up a subjectivity which, in nihilating its other, is itself unopposed, or, in being opposed by nothingness which is the objective absolute for the ironist, subjectivity emerges as undetermined, unconditioned, that is, as itself absolute.

Kierkegaard's discussion of the absolute nothingness of the ironist which is effected through the reflecting back upon self in the nihilation of the actual, is generally treated together with his discussion of the condemnation to death of Socrates. His thesis is that Socratic irony is heightened when the possibility of death becomes imminent because in death the nothingness which is attuned to the ironic consciousness becomes absolute. "Such a soul slumber and such a nothingness must especially recommend themselves to the ironist, for he here has the absolute in opposition to the relativity of life, yet in a form so light that he cannot possibly strain himself on it, since he has it in the form of nothingness."[43]

The absolute as the unconditioned is an expression for the freedom of irony. "The actuality which shall give him content is not, hence he is free from the restraint in which given actuality binds him."[44] In the absence of an actuality which has lost its validity[45] as an absolute, irony realizes "that subjectivity determines itself."[46] But "the infinitely exuberant freedom of subjectivity"[47] indicated by self-determination is fundamentally negative. The discovery of self-determination in the invalidity of positive, objective

absolutes is basically a freedom from objectivity. Ironic freedom is ataraxy with an objective epochē.

Negative freedom is an equivalent expression for ironic independence. Such independence is also negative. It is the ironist's "independence of everything."[48]

The reflection of opposition which constitutes the ironic self as vacuous, absolute, free and independent also qualifies it as inwardness. Inwardness is an expression for the self reflecting upon self without incorporating the "external" actuality as a moment in self-reflection, self-constitution. Kierkegaard states this qualification clearly. "The standpoint of Socrates is subjectivity, inwardness reflecting upon itself, and in relation to itself loosens and dissolves the existent in a surge of thought that swells up over it and washes it away before itself sinking into thought once more."[49]

Another expression for the inwardness attained through the reflection upon self in opposition to world is individuality. As early as the Magister's dissertation the "single one" is too precious to Kierkegaard to be allowed to be abrogated within the system of Hegel. That Kierkegaard sees the reflectivity of irony as developing an inwardness which is to be qualified as individual or singular is clear. He explicitly states that "there is no necessity whatever to conceive a Sophist in the singular, since the Sophist comes under the concept of species, genus, etc., whereas the ironist is always singular and comes under the determination of personality."[50] The Sophist always grasps at what is before him, that is, he reflects himself out of himself into the world, empties subjectivity into objectivity in a linear fashion; the ironist, to the contrary, directs himself back into himself at every moment, "and such an act with its consequent backword current is a determination of personality."[51] The characteristics of the subjectivity revealed by the ironic reflection,

namely, vacuous, absolute, free, independent, inward and individual are similar to the attributes of sceptical subjectivity imputed by Hegel.

The Certainty of Irony

The ironic and doubtful consciousness are not similar because irony does not doubt. Doubt is the seeking of the essential truth behind every phenomenon while irony exhibits the lack of truth, the nullity of essence, the nothingness of all phenomena. They are opposite movements.

> With doubt the subject constantly seeks to penetrate the object, and his misfortune consists in the fact that the object constantly eludes him. With irony, on the other hand, the subject is always seeking to get outside the object, and this he attains by becoming conscious at every moment that the object has no reality. With doubt the subject is witness to a war of conquest in which every phenomenon is destroyed, because the essence always resides behind the phenomenon. But with irony the subject constantly retires from the field and proceeds to talk every phenomenon out of its reality in order to save himself, that is, in order to preserve himself in his negative independence of everything.[52]

The ironist does not pursue an ever-retreating essence and so he does not doubt. Certitude is one of irony's basic ingredients. A problem whose resolution will become crucial for the understanding of the definitions of faith offered by Kierkegaard's Climacus is whether or not the certainty attained by the ironist is in any way objective. Is the ironist objectively certain of the untruth of objectivity? Kierkegaard does not directly take up that question in his dissertation. However he throws some light on the difficulty when he contends that the result of irony is not objective but subjective. "The irony lies in the fact that one arrives at an actual result, but this actual result is wholly personal and as such indifferent to the Idea."[53] "The individual draws these exertions of subjectivity back into himself, terminates them in himself in personal satisfaction. Such is the standpoint of irony."[54] The objective activity of irony does not terminate in an objective ground; it is rooted in subjectivity. Here Kierkegaard takes issue with one element

in Hegel's interpretation of scepticism.

Hegel contends that "the sceptics remain at the result as negative saying, 'This and this has an internal contradiction, it thus disintegrates itself, and consequently does not exist.' But this result as merely negative is itself again a one-sided determinateness."[55] Although Hegel's analysis of scepticism generally stresses the absoluteness of sceptical subjectivity, this text claims that scepticism attains objective certainty of untruth as a negative result. It appears to impute sceptical adherence to the principle of non-contradiction in so far as the demonstration of contradictory theses demands their rejection. But to assent to the principle of non-contradiction is to endorse an objective ground which delivers objective certainty. The objective certainty then takes on the character of an objective termination or objective result.

Hegel maintains that this result of scepticism is as determinate as that of positivism. From the perspective of his own system, both determinations are overcome in the reflective mediation of the principle of contradiction.

Kierkegaard insists that irony terminates in subjectivity. The inference is that the objective activity of irony does not terminate objectively. This further suggests that irony has no objective ground and therefore no objective certainty -- not even of the untruth of objectivity.[56] The ironist neither doubts nor claims objective certainty. His certainty is subjective.

The negative arguments proposed by the ironist do not of themselves generate his self-clarification, his subjective certainty. His systematic, objective annihilation of all objectivity does not necessarily precede and coerce the birth of subjective transparency. On the contrary, subjective certainty is, like subjectivity itself, sui generis. The self in reflecting itself from the world by itself becomes transparent to itself as distinct

from the world and this lucidity, this self-possession is the expression for its subjective certainty.

Irony and Kierkegaard's Early Break with Hegel

Hegel places scepticism in opposition to dogmatism with the intent of resolving their resistant positions by systematically reflecting them into the dialectic of mediation. In his dissertation, Kierkegaard subtly ascribes certain characteristics to the Hegelian system which serve to polarize that irony. Individuality, inwardness and ignorance are qualities of irony that the young Kierkegaard pits against the Hegelian systematic.

Individuality and Struggle

In the dissertation, Kierkegaard attempts to bestow upon irony and the individuality proper to it an authentic status which he feels it does not enjoy in Hegel's systematic interpretation.

> In general, one is accustomed to finding irony conceived ideally, assigned its place as a vanishing moment in the system and for this reason described very briefly. Accordingly, it is not easy to conceive how an entire life may be spent in this, especially when the content of this life must be regarded as nothingness. But one forgets that a standpoint is never so ideal in life as it is in the system. We forget that irony like every other standpoint in life, also has its tribulations, conflicts, defeats, and triumphs. . . . This is the wholly personal life with which speculative philosophy has nothing to do, though a little more exact knowledge of this life would free it from the tautological idem per idem from which many conceptions suffer. Be this as it may, let speculative philosophy be justified in ignoring such things, yet he who wishes to conceive the individual life cannot.[57]

This statement conveys an explicit discontent of Kierkegaard with the Hegelian systematic and represents an early overt break with the Hegelianism to which he apparently adheres in the Magister's thesis.[58] In this passage, the terms that are polarized are "individual life" or individuality on the one side and on the other, ideality and speculation. The ideal and "speculative

philosophy" are related in as much as speculative philosophy is confined to the ideal. Speculative philosophy with its ideality is not capable of expressing individuality; the latter is lost in the idealism of speculative philosophy.

The opposite of individuality is universality and the ideality of speculative philosophy is expressive of universality. Individuality is incommensurable with speculative philosophy and its universalizing idea.

For the ironic consciousness, individuality is constitutive of its subjectivity. Since ideality and universality polarize individuality, they also polarize irony's subjectivity. Because objectivity is the opposite of subjectivity, it follows that the universality of the idea falls to the objective side. Speculative philosophy deals with the universal idea and is objective. Therefore it is incapable of grasping subjectivity which is constituted in individuality.

The opposing terms and their derivatives become clear. Individuality as subjectivity opposes the objective, universal idea of speculative philosophy.

It is obvious that the "speculative philosophy" referred to in the passage is Hegelianism. It is also clear that Kierkegaard is not only departing from, but also opposing Hegel's systematic interpretation of irony. The Dane suggests that irony can only be handled in the "dialectic of life"[59] wherein it will perhaps be shown to have its own viability rather than being relegated "its place as a vanishing moment in the system." Hegelian speculation is an objectification through the universal idea whereas irony is an "incitement to subjectivity" precisely as individuality.

The attempt by Kierkegaard to give irony a life of its own in the face of Hegel's synthesizing approach to the negativity of irony has important significance on the transition in the meaning of reflection from the Kierkegaard who appears to be a young Hegelian to the Kierkegaard who in

the dissertation begins to come into his own.

When Kierkegaard speaks of "reflective individuality," he is shifting the center of the problematic away from the Hegelian context of universal, objective reflection and subtly but emphatically placing it in a context which will provide a new point of departure that is most congenial to his emerging religious life view, namely individuality itself. Kierkegaard is becoming convinced that the Hegelian view of reality is, in the final analysis, similar to that of Goethe and the Romantics in that all understand nature, the soul and history as the visible representation of the "Idea," as essence in its phenomenal manifestation[60] and in so doing assert the primacy of a universal reflection that gives preponderance to the species over the individual.[61] Kierkegaard begins to view the Hegelian position as the objectification of subjectivity together with subjectivity's fundamental character of individuality. He commences to envision it as an emptying out of subjectivity into an objectivity which is specifically expressed in the universal reflection that is a bending back or an objective referability of manifestation to "Idea," of phenomenon to essence. It is the Idealistic and Romantic reflectiveness which views reality as the visible unity of finite and infinite[62] and it is this result which generates the Kierkegaardian polemic.

For Kierkegaard, individuality becomes the necessary polemical stand to take against universality which is, to his mind, destructive of individuality; likewise, self-reflection or the reflectivity that delivers subjectivity becomes the necessary pole to universal reflection or the reflection that objectivizes. It is not difficult to see why Kierkegaard as a tactician employs an analysis of the ironic and sceptical consciousnesses to take the initiative away from the Hegelian, Romantic view of the world which is comprised in universal reflection. When the focus narrows to the ironic and sceptical consciousnesses,

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individuality as subjectivity emerges in the dialectical tension of opposition with the world, over against objectivity, rather than in the merging mediation of subjectivity with the world. The terms of the argument become not reflection as an objective consciousness which is witnessed to and embraced by the irrevocable unity of Idea and manifestation, essence and phenomenon, finitude and infinity. On the contrary, the terms of the problem now become reflection as self-reflection and self-reflection as involving a withdrawal from the world -- a withdrawal of indifference of opposition.[63]

That Kierkegaard has chosen the reflectivity of ironic individuality in the dialectic of life as a suitable weapon against Hegelianism and Romanticism becomes clear in the contrast he makes between reflective individuality and "beautiful individuality." Kierkegaard contends that while the "beautiful individuality" is characterized as a quietly mediated harmony betraying a consciousness of unity, reflective individuality is fundamentally the disquiet of struggle indicating opposition.

> For reflective individuality, on the other hand, every natural determination is a task, and through and out of the dialectic of life emerges the clarified individuality as the personality which at every moment triumphs and struggles still. Reflective individuality never attains the repose pervading beautiful individuality, since the latter is to a certain extent a product of nature containing the sensual within itself as a necessary moment. The harmonious unity of beautiful individuality is disturbed by irony, and to a certain extent it is distrubed by Socrates, destroyed in him at every moment, negated. It is here that the view of death discussed earlier becomes explicable. But above this destruction rises the ironic ataraxy (to recall an expression from Greek Scepticism) elevating itself even higher and higher.[64]

The beautiful individuality is placed by Kierkegaard in the category of "natural determination." Natural determination is a reflected immediacy or a mediated immediacy because the immediacy of the sensual is an expression of the Idea, reflects it, and constitutes a dialectical unity with it. The sensual is a "necessary moment," the manifesting face of the Idea as the

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latter alienatingly distances itself from itself in order to show itself in nature. For Hegel, the alienating moment is the necessary coordinate of the reconciling element within the total dialectic of the Idea. In terms of reflection, this means that the Idea in order to reflect itself in itself must show itself, must appear, and this appearance is nature. Consequently Kierkegaard's reference to the beautiful individuality as a "natural determination" within which there is no task, classifies it as an immediacy however much it is reflected according to the Hegelian dialectic. This again indicates Kierkegaard's departure from the Idealistic school.

The dialectical harmony of the beautiful which Kierkegaard describes in Hegelian terms is a reflected immediacy characterized by repose, and because every Hegelian immediacy is dialectically reflected into harmonious synthesis, the entire systematic of Hegel may be designated as the beautiful. But the beautiful is without struggle; it is "undisturbed".[65] On the other hand, task and struggle announce the collision of unmediated incommensurables which emerge in the ironic reflection within the dialectic of life. The dialectic of individual existence, a dialectic of reflected collision, is opposed to the dialectic of reflected mediation. Consequently the entire system of Hegel is outside the dialectic of life within which task is the distinguishing feature. Irony which is an individual's standpoint -- and indeed any posture of subjectivity in life -- in the dialectic of life, falls outside the competence of Hegel's reflectively mediating dialectic. Simply stated Kierkegaard is making one denial and one affirmation. He is subtly but emphatically denying that Hegel's reflectively mediating dialectic has anything to do with reflected individuality in life and, in this sense, he is charging Hegel with abstraction. He is affirming that the dialectic of individual life is a dialectic of collision announced by struggle and task.

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That Kierkegaard has at least an embryonic grasp of his existential dialectic as early as the Magister's dissertation is confirmed by the fact that he already gears the discussion of reflection toward the dialectic of life. His assertion that reflection is task is later repeated without essential change in The Concept of Dread and still later in Stages on Life's Way. A glance at the pertinent texts, suitably juxtaposed, adequately demonstrates the continuity of Kierkegaard's thinking on this matter, from the dissertation into his formal, pseudonymous authorship. Again the problem is set in terms of self-consciousness which is another expression for self-reflection and self-constitution.

> The most concrete content consciousness can have is consciousness of itself not the pure self-consciousness but the self-consciousness which is so concrete that no author -- not the most copious in his command of words, not the most consummate delineator of character -- has every been able to describe such a thing, although such a thing is what every man is. This self-consciousness is not contemplation; he who thinks that it is has not understood himself, for he sees that he himself is meanwhile in the process of becoming and so cannot be a finished product as the object of contemplation. This self-consciousness therefore is a deed, and this deed in turn is inwardness, and every time inwardness does not correspond to this consciousness, there is a form of the demoniacal as soon as the absence of inwardness expresses itself as dread of its acquisition.[66]

The Concept of Irony was completed in 1841 and there is no change in the description of reflection as deed or task from that time through 1844 when The Concept of Dread was completed. Stages on Life's Way which appeared a year later, 1845, contains a similar statement concerning reflection as task. The pseudonymous Judge William is the speaker and the context is appropriately stated by the title of the essay, "Observations about Marriage".

> In what direction then is reflection to move till it reaches the resolution? -- for within the holy-place of love and upon the consecrated ground of immediacy it dare not tread. The reflection turns toward the relationship of love to reality. That he is in love is for the lover the most certain thing of all, and no meddlesome thought, no broker, runs between love and a so-called ideal. This is a forbidden path. Nor does reflection inquire if he is to worry; he is not forgetful of Socrates. But to marry is to enter into a

> factual situation in relationship to a given reality: marriage is the most extraordinary concretion. This concretion constitutes the task of reflection.[67]

Task, struggle announce the emergence of individual subjectivity reflected in collision with its other. Such reflected individuality is characteristic of irony and polarizes Hegel's mediated reflectivity. Another feature of irony that disrupts the reflection of mediation is inwardness.

Inwardness

Kierkegaard's discussion of ironic inwardness takes place within his analysis of the consciousness of the external which he interprets to be the general consciousness of the "older Hellenism" and within which the ironic inwardness of Socrates would warrant condemnation. In this, Kierkegaard seems to align himself with Hegel's interpretation: "Thus because Socrates makes the truth rest on the judgment of inward consciousness he enters upon a struggle with the Athenian people as to what is right and true. His accusation was therefore just."[68] The "external" to which the Hellenic consciousness acquiesces is comprised by traditional, universal laws sanctioned by the gods, time-tested habits and customs and, in specific, contingent instances of importance to the individual and the state, by the oracle. Socrates does not consult the accepted oracle but has his own daimon.

Kierkegaard, reviewing the exegesis of Hegel on the Socratic daimon, seems to be in accord with Hegel[69] when the former writes: "This daimonic lies in the transition from the oracle's external relation to the individual to the full inwardness of freedom.[70] The daimon is not Socrates, that is, it is still external to him but unlike the externality of the oracle, which is common because accessible to all, the daimon is Socrates' personal advisor. Moreover the urgings of the daimon are only concerned with trivia, mere particularities. Thus the figure of Socrates is heavily weighted toward

inwardness and this generates the tension with the Hellenic consciousness which is exhausted in its external manifestation. In Hegel's purview, the movement of Socratic inwardness opposing Hellenic externality, is a necessary moment for the development of the contradiction which precedes ultimate mediation in the Hegelian absolute. From the vantage point of Hegel's dialectical model, Socratic inwardness is a preparation for, and thus implicitly related to, the mediated absolute. According to the German thinker, ironic inwardness, subjectivity as being-for-itself is not an authentic absolute. Inwardness, being-for-itself, has authenticity only in so far as it anticipates the mediated absolute, being-in-and-for-itself.[71]

Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel that the inwardness of irony must be transcended. But he does not agree that ironic inwardness is destined for mediation within absolute being-in-and-for-itself. On the contrary, Kierkegaard, in the dissertation, quietly shifts the entire Hegelian system to the side of externality. He refers to Hegel's philosophy as "Hegel's positive system".[72] Positivity is laden with content and externally manifested when contrasted with the internal vacuity of ironic subjectivity. When the entire system of Hegel has been relegated to the region of externality, Kierkegaard endows the internality of ironic inwardness with authenticity in reflecting itself from such externality. This function of ironic reflection is equivalently expressed as positing the negative relatedness between the external phenomenon and the internal essence.

The Hegelian mediating reflectivity of essence and phenomenon is expressed as: essence is phenomenon and phenomenon is essence -- the internal is the external and the external is the internal. The task of the ironic consciousness, or better, the task constitutive of ironic inwardness is to disturb this dialectically reflective harmony through the negation of the mutual reflectiveness of essence and phenomenon. For the ironist, "the phenomenon is not the essence but the opposite of essence",[73] the external is incommensurable with the internal.

Since the essence is that which is, its opposite, the phenomenon, is not or is nothingness. When the reflectivity of essence and phenomenon is broken, the external phenomenon, in losing its essentiality, becomes nothing and nothing remains. The positing of this nothingness by fracturing the mutual reflectivity of essence and phenomenon allows reflection to take another direction; that is, to bend back upon itself. The bending back upon self in the presence of nothingness or in the annihilation of all objective content is precisely the expression for inwardness. Irony disrupts the Hegelian mediation of internal and external and allows the being-for-itself of inwardness to emerge. In so far as ironic reflection disengages inwardness from the system, Kierkegaard awards it authenticity.

Ignorance and Deception

Ordinarily knowledge is considered to have positive, objective content and the transmission of knowledge is considered the communication of such content. In Kierkegaard's emerging view, Hegel's dialectical mediation of all opposites is a positive, objective articulation of all experience. Nothing resists dialectical mediation and articulation. For Kierkegaard, the sweeping, positive explication of all things leaving nothing opaque is equivalent to a total gnosticism. His religious concerns with their respect for mystery are offended by Hegel's attempt at full transparency.

Irony is essentially negative. It resists all forms of positive, objective content that would coerce its subjectivity and externalize its inwardness. The explications and communications of the ironist cannot fundamentally have the positive, objective characteristics of knowledge. On the contrary, they are the clever preservation of subjectivity through the explication and communication of nothing. The explication whose content is nothing is ignorance and the witting communication of nothing is deception. Kierkegaard polarizes

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the gnosticism of Hegel with the deception and ignorance of irony.

The ironistic subjectivity emerges as solipsistically individual and therefore as isolation[74] but this isolation is attained through an intersubjectivity which is negated.[75] For consciousness to arise as irony, it must have something upon which to work, something which it can annihilate, make into nothing. Irony "conceives nothingness continually in opposition to something."[76] Irony needs the external, that is, the world and other self-consciousnesses or the other in general, not in order to feast upon the other, not to assimilate it, but to make it into nothing. The ironist, though in the world in order to negate the world, is nonetheless essentially in the world.

From the perspective of its being in the world and in relation to a something other which is another self-consciousness, the ironist is essentially expressive. That is, from this side, the ironist is communicative whether through gesture, verbalized speech in its various forms and more specifically, through dialogue. As expressive, the ironist is manifestation, phenomenon. From its other side, this expression, this phenomenon is negative. Every word, gesture, dialogue by which the ironist communicates is, as expressive of the genuine ironic consciousness, destructive of the other and therefore without a definitive, objective content. If every expression is a communication and every ironistic communication is without positive content, then, with regard to the inter-subjective dimension, every communication of the ironist is fundamentally without communion considered as a sharing of the objective idea. Since the objective is the sharable and the sharable is basic to the communal, the nihilation of all positive content in ironistic expression renders communication a communication of nothingness. Ironistic communication is objectively non-communicative.

Every expression is a phenomenal manifestation, an appearance and, within the Hegelian dialectic of reflective mediation, an appearance of what

is, that is, essence. The ironistic expression is an appearance of what is not. For the ironist, "the phenomenon is not the essence but the opposite of essence."[77] For Hegel, appearance is what it is not, that is, appearance is reflected essence.[78] In irony, appearance or phenomenon is not what it is. The expression is not what it is. The "pressing out" is a "withdrawal from"; the phenomenon is not the essence. This is precisely an expression for deception and accounts for the appropriateness of the name, irony (eiron).

Cleverness sustains ironic subjectivity through objective ignorance. Ignorance is nothingness and the communication of nothingness is a communication of ignorance. If essence is not reflected in phenomenon, every ironistic expression is objective ignorance allowing for the reflective return upon oneself, the clever preservation of subjectivity.

The dialectic of direct ironistic communication does not reflect the thought in the expression which is to say that it does not reflect the essence in the phenomenon. "When I speak the thought or meaning is the essence, the word the phenomenon."[79] In direct linear communication, the word is supposed to unveil a positive intelligible content which is accessible to another and as sharable is considered objective. For the ironist, on the other hand, the word or expression is a hiding of the thought, because the word is the opposite of the thought. Every expression is cancelled in its utterance with the result that communication is a communication of nothingness, the nothingness of ignorance. If the forms of thought are considered to be universal, regarded as in-themselves valid for all, then in direct communication the phenomenon must reflect the essence and both speaker and hearer are bound by what is said. The ironist, to the contrary, in divorcing essence from phenomenon denies the validity of the in-itself, breaks the reflective harmony of the in-itself revealing itself as for itself and is thereby freed both in relation

to others and to himself.[80]

Within the larger perspective of the Greek dialogical dialectic wherein there is consciousness of fundamentally being in the truth which needs merely to be recollected and objectively explicitized through questioning, there is harmonious reflectivity between essence and phenomenon. The communication here is not a delivery of an idea from one who possesses it to another who does not. In this case, communication is a reawakening of the idea which is inherently shared by the conversants. As inherent it constitutes the truth of the individual, as common to each, it constitutes the validity of the community. As explicitized within the developing dialogue, it binds the individual and the other objectively. The idea as objectivized and explicitized is the truth of the individual and thereby determines him. In terms of the dialectic of the idea, this is the individual reflecting himself in the other, that is, "bending back" or recollecting himself in the truth of the innate idea, his truth, in order to express it and reside in it objectively. From the standpoint of the dialectic of the idea, this is a self-communication whereby the individual finds his individuality precisely in the other. From the perspective of irony, it is subjectivity emptying itself out into objectivity.

The task of Socratic communication is to destroy the truth of the objective idea, its essentiality, and to replace it with phenomenon over which the ironist continually triumphs, to replace it with ignorance.[81] In the destruction of the essentiality of the idea, Socrates destroys the individuality which has embodied itself in the objective. In the dialogue, "with his questions he starved out that garrison of opinions, ideas, and venerable traditions, etc., which heretofore had been sufficient for the individuality."[82]

The destruction of the sharable idea, although nihilating the possibility of an objective communication and its implied communion does allow for an

indirect communication which can generate a type of communion between individuals. For Kierkegaard, the Socratic communication of ignorance allowed for the setting free of individuality. "In this way he freed the individual from every commitment, freed him in the same way that he himself was free."[83] For Socrates, "the art of using power is to make free."[84] Such communion is clearly not grounded in the objective idea which serves as an umbrella under which individuals huddle. This communion is had in finding freedom in and through the other's freedom.

The ironic freedom is still a negative freedom; it is freedom from the other. This negative freedom is preserved through ironic deception and ignorance which attempts to render impotent all positive, objective content. Kierkegaard understands Hegel's system to be the positive, objective articulation of all experience -- a thorough gnosticism. Kierkegaard polarizes this gnosticism with ironic ignorance. He favors ironic reflection which through ignorance and deception preserves subjectivity over against the gnosticism of Hegel's reflective mediation which, to his mind, sublates and destroys subjectivity.

Kierkegaard uses ironic reflection to take a position against Hegel which Hegel himself, in connection with scepticism, had already outlined. Hegel claims that the synthesizing Idea cannot be reduced to simple determinateness but is the mediation of the indeterminate and determinate.[85] Hegel does admit that insofar as this Idea, as the unity of these opposites, is itself outwardly a determinate, it stands exposed to the negative. It is clear that Kierkegaard attempts to reduce the Hegelian system to a simple determinateness by characterizing it as a positive, universal, external, objective result. In this way he aspires to render the system exposed and vulnerable to the negativity of irony. This method of attack which Hegel

ascribes to scepticism had already been delineated by him. "The method of its procedure against the rational is this, that it makes the latter into a determinate, and always first of all introduces into it a finite thought determination or idea of relationship to which it adheres, but which is not really in the infinite at all; and then it argues against the same"[86]

The Authenticity of Irony

To Kierkegaard's mind, he has successfully accomplished the polarization of irony with Hegel's reflectively mediating dialectic. On the side of irony, stands individuality, inwardness, and the deception of ignorance. On the side of mediating reflection, there lies universality, externality and the objective positivity of gnosticism. Kierkegaard has subtly established the characteristics of each side in such a manner that they appear irrevocably opposed and contradictory. He thereby intends to release irony from a Hegelian systematic interpretation so that it may not be relegated to a "vanishing moment in the system". Rather it is his intention that irony overcome the objectivizing propensity of the system. In so far as irony serves to disengage subjectivity from the objectively mediating power of the system, thereby announcing the incommensurability between subjectivity and objectivity, irony is authentic.

The Character of Ironic Reflection and its Relation to Subjectivity and to Thought

The character of ironic reflection and its relation to subjectivity and to thought become clearer. Reflection is not simply knowledge. It cannot be thoroughly equated with objective knowledge as a positive content, for, the Socratic reflectiveness, although knowing that it does not know, remains in objective ignorance since it possesses a knowledge which is without content.[87] Every cognitive expression or cognitive interchange in communication

which exhausts the subjective standpoint by emptying it out into an objective intelligible content may indeed be reflective in that a distance opens up between subjectivity and the objective. That is, in order to be conscious of the world as world, there must be at least a submerged consciousness of the self as somewhat distinct from that world. This distinctness is the distance but it is immediately cancelled in the identification of self with the world, the knowing of the self only in the knowing of the world, the fusion of self with the other, the plunging of the self into all the determinations which constitute world. This type of consciousness is more immediate than reflective and despite the sophistication and intensity of the cognitive activity within it, it nonetheless simulates the immediacy of the sensuous consciousness.[88]

Ironic reflection is not to be totally identified with ratiocination or discursive movements of thought. It is not equivalent to reason as a faculty nor with reasoning as a function. Reflection cannot be made equatable with a linear movement of thought which is a function of a rational faculty and which seeks termination in a conclusion. Furthermore, it is now clear that ironic reflection cannot be identified with Hegel's unique meaning of Reason which indeed reflects subjectivity and objectivity, subjective certitude and objective being, but only in order to mediate and sublate them.

For the ironist, reflection is the bending back of self upon self; it is a condition of the possibility of a distancing of the self from the world which is constitutive of ironic freedom, its subjectivity. Reflection is then constitutive of human subjectivity and that subjectivity is not to be considered simply in terms of intelligibility nor in terms of a transparency which enlightens and informs concerning an objective intelligible content. Reflection does deliver up a transparency, does issue in an enlightenment possessed in certainty. But that transparency, that enlightenment is not the intelligibility of an

objective content which has its proper faculty for knowing it. Reflection is an effected process which describes a total posture or attitude, which locates subjectivity in being constitutive of a total consciousness within which individual instances of cognition subsequently derive their orientation. Ultimately the enlightenment which develops out of ironic reflection is the consciousness that the self is not so caught up in the objective categories constituting the world that it is exhausted by them. The transparency that develops with and out of such reflection is the transparency of the self to itself which is an expression for the self's incommensurability with the world.

The Inauthenticity of Ironic Reflection

Although ironic reflection is awarded authenticity in disengaging subjectivity from its other and underlining the objective incommensurability of subjectivity, the subjectivity that emerges is thoroughly void of all content. The extreme vacuity which is characteristic of the consciousness developed out of ironic reflection is hardly endorsed by Kierkegaard. "The ego was like a crow, which deceived by the fox's praise of its person, lost the cheese. Thought had gone astray in that reflection continually reflected upon reflection, and every step forward naturally led further and further away from all content."[89] Kierkegaard considers irony as the "mere contour", the vague outline of a fully constituted consciousness properly so called.

The nothingness of ironic subjectivity is an expression for its absoluteness. Ironic subjectivity having reflected itself from all objective content in the total nihilation of its objective other is disengaged from and unconditioned by the positivity of that other. Its unconditioned negativity is the absoluteness of its nothingness. Kierkegaard will not underwrite the negative absoluteness of subjectivity delivered in ironic reflection. In so far as ironic reflection is absolute in its vacuity, it is inauthentic. Ironic reflection is authentic

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in preserving subjectivity from the Hegelian reflectively mediating absolute, but it is inauthentic in establishing its own nothingness as absolute.

The Validity of Irony as Mastered in the Reflection of Collision

In The Concept of Irony, Kierkegaard seems to be seeking an alternative to: 1) the ironic reflectivity which in totally distancing itself from the world allows the vacuous self to emerge as absolute and 2) the Hegelian universal reflection which ultimately sublates ironic subjectivity in the mediating activity of absolute and finite. When Kierkegaard, in his concluding chapter, maintains that irony has its validity only as a mastered moment,[90] he once again seems to return to the Hegelian position wherein irony is justified as a negative, authentic moment in the development of the synthesizing Idea. For Hegel, irony is mastered by the Idea; it is reflected out of and into it.

Kierkegaard agrees that irony is a "ministering spirit",[91] that it is "not the truth but the way".[92] Yet by this he does not deliver up irony to the Idea. In his final discussion of appropriation, he subtly indicates that irony must overcome the "results" of Hegelian philosophy.

> When irony appears on the scene it brings the way, though not the way whereby one who imagines himself to have a result comes to possess it, but the way whereby the result forsakes him. Add to this that the task of our age must surely be seen to be that of translating the results of philosophy into the personal life, personally to appropriate these results.[93]

Here Kierkegaard enunciates the delicate balance between the truth of subjectivity in the appropriating subject and the truth of the Hegelian result which as result is objective. The balance is weighted toward the truth of subjectivity when the emphasis is placed on "personal life".

Appropriation is a highly dialectical term because it indicates the relation between an appropriating subject and an appropriated object. It would ordinarily presuppose the validity of an object to be appropriated. Indiscriminate

appropriation would hardly surpass the totally ironic consciousness which, rather than risk the appropriation of an invalid object flees objectivity in order to have its self-certainty safely solipsized in hovering over the world. Kierkegaard, in recommending appropriation, seems also to presuppose an objectivity whose validity is sustained independently of the appropriating process. He appears to refer to "philosophy" to ground this object as valid thereby reducing the function of irony in the appropriation process to bringing "the way". Kierkegaard seems to affirm the validity of the object grounded independently of appropriation on the one hand, and on the other, the need for appropriation as the way to truth. But he intends to go further than this because the appropriation of the Hegelian result which Kierkegaard considers objective, is equivalent to the nihilation of subjectivity within the objective result. Appropriation, in this sense, is simply the passive acquiescence of subjectivity to a coercive, dominating objectivity.

Without launching the direct attack on philosophy which appears frequently in his later works, the implication of the necessity of the appropriation process in the constitution of truth are basically opposed to Hegelian, systematic Idealism. Fundamentally, it vitiates the totality of objective thought as the dialectical articulation of the fullness of the real, the synthesis of subjective certitude and objective truth, by raising the question of truth in terms that highlight the dichotomy between truth as an isolated "result" and the assertion of subjectivity, conceived as individuality and personality, as the necessary constituent of any real truth. Kierkegaard disrupts the Hegelian dialectical synthesis in Reason between subjective certitude positing the object and objective truth as valid in itself; he relegates the entire Hegelian synthesis to the area of objective result, negating it by means of irony, thereby indicating the truth of subjectivity within the dialectic of life over against the objective

result. Subjectivity stripped of objectivity is not thereby to be considered as an absolute whose retirement precludes the task of appropriation.

Irony, Kierkegaard insists, must be mastered because its subjectivity is vacuous, but it will not be mastered by the Hegelian result. Rather the ironist has "the way whereby the result forsakes him". Irony is not to constitute the total, individual consciousness, but as a means it destroys the objective validity of the in-itself and frees the individual for an appropriation which, in the absence of the self-justification of the in-itself, becomes highly creative and intensely subjective. Kierkegaard, in his Magister's dissertation, has vaguely anticipated his more mature statement in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript that "truth is subjectivity".[94]

Once disengaged from the world, subjectivity's further task of appropriation establishes the region where irony is to be transcended or mastered. It is within this area that the justification for ironic reflection is to be found. The object of that appropriation is the religious "object".

Throughout the dissertation, it becomes progressively clearer that the idea working invisibly within the thesis and directing the discussion is the religious idea. Kierkegaard reveals this intent as well as the path to a fully constituted subjectivity when he compares Socratic irony to the image of Christ.[95] The relationship of Socrates to an absolute which is nothingness leaves him with a subjectivity, a freedom which is abstract while Christ is most concrete because "in Christ dwelt the immediate fullness of the godhead,"[96] and He simultaneously engaged the world through the Church.

It is Kierkegaard's notion of the religious, however vaguely conceived at this time, which provides the alternative to irony as a total self-constitution and irony as a moment within the Hegelian development of the Idea. The strongest indication of the religious alternative comes at the end of his preface, "For

Orientation," which introduces the chapter, "The World Historical Validity of Irony." That the distinction occurs within prefacing remarks is significant because Kierkegaard's thought is generally informal and less devious in his prefaces.

> Finally, insofar as irony becomes conscious of the fact that existence has no reality, thereby expressing the same thesis as the pious disposition, it might seem that irony were a species of religious devotion. In religious devotion, if I may be permitted to put it this way, the lesser actuality, that is to say, the relationship to the world, also loses its validity; but this only occurs insofar as the relationship to God at the same moment asserts its absolute reality. The devout mind also affirms that all is vanity, but this is only insofar as this negation thrusts aside all interference and allows the eternally existent to become manifest. Add to this that when the devout mind perceives all is vanity, it makes no exception regarding its own person, makes no fuss respecting itself; on the contrary, this, too, must be thrust aside so the divine will not be impeded by its resistance, but pour itself out in the mind made receptive by religious devotion . . . With irony, on the other hand, when everything else becomes vain, subjectivity becomes free . . . . For irony everything becomes nothingness, but nothingness may be taken in several ways. The speculative nothingness is that which at every moment is vanishing for concretion, since it is itself the demand for the concrete, its nisus formativus. The mystical nothingness is a nothingness for representation, a nothingness which yet is as full of content as the silence of the night is eloquent for one who has ears to hear.[97]

The alternative offered by Kierkegaard to the totally ironic consciousness which becomes vain in finding its own self-consciousness as absolute, and the speculative consciousness which finds the absolute in continually negating the negative and attempting to fill out nothingness with the concrete, -- the third alternative is the devout negation of the world by means of irony, thus freeing consciousness for further submission to the religious absolute. This is the sense of Kierkegaard's endorsement of irony as a mastered moment, the direction in which irony may find its "eternal validity".[98]

When Kierkegaard describes his alternative in terms of the devout consciousness, he appears to be taking a position that Hegel had earlier described and sublated in The Phenomenology of Mind. In the segment concerning the "Unhappy Consciousness", Hegel views the devout consciousness as essentially characterized

by an awareness of a juxtaposed dichotomy between absolute and finite, which he abrogates through dialectical mediation. Kierkegaard now takes the devout consciousness, together with its consciousness of the absolute as the absolutely other and uses it as a legitimate contrast to Hegelian synthesis. Where Hegel sees irony as mastered within the reflectivity of the mediating Idea, Kierkegaard views irony as mastered within a religious perspective wherein there is a reflective, dialectical opposition between absolute and finite. The denial of the Hegelian solution through the reinstatement of the viable opposition between subjectivity and the finite other on the one side, and subjectivity and the absolutely other on the other side demands and explication of the new dialectic, the dialectic of collision. To this Kierkegaard directs the attention of his formal authorship. But the basic problematic together with the fundamental posture of reflective opposition is already present in the dissertation.[99]

Important questions still demand attention. Does the reflection involved with objective thought have any religious validity? If, like mastered irony, faith is "victorious over the world"[100] and "bends back" away from the world in order to have its absoluteness before God, how is subjectivity constituted in the reflective distancing which places it before God -- before a God who is at "an infinite qualitative distance" from man. How is the religious epochē dissolved; that is, after being before God, how does one reflect oneself back into the world? In the dissertation, the concreteness of the religious experience is expressed in lyrical terminology as "full of content as the silence of the night is eloquent for one who has ears to hear." Elsewhere, there is a tone of mere exhortation for a reflection back into the world which has been negated by religious irony.[101] Obviously, Kierkegaard is not prepared to fully articulate these relations in his Magister's dissertation. He addresses these problems in his later works, very often regarding his own posture as reflectively distanced

from his production.[102] Kierkegaard considers himself a religious author[103] and more specifically as the poet of religiousness.[104] Since "the poet must relate himself ironically to his poem,"[105] Kierkegaard regards his own subjectivity at this time and throughout much of his pseudonymous authorship as constituted by the reflection of irony.[106]

Internal and External Reflection in Irony

Irony and scepticism are postures of subjectivity that emerge in a reflective dialectic of collision. Collision expresses a relation of unmediated contradiction. The fundamental terms of the contradiction are subjectivity and objectivity, the self and its other. Consciousness is constituted by the reflective relation of these contradictories and in this sense, consciousness is constituted by contradiction. The postures of consciousness can be described by the reflectivity of the contradictories, self and other. Since one of the poles of the contradiction is the self, we shall refer to the reflectivity of this kind of contradiction as "internal".[107] When irony and scepticism are described in terms of the self-other contradiction, its colliding reflectivity can be denominated as internal.

There is, within irony and scepticism, a description of contradiction neither of whose poles is the self. Within the internal reflection of the self-other contradiction lies another contradiction. This contradiction occurs within the pole of the other. The ironist, using objective forms of thought, demonstrates the contradiction in objectivity. That is, he exhibits the contradiction in his other. To every thesis he juxtaposes its opposite but neither of the opposed terms is the self. The self of the ironist stands outside his objective, polemical activity. In so far as the self remains outside its objectively described contradictions and is itself not a pole

constituting the contradiction, we shall call such reflection "external".

The description of faith offered by Kierkegaard's pseudonym, Climacus, is externally reflected. We shall treat it in Chapter III. The definition of faith proposed by the pseudonymous Anti-Climacus is internally reflected and we shall meet it in Chapter IV.

CHAPTER III

REFLECTION AND OBJECTIVE THOUGHT: THE EXTERNAL REFLECTION OF OBJECTIVE QUALITATIVE CONTRADICTION

"ABSURDITY HELD FAST IN THE PASSION OF INWARDNESS IS FAITH"

Climacus, in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, describes Christian faith as: "absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness." This definition implies a function of reflection understood in its root sense, "bending back from". We have seen that this meaning of reflection indicates polarization, opposition or contradiction whose fundamental terms are subjectivity and objectivity. The dialectic of these incommensurables describes the structure of consciousness. Since faith is a specific orientation of consciousness, it can also serve to portray this act of religion. Climacus' definition implies the dialectic of the incommensurables, subjectivity and objectivity. However, it must be stressed that this "internal" dialectic is only implied by the Climacean definition.

The explicit focus of Climacus' definition of faith is not on the internal reflection of subject and object but rather on an objective incommensurability or contradiction. That contradiction is attributed to the faith-object itself and is called the "absurd". The exposition of the inherent contradictoriness of faith's object falls within the province of objective thought. Since the subjectivity that objectively thinks contradiction is not real or ultimate subjectivity, the contradiction that thought exhibits does not reveal real subjectivity as one of its terms. Thus from the viewpoint of genuine subjectivity, the mere thinking of contradiction leaves subjectivity externally re-flected

from it. Climacus' definition of faith emphasizes an objective contradiction which, in reference to the dialectic of subject and object, can be called an external reflection of objective, qualitative contradiction.

Objective thought appears to have an essentially authentic function within the dialectical reflectivity of subject and object in the act of faith. Indeed one would expect that if faith is the authentic reflection of subjectivity and objectivity, and objective thought is essential to this reflection, objective thought must itself have an authentic function within the dialectical reflectivity of the faith-act. Yet Kierkegaard frequently points out that objective thought is a threat to Christian faith and contributes to a movement of inauthentic reflection. An analysis of the relationship between authentic and inauthentic reflection with respect to the activity of objective thought will clarify the legitimate domain of objective thought in effecting the authentic reflection implied in Climacus' definition of faith.

The Contrast between Inauthentic and Authentic Reflection

In 1848, Kierkegaard entered into his Journal a statement which contrasted his meanings of authentic and inauthentic reflection.

> It has been constantly maintained that reflection inevitably destroys Christianity and is its natural enemy. I hope, now, that with God's help it will be shown that a godfearing reflection can once again tie the knot at which a superficial reflection has been tugging for so long. The divine authority of the Bible and all that belongs to it has been done away with; it looks as though one had only to wait for the last stage of reflection in order to have done with the whole thing. But behold, reflection performs the opposite service by once more bringing the springs of Christianity into play, and in such a way that it can stand up--against reflection. Christianity naturally remains completely unaltered, not one iota is changed. But the struggle is a different one; up to the present it has been between reflection and simple, immediate Christianity; now it will be between reflection and simplicity armed with reflection.
>
> And that, in my opinion, is sense. The problem is not to understand Christianity but to understand that it cannot be understood. That is the holiness of faith, and reflection is sanctified by being thus used.[1]

Inauthentic reflection is denoted as "superficial". Its activity includes

dissolving Biblical authority, through fullness of the understanding. With its cognitive equipment, inauthentic reflection endeavors to loosen the "knot" which in some sense anchors Christianity. This implies that reflection, in its attempt at total understanding, is in fact dissolving an element which is essential to Christianity. Because it tries to nihilate a fundamental feature of Christianity it is arrogant, that is, not "godfearing" and consequently inauthentic. The claim is made that the "knot" is totally resistable to cognition. It remains opaque despite the attempt of an inauthentic reflection to exhibit and digest it. On the other side, it is the function of authentic, godfearing reflection to point up the impenetrability of the "knot". Reflection becomes "sanctified" and authentic in demonstrating that Christianity cannot be understood.

This passage perhaps raises more questions than it resolves. On the side of resolution, it is clear that Kierkegaard does not hold that reflection is intrinsically inauthentic. Although he says a certain species of reflection is incompatible with Christianity, there is another brand of reflection which he aligns with the "holiness of faith". A crucial question raised and left unanswered in the passage pertains to the precise character of this highly praised reflection. Is this reflection a subjective or an objective reflection? If it is a subjective reflection, it must be a reflection which delivers up subjectivity. Or better, the reflective act must itself be constitutive of subjectivity. Moreover, if this reflection is connected with faith, as the passage suggests, then this reflective act reveals a subjectivity which is not the vacuous consciousness of the sceptic or the ironist but rather the height of human subjectivity -- Kierkegaard's expression for faith. If such is the case, the reflective act is intrinsic to the act of faith itself. It might well be the reflection Kierkegaard refers to in his formulas for the act of faith.

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On the other hand, there is some indication that the authentic reflection described here has an extrinsic relation to an already fully constituted act of faith. He speaks of "simplicity armed with reflection" standing up against reflection. This phrasing allows for the interpretation that the Christian is fully constituted in faith and is subsequently equipped to do battle with an inauthentic, superficial reflection that would encroach upon the domain of Christianity. In that event, authentic reflection takes on the character of an academic, apologetical tool to be used in the service of Christianity but not intrinsically constitutive of it. Moreover, godfearing reflection and superficial reflection become qualitatively similar. Godfearing reflection, in taking on an apologetical character, engages superficial reflection on its own ground. If the nature of superficial reflection is to be objective, then godfearing reflection must likewise be objective in order to engage it in dialogue -- no matter how polemical that dialogue might be. Both would be involved with a movement of the objective forms of thought. The question then arises: Does Kierkegaard in 1848, after the completion of his pseudonymous works (with the exception of The Sickness unto Death which uses a new type of pseudonym but a pseudonym nonetheless) now regard them in hindsight as simply an objective type of apologetic, the function of which was to show that Christianity cannot be understood?

It is at first glance difficult to accept the thesis that at the time of this entry, 1848, Kierkegaard regarded his previous pseudonyms as simply performing an apologetical function. The effort of the pseudonyms was very often directed against the very notion of apologetics.[2] Yet the apologetics which Kierkegaard so often attacked was a positive apologetics, one that rationally attempted to prove or to make highly probable the existence and knowledge of God and of Christ. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, may now be endorsing a

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negative apologetics. If he now understands Christianity to be impenetrable to thought, he may, in this case be subscribing to a reflective thought movement that will be destructive of the appetite of a thought activity which attempts to devour all. It is not unlikely that Kierkegaard, at this time in his life, may now view his pseudonymous works, which he formerly felt were an existence communication, as a rationally exhibited polemic against the ambitions of gnosticism. Again, if such be the case, godfearing reflection as well as the reflective expression of the pseudonymous authorship, are no less objective than superficial reflection.

The "knot" to which Kierkegaard refers in the passage, the preservation of which is the task of a godfearing reflection, is the paradox. Although the word "paradox" is absent from this citation and the word "authority" seems to be contextual with the tying of the knot, there is much evidence to support the position that paradox is implied here. In the Postscript the phrasing, "to understand that it cannot be understood", is always associated with the paradox. "In connection with the absolute paradox the only understanding possible is that it cannot be understood."[3] "To explain the paradox would then mean to understand more and more profoundly what a paradox is, and that the paradox is the paradox."[4] "Whoever, on the other hand, takes it upon himself to explain the paradox under the supposition that he knows his own mind in the matter, will precisely concentrate his energies upon making it clear that it must be a paradox."[5] "The simple wise man will thus seek to apprehend the paradox as a paradox, and will not engage in the business of explaining the paradox by understanding that there is none."[6]

This last quotation, written by Kierkegaard in 1846, is closely paralleled by the Journal entry of 1848. It delineates the dual types of reflection: a godfearing reflection that understands that the paradox cannot be understood

and a superficial reflection which engages "in the business of explaining the paradox by understanding that there is none."

Here again several pertinent questions emerge. What is the paradox? What is the "absolute paradox"? Is there more than one paradox? Is the absolute paradox the fundamental object of religion? If the paradox is a faith object, does it transcend understanding or contradict it? If it is a contradiction, what is the nature of this contradiction? The resolution of these questions waits on an investigation into the meaning of objectivity and objective reflection as well as the fuller discernment of the meaning of inauthentic and authentic reflection.

The Movement of Inauthentic Objective Reflection

It was previously established that reflection has the character of authenticity when it is in some way constitutive of subjectivity.[7] That is, reflection is indicative of a distancing of the self from what is not self. Or better, the self is constituted as a self when reflection opens up a distinguishing distance. Basically the distinction that emerges is self and other. The self is considered as subjectivity, the other, objectivity. The ironic or sceptical subjectivity is constituted in the reflective distancing which constantly annihilates its other. Such subjectivity is free from content and vacuous. Its vacuity is determined by a reflectivity which constantly negates a distinguished object. However, not every reflectivity nihilates the other immediately upon distinguishing it, just as not every subjectivity is constituted as ironic and sceptical. There is a reflective activity which moves in a direction opposite that of ironic and sceptical reflection. It is an objective reflection that moves toward the object and renders subjectivity indifferent.

The way of objective reflection makes the subject accidental, and

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> thereby transforms existence into something indifferent, something vanishing. Away from the subject the objective way of reflection leads to objective truth, and while the subject and his subjectivity become indifferent, the truth also becomes indifferent, and this indifference is precisely its objective validity.[8]

One of the characteristics of objective reflection is its indifference to subjectivity. But it is unconcerned with subjectivity precisely because it empties it into objectivity. Objective reflection objectivizes subjectivity.

> At its maximum this way will lead to the contradiction that only the objective has come into being, while the subjective has gone out; that is to say, the existing subjectivity has vanished, in that it has made an attempt to become what in an abstract sense is called subjectivity, the mere abstract form of an abstract objectivity.[9]

While the ironic and sceptical self-consciousnesses are constituted in the nihilation of objectivity, objective reflection nihilates the subject by submerging it in objectivity and the expression for this, from the point of view of subjectivity, is indifference.

The movement of objective reflection is toward the object and away from or indifferent to the subject. Since one requirement for authentic reflection is a movement that distinguishes and gives viability to subjectivity, objective reflection is inauthentic. Authentic reflection minimally bends back toward the subject while inauthentic reflection bends back toward the object. Any reflective movement that does not deliver up a distinguishable and viable subjectivity is inauthentically objective.

Inauthentic objective reflection is conditioned by a movement of thought or a movement of passion. Every movement of thought that is indifferent to subjectivity or positively contributes to a reflective movement away from subjectivity is inauthentic, objective thought. Similarly a movement of passion is inauthentic when it does not properly reflect subjectivity.

Kierkegaard's pseudonymous Climacus launches a two pronged attack: one directed against forms of thought which he considers responsible for

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inauthentic, objective reflection and the other against forms of passion whose activity fails to effect the movement of authentic reflection. Underlying both polemics is the pseudonym's religious interest. Climacus is attempting to prevent both the conception of Christianity as an objective truth which can be acquired without personal engagement and the volatilization of Christianity in amorphous, subjective emotions.[10] He feels that the former is made an issue by philosophical idealism and the latter is the general mood of the Romantic era.

Inhibiting the Movement of Inauthentic Objective Reflection: The Limitations of Objective Thought

Climacus' View of the Characteristics of Objective Thought: Seventeenth-Eighteenth Century Influences

In order to understand Climacus' attack on the form of objective thought which he feels effects an inauthentic, objective reflection, it is necessary to understand his target. There can be no doubt that Hegel and the Danish Hegelians bear the greatest burden of Climacus' offensive. Yet many of the cognitional criteria and characteristics that Climacus attributes to the Hegelian systematic are, in his view, shared by Continental Rationalism. Moreover his critique of objective cognition is often articulated against a backdrop provided by British Empiricism. At least a brief survey of the criteria and characteristics of objective cognition imputed to Rationalism and Empiricism by Climacus is requisite for an understanding of Climacus' criticism of this form of thought.

Kierkegaard's first exposure to Descartes was very likely through the lectures he attended as a student at the University of Copenhagen.[11] In the winter of 1837-1838, Martensen delivered a course in Modern Philosophy the notes of which provided him the material for his subsequently published work, Prolegomena to Speculative Dogmatics.[12] This book reflects the view of modern philosophy then current in Denmark -- "that of a continuous movement extending from Descartes to Hegel, although the enormous prestige enjoyed by the latter

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meant that Cartesian thought was interpreted mainly as the starting point for the investigation of problems upon which later philosophers were deemed to have shed much greater light."[13] It appears that only in the year 1842 does Kierkegaard undertake his first serious, direct study of Descartes' works.[14] In this year, he first makes use of the Opera philosophica in the Amsterdam edition of 1692. There is indication in the Journals that he read Descartes together with Leibniz and Spinoza. Of Descartes' works, "he read with some care the Discourse on Method, Meditations, Principles of Philosophy and the Treatise on Passions."[15]

It seems that Kierkegaard began his first direct study of Leibniz at about the same time that he worked with Descartes, 1842-1843.[16] At this time, he probably read Théodicée and Nouveaux Essais. The catalogue of Kierkegaard's library includes J. E. Erdmann's, G. G. Leibnizii Opera philosophica (Berlin, 1840), an edition that contains nearly all the major works available at that time, including, in addition to the French text of the books mentioned above, the Monadology, the correspondence with Clarke, and various Latin writings. "A little later Kierkegaard must have acquired the German translation of the Théodicée by J. C. Gottsched, for this also figures in his library and is quoted in his notes.[17]

It is curious that Kierkegaard's pseudonyms in any way appropriate a theory of cognition which is directly or indirectly akin to seventeenth century Rationalism. The notable Rationalists of this era, Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz were oriented to mathematics. In general, at the heart of historical Rationalism is the hope that the new mathematical discoveries of the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries would dissolve the philosophical chaos of the late Middle Ages. Mathematical methodology on the Continent and the methodology of the physical sciences on the British Isles became the dual dynamisms that were to resolve, not simply mathematical and scientific problematics but also the problems of God, man and nature that were formerly reserved

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for philosophy. If the general claim of Rationalism is to reduce every order of reality to the mathematical and to render these spheres comprehensible through the intelligibility characteristic of mathematics, then it is difficult to understand how Kierkegaard would regard Rationalism in any favorable light. This difficulty is accentuated by the emphatic statements of Kierkegaard's pseudonyms describing the limitations of mathematical cognition. Climacus places mathematics in the domain of the objective and indifferent. "In the case of a mathematical proposition the objectivity is given, but for this reason the truth of such a proposition is also an indifferent truth."[18] The Postscript's pseudonym emphasizes the total indifference of mathematics by comparing it to logic. While logic is also indifferent to existence, it is related to subjectivity as hypothesis.

> Nothing must then be incorporated in a logical system that has any relation to existence, that is not indifferent to existence. The infinite preponderance which the logical as the objective has over thinking, is again limited by the fact that seen objectively it is an hypothesis, precisely because it is indifferent to existence in the sense of actuality. This double aspect of the logical distinguishes it from the mathematical which has no relationship at all either to or from existence, but simply has objectivity -- not objectivity and the hypothetical together -- as the synthesis and the contradiction in which the logical is negatively related to existence.[19]

Despite the disparity between Kierkegaard's view and that of historical Rationalism, his Climacus often projects his position over against but within the context of a problematic that has been colored by the terminology and the thought of that Rationalism. In defining his own posture against elements of Rationalism rather than in indifference to it, his own view takes on some limitations of the target itself. Consequently, it is difficult to sort out the position of Kierkegaard without making constant reference to the object of his polemic. His discussion of the meaning of objective certainty and objective uncertainty in relation to faith is especially bound up with his contact with Rationalism and Empiricism. This exposure comes not only by way of his direct

reading of Descartes, Leibniz and Spinoza but also through Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi. A good deal of the givens of Rationalism, especially the Leibnizian distinction between contingent and necessary truths with its concomitant problem of reconciling thought and existence, as well as several Spinozistic positions were bequeathed to Kierkegaard by G. E. Lessing.[20] They were highlighted in Kierkegaard's interest by Jacobi's controversy with Lessing.

Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi: A Response to the Character of Objective Thought in Rationalism and Empiricism

Kierkegaard began to read Jacobi in 1844[21] and refers directly to him in the Philosophical Fragments,[22] which was published in the same year. There Climacus acknowledges Jacobi's thought in the expression, "cognitive inference is made from cause to effect, or rather from ground to consequent."[23] Despite some fundamental differences between the thinking of Kierkegaard and Jacobi,[24] there are many striking similarities which, in the light of his direct reading of Jacobi, can hardly be said to be coincidental. Indeed, despite the disparities, Climacus, in the Postscript admits: "I do not deny that Jacobi has often inspired me."[25]

Our primary concern is with Climacus' critique of the forms of objective thought that contribute to an inauthentic objective reflection. Our interest is with Jacobi only in so far as he prepared the ground for Climacus' critique with his own criticism of Rationalism's brand of objective thought and his own modifications on aspects of Empiricism's theory of cognition. Since Climacus' definitions of faith include meanings of certainty and uncertainty, the discussion of Jacobi will focus on his meaning of certainty. Objective certainty is the criterion for objective truth and is grounded in the immediacy of intuition.

The Ground of Objective Thought: Immediacy and Intuition. -- According to Jacobi, the ground of knowledge is that beyond which one cannot and need not

search for the validation of knowledge. The ground is the terminus which rests thought's movement toward verification. It needs no further principle to explain it since it is self-explanatory and self-verifying. Because it does not need another to mediate it, it is unmediated or immediate. Jacobi agrees with the Rationalists that intuition has the required characteristic of immediacy which serves as the foundation of knowledge. They would further concur that, since all real knowledge is true and certain, intuitional immediacy is the ground of knowledge, truth and certainty.

Jacobi claims that certainty in cognition is had with the immediacy of intuition in perception. He refers to the fundamental consciousness of the Realist as intuitional.

> The decided Realist, who upon the evidence of his senses unhesitatingly accepts external objects, considers this certainty as an original conviction, and cannot think otherwise than that upon this fundamental experience, all our speculation as to an outer world must rest, -- how shall such a decided Realist name the means through which he obtains his certainty of external objects, as of existence independent of his own ideas of them? He has nothing on which his judgment can rest except the things themselves, -- nothing but the fact that objects stand there, actually before him. In these circumstances, can he express himself by a more appropriate term than revelation?[26]

Jacobi points out that for the Realist there is no reflective verification possible for his acceptance of external objects. External reality is grasped immediately and Jacobi suggests that the best expression for this quality of immediacy is revelation. The immediacy of the experience of an external reality is its certain unveiling upon sensation. Such a primitive and spontaneous apprehension of the real has the characteristics of an intuition which does not at first glance appear to differ from the kind of intuition endorsed by the Rationalistic school.

Characteristics of Cartesian Intuition. -- Unmediated Character of Cartesian Intuition. -- The entire plan of Descartes was the structuring of a series of interconnected truths each of which, though derived from the preceding truth

would nonetheless be intuitable and consequently immunized against the attacks of the sceptic.[27] Since Descartes derives all subsequent truths from the first intuited truth, namely, the cogito, they are considered as precontained in that first truth.[28] All the major truths -- cogito, nature of soul, existence of God, nature of body, existence of body -- are verified in the first intuition because their intelligibility is virtually given in that primal intuition. The mind's function is to draw out or make explicit the truths already inherent in the cogito. In this deduction of subsequent truths, the mind, in each case, intuits their truth.[29] There is a vertical concatenation of unmediated truths all of which can be neatly telescoped back into the original intuition of the cogito. All the truths of the Cartesian deduction are unmediated which is to say that they have the quality of immediacy. This method is of course peculiar to mathematical deduction and betrays the Rationalistic mathematization of all phenomena.[30]

Intuition, Necessity and Reduction to Identity. -- The major Rationalists were mathematicians in their own right. They carried over their experience of mathematical intuition into areas not generally considered to be in the mathematical sphere. The underlying motive for this may be that there is a particularly satisfying quality to the mathematical experience which may be due to the completeness of the intuition or to its irrelevance or indifference to contingent truths of fact. In structuring their systems, the Rationalists generally did not concede the pure contingency of the latter. When they allowed a difference between necessary and contingent truths -- as in the case of Leibniz -- they, like him, attempted to ultimately reduce contingency to necessity.[31] This procedure is in keeping with the sense of Rationalistic intelligibility. For the Rationalist, the very meaning of intelligibility carries with it the note of necessity. For a relation to

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be intelligible, it must express a necessary connection. Fundamentally that necessity is a function of identity.

Intelligibility implies necessity and the necessary is reducible to identity. This is implicit in Descartes' procedure of deducing all truths from a single intuited truth which precontains all subsequent truths. Each truth derived from the cogito has its intelligibility grounded in the cogito. All truth is reducible to that first truth and in that sense is identical with it. Since each truth is reducible to the first truth, the connection between these truths is a necessary connection. Necessity's reducibility to identity is also evident in Leibniz' principle of identity which is the ground for the principle of sufficient reason. The reason is sufficient and the process is terminated when that process has been reduced to identity. Even for contingent, true, affirmative propositions praedicatum inest subjecto.[32] It is also clear in Spinoza where all modes of thought and extension are derived from and are reducible to the one substance. In Rationalism, necessity and intelligibility are measured by identity. Identity is the terminus, the ground, and as such, identity is an expression for intuition.

Intuition and Objectivity. -- The criterion of truth as apodicticity weights Rationalistic intuition on the side of objectivity. In the intuition, the intelligible content presented to the mind is indubitable and so the mind is unable to negate it. The function of consciousness is reduced to simple, immediate affirmation. Such a "yea-saying" endorsement is not to be construed as a particularly influencing contribution of subjectivity. No mind can be creative in the face of this compelling intelligible content which assails the mind and wrests the affirmation from it. The role of consciousness in the intuition is reduced to mere acquiescence and in that sense the mind is highly passive. In eliciting the affirmation, the intelligible content fully

measures consciousness and this insures the content's objectivity. This means that the object, that which is thrust before the mind (ob-jacere), has its in-itself validity independent of the mind. The in-itself, objective validity of intelligible content is grounded in the principle of identity which immediately evokes the mind's acquiescence in intuitional affirmation.

Intuition and Universality. -- A thorough unassailability is guaranteed to intuitable intelligible content by its valid-in-itself characteristic. All minds must assent to the coercive certainty of this positive objective content and so universality of acceptance is assured. In the intuition, objectivity always carries with it the note of universality.

Universality and Objective Communicability. -- The universality of intelligible content guarantees its objective communicability. Since no mind can extricate itself from the intelligible content through the negativity of doubt, all minds immediately endorse such content. The coerced acceptance is the indubitability, the certainty of the content. Because the content cannot be altered by individual consciousnesses but must be universally affirmed, such content is certain and universally sharable. The universality of its sharability is its objective communicability. It is this sort of objectively certain content to which Climacus refers in his assertion: "Direct communication presupposes certainty."[33] All direct communication indicates a positivity of content intuited by minds whose yea-saying is thoroughly evoked by the content.

Intuition is fundamentally objective and its objectivity implies that the content is in-itself, universal, communicable and that the mind's relationship to its objectivity is largely passive. The subjective contribution of intuition is referred to by Descartes as the mind's "natural light."[34]

The Subjective Dimension of Cartesian Intuition: The Natural Light. -- The subjective quality of the intuition, that which belongs to the subject and

is the subjective condition of the possibility of affirmation, is the natural light. Without it, there would be no response at all to an intelligible object. The natural light qualifies the intuition as a human experience. In its absence all content remains mute. The natural light is the subjective ground for the immediacy of intuition. It cannot be questioned, for once challenged it falls into the domain of mediation and can never again be the suitable constituent of intuitional immediacy. It is for this reason that the natural light does not fall under the criticism of methodological doubt. Descartes has effected the reduction of subjectivity to the natural light whose function is the simple endorsement of an objective intelligible content, the latter having its clarity, distinctness and certitude largely built into it.

Jacobi's Critique of Rationalistic Cognition

Jacobi's criticism of Rationalism's theory of cognition is based on his own assertion that the unity of subjectivity and objectivity, consciousness and existence is delivered with immediacy in perception and that the experience of the unity is the experience of certainty. Cartesian methodological doubt mediates that immediacy and thereby destroys both the unity and the primitive experience of certainty.

The systematic doubt of Descartes is methodological because the intent is resolution of doubt. Doubt is resolved by the indubitable which is the apodicticity of the clear and distinct. That which is apodictic is certain. Knowledge to be knowledge at all must be certain and only then is it true. The method of doubt points to certainty as the resolution of doubt and the criterion of knowledge and truth.

The universality of methodological doubt includes the existence and nature of the material world. Systematic doubt has for its purpose the certain reinstatement of the existence and nature of the physical world.

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Descartes' search for certitude ends in the solipsizing of consciousness through the cogito. The existence of an external world, lost through doubt, is validated only after the reality of a veracious God is demonstrated. After the existence of an undeceiving God is proven Descartes shifts the meaning of truth. In the fourth Meditation,[35] truth signifies the conformity of idea with existing thing. Truth is no longer measured solely by clarity and distinctness -- by certitude -- but rather the consent of the will to the conformity or lack of conformity between ideas and existing things.[36] This curious change in the meaning of truth to the agreement between thought and existence indicates a struggle for their reconciliation and bears witness to the depth of the cleavage between thought and existence originally effected by the process of methodological doubt.

From Jacobi's perspective, methodological doubt is reflective. It thereby destroys the immediate experience of the unity of thought and thing. It is this immediate concurrence of consciousness and existing object which delivers the original experience of certainty. The reflective mediation of that immediacy ruptures the unity of thought and thing, destroys the primitive experience of certainty and makes futile any further search for apodicticity.[37] In Jacobi's view, the opposed duality of thought and existence is generated by a reflected or mediated search for an alliance of thought and existence which is originally given with certainty only in sensuous immediacy.[38]

The attempt to break the epochē of existence and to validate the existential scene through proofs for the existence of a veracious God must fail[39] because these proofs fall under the same criticism. Proof or demonstration is a reflectively mediated attempt for a certainty had only in immediate sensuous experience. Every search for certainty presupposes what it intends to deliver -- the certainty of sensuous immediacy.

In Jacobi's judgment, the Rationalist's methodological search for certainty drives a permanent wedge between thought and existence. Therefore the characteristic he attributes to Rationalism's mode of thought is abstraction. Such thought is proper to the understanding which Jacobi considers a faculty of mediation, a simple faculty of concepts, judgments and conclusions which can reveal nothing out of itself.[40] It simply gets concepts from concepts and eventually attains ideas, though it does not touch reality.[41] The understanding reflects upon sense intuitions, separates and unites concepts, judgments and conclusions[42] and is therefore a faculty of abstractions.[43] Mediated conception cannot give objectivity but objectivity is grasped in the immediacy of perception.[44] Jacobi's position is clear: mediated reflective thought has no certain existential reference.

Jacobi on the Intuitional Immediacy of Faith

Another aspect of Jacobi's thought which has direct bearing on Climacus' discussion of objective cognition and its limitations is the former's characterization of immediate intuition as faith. Jacobi is not here concerned with a natural light that will endorse an abstract intelligible content. He is nonetheless interested in the possibility of certainty in objectivity understood in an empirical sense. His attention was drawn to this problem by Hume whose pronouncements on the matter in part inspired Jacobi's work entitled, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus. In the preface to this treatise, Jacobi protests against the charge that he is an enemy of science and philosophy and the champion of blind faith.[45] He vindicates the use of the terms, "faith" and "belief" by showing that David Hume had used these words in the sense in which he himself was now employing them. Jacobi's claim is that there are no better terms to express the immediate cognition of facts, as opposed to the construction of inferences. Hume's

scepticism regarding the mediated certain verification of the external world and the principle of causality is shared by Jacobi. Hume relegated the principle of causality to the imagination and accounted for causal connections through the psychological principle of association.[46] The habit of associating sequences through repeated sense experiences explains the origin of the idea of cause. Since psychological habituation depends upon a subjective determination, primarily the imagination, the sequence itself is not necessary.[47] Because the causal connection is contingent upon sense, memory and imagination, it cannot be predicted with certainty but rather with a varying degree of probability.[48] Consequently, all our conclusions concerning matters of fact and existence demand a measure of belief or common faith.[49]

Jacobi to some extent aligns himself with Hume against the Rationalists on this point. He explicitly states that, "Das Element aller menschlichen Erkenntniss und Wirksamkeit ist Glaube."[50] For Jacobi, faith or belief is the name of that feeling of certainty which is attached to our knowledge of objects.[51] But Jacobi does not limit the function of belief to the imagination. Belief is constituted in the immediacy of the sensuous intuition of external reality which does not rest on mediated demonstration nor is it endorsed by a hypothetical natural light. In the absence of the possibility of mediate proof terminating in abstract intuition, belief is an immediate conviction which cannot rest on proof.[52]

Jacobi on the Relation of Abstract Thought and Immanence

For Jacobi, mediated thought abstracts from actuality and Rationalistic cognition is mediate. In Jacobi's eye real causality refers to actuality. His inference is that the relationships established by Rationalism cannot properly be called causal. Rationalistic relations are intelligible relations.

This kind of relation is necessary, that is, the intelligibility of the effect or consequent is precontained within the intelligibility of its cause or ground. Every consequent has its intelligibility grounded within another intelligibility and all intelligibility comes to rest in an absolute intelligible ground -- every intelligibility is contained within every other and all are reducible to identity in that absolute ground. "Containment within" is an expression for immanence. Jacobi concludes that mediated relationships are immanental.

If everything is contained within everything and all are grounded in the one absolute, everything is univocal or has the same intelligible quality. There can be no radical otherness. Jacobi claims that the immanence of Rationalistic cognition cannot allow for any otherness and certainly cannot introduce an absolutely other. It cannot allow transcendence either, for transcendence requires otherness and absolute transcendence requires an absolutely other. For Jacobi, the intelligible relationships posited by Rationalism prohibit the discussion of transcendence because Rationalism abstracts from actuality and also from real time.

> With the entrance of time the concept of ground and consequent changes to that of cause and effect. As however, the effect proceeds out of the cause, and both are in a necessary way joined together, we know only that, if we abstract the idea of continuous time, the cause changes into ground (subject), the effect into mere consequent (predicate), and both (cause and effect) pass into one another. Thus we explain the single and entire results of a man out of his permanent character. Where we cannot proceed in this manner and in our consideration get rid of time, there we attain to no insight but acquire through experience, like the beasts, mere expectation of similar cases.[53]

Jacobi feels that when one abstracts from real time and all intelligible relations are reduced to identity, every statement concerning religion or the relationship of God to man is limited to immanence. If God is the subject of any proposition, then he serves as the intelligible ground for all predicates.

Predicates are related to the subject in the necessity of identity. Each falls into the other -- beides (Ursache und Wirkung) in einander fallen lassen können." Consequently no qualitative difference or otherness can emerge and all discussion of transcendence is precluded.

On the other hand, when time is an essential consideration, the notion of real cause survives. However, if the meaning of time is limited to sense and psychological determinations, insight is also limited to mechanical memory and, through projection, to the mere bestial expectation or anticipation of similar cases. Jacobi considers real time essential for a legitimate analysis of the kind of causal activity that can be associated with transcendence. It is also clear that -- given the context of real time -- he will not endorse any explanation of time that fully relies on sensation and imagination. This form of sensuous cognition appears no more capable of addressing transcendence than the abstractions of Rationalism.

Jacobi is searching for an alternative to the a priori procedure of Rationalism and the a posteriori method of Empiricism while still allowing for the emergence of transcendence. Both Rationalism and Empiricism remain in the same circle in which they begin. Descartes had started the method of demonstration from purely a priori considerations, and it ended in the dialectic of Kant. Locke had begun purely epistemological studies, starting from subjective sensations, and this movement ended in the scepticism of Hume. It was Jacobi's contention that Kant had not really resolved the problem presented by Hume but was himself equally subjective.[54]

The problem Jacobi must face is whether or not there can be any relation of immediacy to mediated expression. He sets the distinction between immediate experience and mediate inference so emphatically that any transaction between them appears unlikely. If certainty and truth is had in the immediacy of the

individual's faith intuition, all subsequent mediation is distanced from that certainty and truth. Because Jacobi felt that the only real alternatives for intelligible expression of immediacy were those of Rationalism and Empiricism, he is inclined to despair over the possibility of establishing a relationship.[55] He nonetheless sees the need for such a connection; this is evidenced by a letter to Hamann who, together with Herder and Jacobi, was an outstanding spokesman for the school of Gefühlsphilosophie.

> There is light in my heart but when I would bring it to the understanding it disappears. Which of the elements is the true one -- that of the understanding, which indeed fixes forms but behind them shows only a bottomless abyss or that of the heart, which indeed throws light upwards but fails in determinate knowledge. Can the human mind grasp the truth, except through the union of both in a single light?[56]

Kierkegaard's Climacus, in his descriptions of faith, proposes an alternative that he feels will resolve Jacobi's dilemma.

Jacobi's Influence on Climacus' Critique of Objective Thought

Climacus' View of the Criteria and Characteristics of Objective Thought

Kierkegaard's Climacus is in almost total agreement with Jacobi's critique of objective cognition. Both concur on the criteria for objective thought. Climacus, like Jacobi, holds that knowledge to be objective at all must be certain. Climacus also agrees that the essential meaning of certainty is the secure.[57] Knowledge is secured when it is grounded[58] and objective thought is properly rooted when it comes to rest.[59] Terminus is achieved by thought when it reaches the stage of unquestionability and registers as the immediacy of intuition.[60] Furthermore reducibility to identity is an index of the immediacy of intuition. Objective thought is valid only if it meets the demands of these criteria.

According to Climacus, objective thought can be valid only if it is clothed

with several specific characteristics. The certainty generated by thought must be thoroughly objective, that is, its truth must be in-itself and independent of the knower. The mind's assent is elicited or coerced by the object. Hence the subjectivity of the knower is minimized and objectivity is dominant.[61] If it is objective in this sense, its truth will be universal and objectively communicable.[62]

Since valid objective thought is reducible to identity and thereby intuited, it follows that every element in that movement of thought is contained in every other and all are grounded in the intuition of identity. The requisite for necessary connection between two meanings is that one is contained in the other.[63] If this requirement is present every link in the chain of thought is cemented with necessity. For Climacus, this form of necessity is essential for legitimate objective cognition.

Climacus, like Jacobi, links the characteristic of immanence with the quality of necessity that both men demand of mediated objective thought.[64] Necessity implies that every meaning is contained in every other and all are grounded in the one absolute intelligibility. Since everything is contained within everything, everything can be said to be immanent.[65] Consequently all things have the same quality and there can be no radical distinction, no fundamental otherness between God, man and world. Because transcendence is a going beyond that requires otherness, Climacus claims that mediated thought, which cannot address otherness, precludes the possibility of transcendence.

The criterion that Climacus demands for the validity of objective thought is certainty which is its reducibility to an objective ground. The characteristics that he exacts from objective thought are its in-itself validity, universality, communicability, necessity and immanence.

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The Existential Limit to Objective Thought

Climacus is in accord with Jacobi's contention that thought and existence, idea and thing, consciousness and object are discontinuous.[66] Thought mediates existence or actuality and remains divorced from it. Objective cogitation is thereby insulated in itself and can make no certain statement about the existentially real.[67] Once this split occurs, thought itself cannot reinstate existence.

Climacus agrees that the limits set on intellectual intuition by Jacobi are justified. He concurs with Jacobi's affirmation that in relation to existence all thought is mediate. As such, it cannot attain the immediacy required for an intuitional grasp of existence. The immediacy claimed for intellectual intuition is grounded in the principle of identity. Climacus acknowledges that identity can terminate a movement of thought but refuses to admit that the principle has existential reference. "An existing individual may arrive at identity as a maximum, and may repeatedly arrive at it, but only by abstracting from existence."[68] The pseudonym's attack on intellectual intuition intends to render all objective thought groundless and uncertain in matters of existence. Intuition has the quality of coerciveness only in the order of objective thought which is incommensurable with existence. The ground of objective thought may be capable of eliciting an abstract intuitional assent but this acquiescence has no impact on existential truth.

Climacus and Jacobi are one in asserting that certainty is experienced in immediacy. They further agree that, pertaining to existence, the immediacy which generates certainty is not an intellectual intuition. It thereby lacks the characteristic of a dominant objectivity coercing the mind's assent in matters of existence. Since the objectivity of the intuition bestows upon the content universality and communicability, the denial of its objectivity

is also a refusal to accept these derivative characteristics in relation to existential truth. Climacus concurs with Jacobi in affirming that immediacy delivers certainty and thus serves as a ground; yet the immediacy of certainty is had, not in intellectual intuition, but in the individual's experience of faith.

The Relation of Objective Thought to Faith

The fundamental disagreement between Climacus and Jacobi centers around the relation of the immediate certainty of faith to objective thought. In Jacobi, the immediacy of faith is had prior to all mediate thought and serves as the criterion for all certainty. Moreover this immediate experience, had in sensuous perception, expresses the unity of consciousness and actual object, thought and existence, ideality and reality. Climacus places the immediate perceptive experience in the category of aesthetic or sensuous immediacy.[69] This is a first immediacy. He parts ways with Jacobi by claiming that the first immediacy does not deliver the unity of thought and actuality in the single experience of a faith-certainty. It is not a faith experience.[70] The certainty of faith can take place only after the mediacy of thought has ruptured the aesthetic, first immediacy.[71] In Climacus' view, faith occurs after reflection but is an immediacy nonetheless: a "new immediacy" after reflection.[72]

Faith is immediate for Climacus because it is unmediated by the thought that mediates the first immediacy. He is in harmony with Jacobi's thesis that objective thought mediates the aesthetic immediacy and cannot subsequently effect a return to that immediacy. Objective cognition bifurcates thought and reality, consciousness and object, and cannot later accomplish a synthesis. In this sense, objective thought is reflective; it distances the thinking subject from a sensuous immediacy. But if the thinking subject exhausts his subjectivity in objective thought he becomes abstract -- without even the

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dimension of existence given in sensuous immediacy. The subjectivity that is usurped by objective thought cannot attain existence through thought. In this sense thought is infinite: "Reflection has the remarkable property of being infinite. But to say that it is infinite is equivalent, in any case, to saying that it cannot be stopped by itself; because in attempting to stop itself it must use itself, and is thus stopped in the same way that a disease is cured when it is allowed to choose its own treatment, which is to say that it waxes and thrives."[73]

A movement other than the movement of objective thought is required to recapture the existence lost by thought. A movement of passion is needed, but not a passion whose sensuous spontaneity is still unreflected by thought. The passion occurs after the thought that mediates the first sensuous immediacy, but the passionate movement after thought is not evoked by thought. The resolution of thought by passion is not elicited in the manner of a conclusion issuing from the intelligibility of premisses nor is it compelled by an objective intelligible content. Objective thought, though intelligible, is incommensurable with existence and consequently not coercive in existential problematics. Thus the passionate act that is commensurable with existence is not mediated by the positivity of objective thought. On the contrary, it is highly subjective, creative and immediate. The alternative that Climacus offers Jacobi, who failed to reconcile reflection with a first immediacy of faith, is that faith is a passionate act that is neither reducible to objective thought nor equivalent to the passionate spontaneity of sensuous immediacy.[74] Faith is a new immediacy -- it is a second immediacy. Faith is an immediacy after the reflection effected by objective thought.

The relationship between objective thought and inauthentic objective reflection now becomes clearer. Objective thought, which claims for itself an irreducible ground that forces subjective assent in matters pertaining to

existence, effects an inauthentic objective reflection. Such thought "bends back" subjectivity into objectivity. The intent of Climacus' critique is to block the movement of objective thought toward an objectivity that submerges subjective existence without reducing this subjectivity to the mere aesthetical determinations endorsed by Jacobi.

The principles Climacus utilizes to point up the existential impotence of objective thought are at work in his critique of an objective approach to history which can be used as an objective escape from the subjective demands of faith.

Closing an Objectively Reflected Path to Christianity: Objective History

The Intent of Climacus in his Analysis of History

Climacus' concern with the meaning of history is primarily a reaction to the pronouncements of Hegel and the Hegelians on this subject. For Climacus, the Hegelian notion of world history dialectically mediates individuality into evolving universality and results in the loss of subjectivity within objective totalities. In this pseudonym's view, the act of religion is located in subjectivity and the historical objectification of individuality implies the nihilation of faith. Climacus' intent in his analysis of history is to inhibit this objective movement away from subjectivity and to establish the latter at the center of the religious experience.

Besides the objective bent of Hegelian reflection, the path away from subjectivity was also opened by objective analyses and exegeses of scripture, considered as historical documents, with the intent of establishing the authenticity of witnesses and the plausability of Christ and Christian doctrine.

The Strategy of Climacus: The Attack on Objective Certainty

Climacus' strategy is to attack the objective certainty that both immediate

cognition and immediate sensation claim for themselves[75] in the analysis of historical phenomena. If immediate cognition and immediate sensation cannot deliver objective certainty with regard to history, then the objective route to historical events is closed and the only way one can relate to such phenomena is through subjectivity. The historical occurrence uppermost in the mind of Climacus is the God's coming to be in time.

Criteria and Characteristics Required for an Objective Grasp of History

For Climacus, our objective knowledge of history rests on the understanding of the causes of historical events. Without the knowledge of the cause, the incident remains mute and falls into the realm of brute fact. The event only becomes intelligible when its cause is known, that is, when the intelligibility of the cause is manifest. Therefore, the intelligibility of the effect inheres within the understandability of the cause. Since the effect as effect resides within the cause, our objective knowledge of historical happenings assumes their immanence.

The objective knowledge of history has the characteristic of necessity. If the comprehensibility of the effect fully resides in the intelligibility of the cause, then apprehension of the cause fully delivers knowledge of the effect. The relation between cause and effect cannot in any way be said to be fortuitous. Indeed the essential requisite for intelligibility is precisely the necessity of the relationship. Our objective knowledge of the sequence of historical phenomena assumes necessary connection between those events.

The conceivability of every effect is had in its cause and the intelligibility of the entire concatenation of events is had in its ground. Intelligibility requires reducibility to a ground which secures the understandability of every element in the chain and the entire chain itself. Reducibility to a

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single ground is reducibility to identity which rests the process and insures the security of certainty. Climacus places intuition of the ground in the category of "immediate cognition." He exacts this characteristic from a fully objective understanding of history.

Failure of Thought to Meet Objective Requirements for a Grasp of History

Climacus claims that an objective grasp of history is not possible. He arrives at this assertion by establishing a disparity between the nature of history and the criteria for valid objective knowledge. For Climacus, history involves coming into existence.[76] It is essentially related to real becoming in real time. Historical becoming involves process in real time. Objective knowledge of historical process is not possible because the criterion for genuine objective cognition is certainty. Knowledge can only be certain when it is grounded in an objective terminus. A movement of thought through sets of necessary relationships is possible only if the relationships are reducible to staticity in the principle of identity and grasped as such in "immediate cognition". Since all necessary, intelligible relations are generated by, and are traceable to this immutable ground, a movement of thought involves no real change or process but rather manifests staticity. "The immutability of the necessary, on the contrary, consists in its constant relating itself to itself, and in its relating itself to itself always in the same manner, excluding every change."[77] Consequently the character of the certainty required for valid objective thought renders such thought inadequate for an understanding of process which is essential to history. "Certainty is impossible for anyone in process of becoming, and the semblance of certainty constitutes for such an individual a deception."[78] Climacus contends that an approach to history that claims to objectively secure history through immediate cognition is not commensurable with the nature of history and so must fail. Sensuous immediacy

is no better equipped than cognitive immediacy to express historical relationships.

Failure of Sensuous Immediacy to Grasp Historical Phenomena with Certitude

The high priority placed by Jacobi on the capacity of sensuous immediacy to deliver certainty is severely challenged by Climacus. Climacus allows that sensuous immediacy is guileless: "Immediate sensation and immediate cognition cannot deceive."[79] The immediacy of sensation cannot deceive because it has nothing to do with misrepresentation. Such an immediacy simply affirms that the event is. But consciousness of effect as effect goes beyond the consciousness of presence. "I cannot sense or know immediately that what I sense or know immediately is an effect, since for the immediate apprehension it merely is."[80] Consequently the causal relations of history fall outside the scope of sensuous immediacy. "The immediate impression of a natural phenomenon or of an event is not the impression of the historical, for the coming into existence involved cannot be sensed immediately, but only immediate presence."[81]

Recognition of an effect as an effect demands the activity not of simple immediacy but rather of reflection.[82] The meaning of effect carries with it the meaning of "coming into existence". Since coming into existence is essentially related to the historical, the activity of reflection rather than that of simple immediacy is required for a grasp of history. Reflection ruptures sensuous immediacy together with its purported certainty and places consciousness in a position that is receptive to the historical.

In his discussion of history, Climacus has accomplished three things. He denies that necessary, intelligible relationships grounded in immediate objective cognition, are adequate to express the real movement of history. He denies that the immediacy of the sensuous consciousness is the proper organ for a grasp of history. Finally he affirms that reflection is essential for

an historical consciousness. It is clear that the thought which effects the reflection required for history cannot have the same function and characteristics as the Rationalistic mode of cognition he criticizes earlier -- it cannot be the thought that seeks an intellibile ground to serve as the support for the certainty of a stream of necessary relationships. The kind of thinking that is appropriate for an historical consciousness must be commensurable, not with the certainty of intelligible ground, but with "the uncertainty of coming into existence."[83]

The Condition for the Objective Uncertainty of History: Negativity and Freedom

There are two elements constitutive of coming into existence which account for the objective uncertainty of all historical knowledge.

> The nothingness of the antecedent non-being is one side of it, while the annihilation of the possible is another, the latter being at the same time the annihilation of every other possibility.[84]

The non-being out of which being comes to be is not a bare nothingness. It is "a being, which is nevertheless a non-being."[85] Climacus' stress on the element of negativity in being is an attack on a form of cognition whose pure positivity demands necessity and eliminates possibility.[86] If every meaning is contained within every other and all are grounded in an intelligibility that immediately coerces the mind's yea saying, then a positive affirmation in the first intuition is an affirmation of every element derived from it. Hence the cognitive process is positive both in the mind's affirmation and in the intelligible content. The initial affirmation, being an affirmation of all subsequently deduced truths, insures the necessity of all relationships, the certainty of every element in the chain, and precludes possibility. Climacus combats the certainty of such necessity by emphasizing the negativity within all becoming.

The negativity of coming into existence conditions uncertainty through

"the annihilation of the possible" which is "at the same time the annihilation of every other possibility." The destruction of the possible is another expression for the coming to be of the actual while the emergence of the actual is the elimination of a variety of possibilities. When possibility is terminated by the actual, a backward glance at the process may be inclined to establish a necessary connection of the actual as effect with a thoroughly definable and positive cause. This procedure produces a hindsight description of being's potency -- its negativity. But such delineation of potency bestows form on the formlessness of negativity. It crowds out negativity with positivity and implicitly denies the radically negative element of all being. In so doing, it neglects the possibilities that were open to the non-being of the being before the transition.[87] It is in fact to limit the possibilities to this one which has been realized. To restrict possibility to one is to affirm necessity and deny possibility. On the other hand, if actuality arises through the annihilation of possibility and the "annihilation of every other possibility," then it cannot be said that coming into existence occurs with necessity and with necessity's certainty. Climacus attempts to inhibit an interpretation of history's movement as necessary by allowing a plurality of options open to the negativity of being. But the condition for these possibilities is the negativity of freedom.

The negativity in human history's coming into existence is an expression for freedom. This is the fundamental postulate of Climacus' Fragments. "All coming into existence takes place with freedom, not by necessity. Nothing comes into existence by virtue of a logical ground, but only by a cause. Every cause terminates in a freely effecting cause."[88] History's coming into existence is not rooted in a positive intelligible ground that generates necessity and its concomitant certainty. It is grounded in the negativity of freedom which is not intelligible in a positive sense but which is the condition of possibility

and its correlative uncertainty.

Neither a sensuous immediacy nor objective thought that is finalized in an intelligible ground is adequate for a grasp of history's coming into existence. The thought that is required for history ruptures sensuous immediacy. In this sense, it is mediately reflective. But this reflection does not search for an intelligible foundation; rather, it recognizes the negativity of freedom, freedom's objective unknowability and objective uncertainty.

Freedom, Contradiction, Transcendence and the Impotency of Objective Thought for a Grasp of History

Climacus, in agreeing with Jacobi that rationalistic cognition is limited to a single quality and so precludes the possibility of transcendence, also concurs that real causality lends itself to the emergence of transcendence. However Climacus locates more precisely the area for this transcendence. Transcendence is possible in history because the fundamental cause in history is human freedom.

Transcendence means going beyond and to go beyond is to be at a distance from. The distance is obviously not spatial but is the remoteness of difference. Difference implies duality which, in turn, infers otherness. If the other is to be truly other there must be a difference in quality between them. But qualitative otherness is an expression for contradiction and so transcendence requires qualitative contradiction. "Contradiction is implicit in all coming into existence."[89] History is directly involved with coming into existence; therefore contradiction and transcendence are constitutive elements of all history.

The terms of the contradiction that allows for transcendence in history are being and non-being. Being is actuality, positivity, necessity, object; non-being is potency, negativity, freedom, subject. Although these contradictories

are qualitative, they reside together and are involved in all coming into existence. Given the negativity of freedom in the history of human existence, the positivity of objective thought with its thrust toward resolution in an intelligible ground has neither power to deal with free human history nor with the contradictions stemming from freedom in history. Subjective faith, not objective thought, is commensurable with human history. --

Faith and History: The Character of Faith in Relation to History

The activity that is adequate for a grasp of coming into existence is faith. "Now faith has precisely the required character; for in certainty of belief there is always present a negated uncertainty, in every way corresponding to the uncertainty of coming into existence."[90] It is apparent that the uncertainty connected with coming into existence is an objective uncertainty. Necessity implies objective certainty while coming into existence occurs with freedom. There can be no objective certainty with regard to freedom and the contradictions stemming from freedom. So also there can be no objective certainty with regard to coming into existence. Putting it positively, coming into existence pertains to objective uncertainty. Objective uncertainty is nihilated by the subjective certainty of belief.

Belief is highly dialectical. This means that it is constituted by opposing terms. Belief cannot simply be a subjective certainty that is indifferent to objectivity. If it were, then faith would terminate process in a subjective ground just as emphatically as thought completes movement in an objective principle. Neither pole, taken separately, is congruous with historical process. In faith, there is a dialectical interplay between subjective certainty and objective uncertainty. The former is won through struggle with the latter. Moreover the dialectical tension is not resolved

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with the arrival of subjective certainty. That is, the subjective certainty of faith cannot be considered a phase that has passed through objective uncertainty and is no longer challenged by it.[91] Objective uncertainty always remains an at-hand threat to subjective certainty. That is why the passion of faith requires repetition to sustain its dialectic.[92] The polarities, subjective certainty -- objective uncertainty, provide the tension in the dialectical movement of faith.

Ordinary Faith and Reflection in History

The function of reflection in the ordinary act of faith now becomes more fully delineated. Faith is not possible as long as one resides in sensuous immediacy. Reflection destroys that immediacy in effecting a distance from it which is opened up by objective thought. Such thought is not capable of grasping any existence and especially not competent for an understanding of human "coming into existence" when the negativity of freedom is seen to be constitutive of human becoming. The inability of objective thought to provide for certainty in matters of human existence generates the reflectivity that allows for the possibility of the emergence of passionate faith with regard to historical events.

Ordinary belief is not specifically directed toward religious phenomena. However historical events that have a religious character minimally make a demand on the passion of ordinary faith since they are, after all, historical. Yet throughout his discussion of history, Climacus keeps an eye on the central historical happening that distinguishes Christianity: the coming into existence of the Eternal in time. The character of faith, and its prerequisite reflection take on a new dimension when confronted with the Christian Paradox.[93]

Religious Implications of the Destruction of Objective History

The destruction of an objective interpretation of history shuts off an objective route to religious phenomena in history. Intellectual conviction elicited by rationally structured religious doctrine developed through history cannot be constitutive of a religious act. Since objective doctrine that purports to be rationally coherent must terminate in an intelligible ground, Climacus' description of the impotency of this ground destroys the relevance of all such doctrine to the existential act of religion.

The destruction of objective history also negates the value of the objective testimony of witnesses to religious phenomena in history. Since all coming into existence takes place with a freedom that transcends sensuous and cognitive immediacy and whose proper organ is faith, a contemporary to a religious event (miracles and the like) is in no better objective position for a grasp of such phenomena than a later disciple. The passionate, subjective act of faith renders everyone equally contemporaneous with the religious events of history.[94] Indeed no event can be termed religious until this faith act is performed.

The impotence of objective thought prevents an objective historical route to Christianity and thereby prevents an inauthentic objective reflection, while allowing the possibility for the disclosure of subjectivity in faith. The fulfilled possibility of subjectivity's faith disclosure is indicative of an authentic reflection.

Authentic Objective Thought and the Movement of Authentic Reflection

It has been stated that objective thought is authentic when it allows for a movement of authentic reflection. This reflective movement is authentic when it at least allows the possibility for the emergence of subjectivity as differentiated from objectivity -- that is, when it allows subjectivity to "bend back" from objectivity producing self-consciousness. It follows that

objective thought is minimally authentic when it allows for the emergence of a differentiated subjectivity.

Authentic Objective Thought and the Reflection of First Immediacy

Objective thought fills the basic requirement for authenticity by mediating the first sensuous immediacy. In brute sensuous immediacy, nothing is differentiated. All polarities including subjectivity-objectivity and truth-error are indistinguishable in that primary immediacy.

> How then is the child's consciousness to be described? It is essentially quite indefinite, a fact we can also state by saying that it is "immediate". Immediacy is indefiniteness. In immediacy relationships are absent; for as soon as relationships exist, immediacy is annulled. In immediacy therefore everything is true; but this truth is straightway untrue; for in immediacy everything is untrue.[95]

Immediacy is a sphere of existence: "Immediacy is reality."[96] But it is a mode of existence wherein all polarities are submerged. Differentiated subjectivity and a differentiated truth are not achieved in immediate existence.

Immediate existence is annulled by mediacy. The mediating of immediate actuality is accomplished by thought in speech. Since speech is the embodiment of thought and idea, "speech is ideality."[97] Climacus sets his position in question and answer form. "What then is immediacy? It is reality. What is mediacy? It is Word. How does word annul Reality? By talking about it."[98]

Kierkegaard's Climacus has grasped an essential implication of the use of symbol. The symbolism of language disengages the speaker from the limitations of direct, brute experience. No longer plunged into a world that can be experienced only in sensuous particularity, the symbol-user can know and manage reality by thinking and manipulating its symbols. He can think existence. But the thought-symbol is not itself reality; it represents or "stands for" it. In this sense, language that embodies thought is distanced from existence. It can therefore be said that thought in speech mediates reality and distinguishes

the speaker from existence. The differentiation of the thinking subject from existence is a requisite for the constitution of subjectivity as distinct from objectivity. In as much as this distance reveals a distinguishable self, the reflectivity of thought that effects this distance meets one of the requirements for authenticity.

It is important to understand that this function of objective thought is authentic only in regard to the distinguishing of subjectivity from brute immediacy. Once fluent in language, consciousness may saturate its entire experience with symbol, the linguistic patterns of structured symbol and the logic that is associated with these structures. The subjectivity that was revealed in thought may exhaust itself in the thinking that is comfortable only in the consistency of its own terms. It may reduce the first immediacy of existence to the immediacy of intellectual intuition of identity and contradiction resulting in both the loss of existence and the dissipation of subjectivity in objective abstraction. It thereby performs an inauthentic objective reflection.

Authentic Objective Thought and the Juxtaposition of Contradictories

A second function of authentic objective thought is the juxtaposition of contradictories. Kierkegaard discerns this specific activity of thought in both the doubting and the ironic consciousnesses.

We have already seen how Kierkegaard's Climacus views the operation of thought in the doubting consciousness.[99] That discussion can now be related to the authenticity of thought in authentic reflection. Thought reflects subjectivity from immediate existence and generates the polarization of subjectivity and objectivity. In so far as subjectivity is revealed by this reflection, objective thought meets one of the requirements for authenticity. However

consciousness is not fully constituted through the simple reflectivity of objective thought. If the contradictories generated by the act of thinking are merely contemplated by thought, a real doubting consciousness does not emerge. For real doubt, subjectivity must passionately engage the polarities provided by objective thought. Nonetheless the juxtaposition of contradictories by objective thought is an essential requirement for real doubt.[100] Given a real doubting consciousness, the polarizing activity of thought must be present. In authentic doubt, objective thought is authentic in the juxtaposition of contradictories.

The function of objective thought in the constitution of the doubting consciousness is simply to propose contradictories. It is important to note that objective thought presents the contradictions, it does not discard them. When objective thought does not invalidate the contradictions it discovers, it is clearly not operating with the principles of contradiction and identity.

The doubtful consciousness has some similarity with the ironic consciousness. Although real doubt is constituted in being between the contradiction while irony remains indifferent to it, neither assents to the truth of any objective principle or conclusion. Irony sees its task as offsetting any objective thesis by objectively demonstrating its opposite. It endorses neither its own rebuttal of any thesis nor the logical principles underlying its argument. On the contrary, it claims that, since it is possible to demonstrate the opposite of any objective thesis, the objective certainty of any given proposition is illusory. In the absence of an objective resolution of the contradiction, the possibility is allowed for either the willed disengagement of subjectivity from the objective contradiction (and this is irony) or for the emergence of subjectivity's interest between the polarities (and this is doubt). Objective thought, in allowing the possibility for the emergence of a differentiated

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subjectivity by closing off objective resolution, performs an authentic reflection.

A year after the publication of the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard, writing without a pseudonym, endorses this function of objective thought.

> Knowledge is the infinite art of equivocation or the infinite equivocation; at its utmost it means precisely to place contrasting possibilities in equilibrium. To be able to do this is to have knowledge, and only he who knows how to communicate contrasting possibilities in equipoise, only he communicates knowledge.[101]

The first and second functions of objective thought perform a movement of authentic reflection because they differentiate subjectivity and allow for a viable self-consciousness. But a subjectivity that is merely distanced from simple immediacy and the doubtful subjectivity fall short of the height of human subjectivity, Christian faith. For Climacus, the function of objective thought that reflects the believing consciousness differs from its function in reflecting immediacy and in reflecting doubt.

The Reflectivity of Authentic Objective Thought in the Act of Christian Faith

In the act of Christian faith, objective thought has a function that essentially distinguishes Christian faith from pagan forms of religiousness. In order to underline the Christian distinction, Climacus describes the Platonic and Socratic consciousnesses.

Platonic Idealism is placed by Climacus in the category of recollection.[102] Unlike mere remembrance which has been empirically explicated in terms of the mechanics of sensation and imagination, recollection expresses the backward reflection of existence into the idea. Kierkegaard's pseudonym views the Greek idea or ideal as universal which implies that it is trans-spatial and trans-temporal -- in one word, it is eternal. As such it is abstracted from individual existence which is always in temporal process of becoming. Since

the idea is immune to change and the future orientation connected with process, its resulting static nature has the accompanying note of "always was". The vectors of Platonic Idealism, according to Climacus, trend toward the past. Moreover truth and reality are not to be discovered in the flux of particular existents, but in the eternal idea. The idea, the universal, the eternal, truth and reality point to the past and transcend individual existence in time.

Each moment of individual existence finds its justification and its truth in the abstract eternal which is always already within as past.[103] To possess the truth in individual existence is to make explicit, to re-collect the inherent eternal which has always already arrived from the past. The entire significance of the individual existent in the present is grounded in a recollected eternal.[104] Individual existence is lost to the present and deprived of a future by being found and grounded in the past. Thus every moment has only a trivial historical significance in passing into its past,[105] and the individual's existential moment loses its decisiveness for truth.[106] Human existence is spent in reflectively recollecting an abstract, eternal past.

Climacus interprets the position of Socrates as radically different from that of Platonic Idealism. He maintains that Socrates is an ironic consciousness. The function of irony, like scepticism, is to challenge the validity of any proposed truth by demonstrating the feasibility of its antithesis. This activity of irony renders the objective idea objectively uncertain. Moreover it preserves subjectivity over against the demands of a coercive objectivity. Socratic irony throws doubt on the validity of the Platonic, objective, abstract, eternal idea thereby sustaining individual subjectivity. By refusing to vaporize subjectivity in the abstract eternal, Socrates juxtaposes the possibilities of his existing individuality with the eternal truth that sceptical thought

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has rendered objectively uncertain. These are the terms of the paradox constituting pagan religiousness. "The paradox emerges when the eternal truth and existence are placed in juxtaposition with one another."[107] Here there is juxtaposition rather than fusion precisely because irony has challenged the compelling power of the objective idea. Irony has reduced the eternal to objective uncertainty. To sustain a relationship to an objectively uncertain eternal makes a demand on subjectivity. Such a relationship defined pagan religiousness as "objective uncertainty held fast in an appropriation process of the most passionate inwardness."[108]

The tension within the paradox of pagan religiousness is mollified by the ever present possibility of reverting back to speculative recollection. "To do this is to speculate; to be able to do this, but to reject the possibility by apprehending the task of life as a realization of inwardness in existing, is the Socratic position."[109] Climacus claims that the speculative, objective route to the eternal remains a threat to irony. The validity of irony cannot itself be an objectively verifiable and permanently fixed posture since irony challenges all objective evidence. Fundamentally the ironic posture is subjectively willed, not objectively validated. Since irony is not objectively controlled, it lacks objective stability. Consequently the speculative objective path always remains open for this form of consciousness. The possibility of the objectification of individual subjectivity, always open for the ironic consciousness, is entirely closed off by Christianity's absolute paradox, the absurd. It is exactly this characteristic that distinguishes Christian faith from pagan belief.

A paradox, that is, the juxtaposition between eternal truth and individual existence, takes on a qualitatively different tension when the possibility of reverting to the immersion of existence in a speculative eternality

is entirely closed off. It is the absurd that blocks the path of retreat to the immanence of speculative recollection. The absurd is the "knot" that prevents a "superficial reflection" from immanentizing the possibility for transcendence in individual existence. "The absurd is -- that the eternal truth has come into being in time, that God has come into being, has been born, has grown up, and so forth, precisely like any other individual human being, quite indistinguishable from other individuals."[110] The absurd is the figure of Christ; the image of the God-man. It is the objective certainty that the insertion of the eternal into time is absurd that decisively separates the Christian paradox from the Socratic.

> When Socrates believed that there was a God, he held fast to the objective uncertainty with the whole passion of his inwardness, and it is precisely in this contradiction and in this risk that faith is rooted. Now it is otherwise. Instead of objective uncertainty, there is here a certainty, namely that objectively it is absurd; and this absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness is faith.[111]

The absurd is a self-contradiction whose terms are the eternal and time. Eternality excludes the determinations of time[112] and conversely, temporality excludes the characteristics of eternality. These mutually exclusive terms are held together in the God-man -- the Christian's object of faith.[113] The central religious object of Christianity is a self-contradiction.

The absurd is an objective, logical, contradiction. Objectivity is always incommensurable with existence and only subjectivity can grasp existence. Climacus unequivocally states that the certainty pertaining to the absurd is an "objective certainty". The contradiction constituting the absurd is contemplated in objective thought as a logical contradiction.

The Christian absurd is a rationally untenable contradiction. It has previously been shown that the function of objective thought in the sceptic's consciousness is to juxtapose contradictories. For the sceptic, the arrangement of contradiction does not imply its rejection. The repudiation of contradiction

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demands adherence to the logical principle of contradiction and the sceptic admits no such commitment. Consequently, confrontation with contradiction within sceptical thought does not result in rational offense. The situation is exactly the reverse in the case of the Christian absurd. Indeed the term, "absurd", implies more than simple contradiction; it connotes rejection. Rejection is an expression for the opposition of contradiction to objective thought. The absurd "involves the contradiction that something which can become historical only in direct opposition to all human reason, has become historical."[114] The absurd is "objective repulsion."[115]

The function of objective thought in the reflectivity of the act of Christian faith becomes evident. Objective thought exhibits the logical contradiction inherent in the object of Christian faith and rejects it as rationally undigestible. For reason, the object of Christian faith cannot be entertained as a logical object. Or better, from the perspective of logic, the Christian's faith object cannot be said to have intelligible content. Moreover the principles of logic affirm that the Christian's faith object is most certainly not an intelligible object. Objective thought's certainty of the objective logical nothingness of the Christian's faith object absolutely shuts off even the possibility of an objective route to Christianity. The only remaining path to Christianity is subjectivity.

The relation of objective thought to the reflectivity of the act of Christian faith is now transparent. Objective thought with its objective certainty of absurdity blocks an objective appropriation of the Christian object and thereby prevents an inauthentic sublating of subjectivity in objectivity. Putting it positively, objective thought, in definitively disallowing an objective approach to Christianity, reflects subjectivity from objectivity. The reflectivity effected by the function of objective thought absolutely disengages subjectivity

from objectivity and allows the possibility of subjectivity's creative disclosure with regard to Christianity's absolute paradox. "The absurd is precisely by its objective repulsion the measure of the intensity of faith in inwardness."[116] Authentic objective thought authentically reflects subjectivity by revealing a distinguishable subjectivity and by divulging the demands made upon subjectivity by Christianity. With regard to Christianity, objective thought is authentically reflected in "understanding that it cannot be understood."

Faith-Reason and Climacus' Definition of Christian Faith

There has been considerable controversy among commentators regarding Kierkegaard's view of the relationship between faith and reason or objective thought. These scholars are split on the problem of whether Kierkegaard's descriptions of faith imply that faith is in direct contradiction to reason or whether faith transcends reason without contradicting it. The foregoing analysis of the function of objective thought in authentically reflecting the possibility of faith throws some light on this issue.

One element of the difficulty that divides interpretations of Climacus' position has to do with the nature of the contradiction constituting the absurd or the absolute paradox. Some view the absurd as a "behavioral" contradiction. "It is the 'paradox' of having one's ordinary sense of interests and values disturbed by meeting God in Christ. This creates an opposition (a behavioral opposition, not a logical one)."[117] David Swenson concurs with this interpretation. He understands Climacus' use of "Reason" in the Fragments to mean "the reflectively organized common sense of mankind, including as its essential core a sense of life's values. Over against the 'Paradox', it is therefore the self-assurance and self-assertiveness of man's nature in its totality."[118]

A second interpretation affirms that the Christian's faith object is a logical self-contradiction. "The Incomprehensible or true absurd is the logically

self-contradictory."[119] The absurd denotes "the abrogation of the principle of contradiction, the denial of the principle of identity."[120] Those who claim a logical contradiction describe its terms as the eternal, necessary, infinite, God on the one side and the temporal, possible, finite, man on the other.[121]

Those who are opposed to interpreting the absolute paradox as a logical contradiction claim that there can be no such contradiction because the God-term cannot be defined.[122]

The absurd as described in the Postscript is wrongly conceived as a "behavioral" paradox. There can be no doubt that the eternal God's coming to be as man in time will generate a clash with an individual's "sense of life's values" as they are lived out in his behavior. Kierkegaard underlines the abrasiveness between an individual's "reasonable" worldly values and the seriousness of Christian existence implied by the Incarnation in such works as Judge For Yourselves[123] and throughout Works of Love. Here the contradiction is between the God-man and my individual existence and this is one possibility for offense at Christianity. However, when Climacus describes the absurd in the Postscript, he does not at first refer it to any mode of individual existence. The contradiction constituting the absurd is not between my individual existence and the God-man. The existing self is not a term of the contradiction. In Climacus' analysis, the contradiction is discovered in the figure of the God-man himself without reference to my existence. This contradiction is first described objectively. The objectivity of the description is disclosed in Climacus' phrasing -- "Instead of objective uncertainty, there is here a certainty, namely that objectively it is absurd." Only after this contradiction is objectively expressed, is subjectivity's relation to the God-man described as faith -- "and this absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness is faith." On the one side, we have the objectively described contradiction without reference

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to subjectivity's passionate appropriation. In this sense, subjectivity is "externally" reflected from the objectively described absurd. On the other side, subjectivity passionately engages this contradiction through its appropriation of it. In the appropriation of the objectively exhibited contradiction the faith-consciousness is constituted. This consciousness can also be described in terms of a contradiction one of whose poles is the self. That is, the consciousness constituted in faith can be described as an "internal" contradiction. But this form of description is not undertaken by Climacus in the Postscript. He himself is not a Christian and so describes the content of the act of faith externally and objectively. The "behavioral" interpretation of the paradox refers to the contradiction between individual existence and the God-man and does not focus on the God-man contradiction itself. To raise the question of a behavioral paradox in the context of the internal reflection of the incommensurable terms, subjective existence and the absolutely other may well be appropriate. However this is not the external contradiction that Climacus describes as the absolute paradox, the absurd. In reference to Climacus' definition of Christian faith under consideration, the absurd cannot properly be called a behavioral paradox.

A significant objection to the view that the absurd is a logical contradiction is that both terms of the contradiction cannot be defined. In the Philosophical Fragments, Climacus clearly states that, in the God-man contradiction, God is the unknown.[124] Since it is impossible to have a logical contradiction unless both terms are defined, the absurd cannot be a logical contradiction. This objection is important because it reveals a difference in Climacus' description of the absolute paradox in the Fragments and his description of the absurd in the Postscript.

Climacus begins his discussion of the absolute paradox in the third

chapter of the Philosophical Fragments. The culmination of a specific progression in his explanation points up the difference in the absolute paradox of the Fragments and the absurd of the Postscript.

Climacus starts the discussion of the absolute paradox with an investigation of the pathos of reason. By so doing, he shifts the emphasis from a framework wherein reason is central and the place of pathos a minor or residual element, to a new setting wherein human pathos is central and reason must subsequently find its relationship to passion. Because "the highest pitch of every passion is to will its own downfall",[125] reason itself is a suicidal passion: "the supreme paradox of all thought is the attempt to discover something that thought cannot think."[126]

The second phase of Climacus' thought arises with the question of determining the object upon which the pathos of reason seeks collision and its own downfall. Climacus simply states, "It is the Unknown,"[127] which he hypothetically equates with "the God."[128]

Climacus immediately launches into a refutation of the proofs for God's existence and this opens the third stage of the progression. If the God is to be identified with the Unknown, he cannot be made transparent through rational demonstration. The critique of such proof centers around the contention that thought is abstract and not capable of verifying any existence.[129] Thought and existence, ideality and reality are qualitatively distinct. In a proposed proof for the God's existence, "What is lacking is a distinction between factual being and ideal being."[130]

The fourth phase begins with the answer to the renewed question: What is the Unknown? "It is the limit to which Reason repeatedly comes, and in so far, substituting a static form of conception for the dynamic, it is the different, the absolutely different."[131] Because the object upon which Reason founders is

the absolutely other, it cannot conceive it. From the viewpoint of reason, the conception of the absolutely other would be tantamount to rendering it commensurable with reason and destroying its radical otherness. From the standpoint of the absolutely other, reason's conception of that other would amount to reason's transcendence of itself.[132]

The final phase of Climacus' thought comes with the assertion that it is sin which is constitutive of the absolute unlikeness.[133] That unlikeness, due to sin which man has brought down upon himself, is not proclaimed by man but by the absolutely other.[134]

Sin is the ground of the qualitative distance between God and man. That qualitative difference puts the God completely out of the reach of reason. Yet God, the Unknown, becomes man. The God-man is thus inaccessible to reason because the God-term cannot be described.

> This man is also the God. How do I know? I cannot know it, for in order to know it I would have to know God, and the nature of the difference between the God and man; and this I cannot know, because the reason has reduced it to likeness with that from which it was unlike.[135]

In the Fragments, Climacus clearly disallows an essentialistic definition of the God which precludes the possibility of discerning the "nature of the difference between God and man." Thus the "difference" cannot be determined as a logical contradiction. It cannot be said that the absolute paradox of the Fragments is a logical contradiction. Climacus changes this view in the Postscript.

Climacus introduces the absurd in the second chapter of the Postscript. He begins this chapter, entitled, "The Subjective Truth, Inwardness; Truth is Subjectivity," with a polemic against the Hegelian mediation into identity of subject and object.[136] Climacus repeatedly returns to this polemic throughout the discussion.[137] Against the principle of mediation he affirms the

discontinuity between subjectivity and objectivity.[138] This argument with the speculative principle of mediation is the first phase of his thinking which leads to the discussion of the absurd.

A second phase can be discerned in his explication of the paradox as the tension between inwardness in existing and the eternal truth.[139] The discontinuity between subjectivity and objectivity serves to express the tension between subjective, passionate existence and an objective approach to the eternal truth. This is a paradox but it is not yet the absolute paradox, the absurd.

The tension between subjective existence and the eternal truth is released if a purely objective appropriation of the eternal is accomplished. In the third phase, Climacus briefly rejects objective proofs as a legitimate path to the eternal truth.[140] He praises Socrates who, through self-proclaimed ignorance,[141] refuses this path and maintains the tension of the paradox.

The fourth stage is the explication of Socratic faith.[142] Socrates reduces to uncertainty the objective approach to the eternal. This form of faith "is precisely the contradiction between the infinite passion of the individual's inwardness and the objective uncertainty."[143]

The fifth step introduces sin as the element that distinguishes Christian from Socratic faith.[144] The path to the eternal truth by way of objective speculation, which is always accessible to Socrates, is entirely shut off through consciousness of sin.[145] Sin renders subjective, individual, existence absolutely incommensurable with eternal truth. The eternal truth is absolutely other than existing subjectivity.

The sixth and culminating step is the description of the absurd. The absolutely other than man becomes man -- "The eternal truth has come into being in time."[146] When reason is turned toward the absurd it discovers

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"the contradiction that something which can become historical only in direct opposition to all human reason, has become historical."[147] It must be underlined here that reason, when confronted with the absurd, does indeed grasp it as contradictory to reason.[148] Reason is objectively certain of the absurdity.

The differences in the explication of the God-man paradox in the Fragments and the Postscript can now be detected. The discussion of the suicidal passion of reason found in the Fragments is absent from the Postscript and this is the main reason why the description of the paradox in the former differs from the absurd of the latter.

In the Fragments, the pathos of reason is intrinsically a thrust toward reason's self-destruction. The passion of reason is not simply directed toward reason's illuminating of the unknown. If the objective character of reason is associated with enlightenment, the passion of reason directs reason against itself. The power of the principles of reason which guide it toward objective clarity is broken by an opposite line of force -- the passion of reason. It is this passion that propels reason toward the unknown as that which it cannot know. Reason cannot grasp that which is absolutely other than reason. The unknown, the absolutely other "is the limit to which Reason repeatedly comes." Yet to recognize a limit precisely as limit implies that it has already been surpassed or transcended. Reason cannot transcend the objective principles that ground it. Therefore reason's recognition of its limitations is not accomplished through its own rational principles. It is passion, specifically the passion of reason, which, in moving reason to its own undoing, discloses its discontinuity with the cognitively voracious principles of objective thought, reveals the limitations of reason and points to the Unknown as unknowable. That there is an unknown, an absolutely other, which is a limit to reason is not discovered here by the affirmation of an objective

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contradiction which is exhibited through principles of reason such as the principle of noncontradiction. The Unknown, the absolutely other which is a limit to reason is disclosed as unknown in the passion of reason itself. In the Fragments, Climacus appears to be saying that if there were no Unknown, no absolutely other, reason would be without the self-destructive passion indigenous to it. Given such an Unknown, the restless passion of reason moves it to its own destruction and indicates reason's limitation. It is just this stress on reason's passion as the ground for the discernment of the transcendence of reason that relieves Climacus of the need to express the God-man paradox as a rationally repulsive logical contradiction in the Fragments. This is not the case in his Postscript to the Fragments.

In the Postscript, Climacus introduces his discussion of the absurd, not with an analysis of the pathos of reason but with a fiery attack on the Hegelian mediation into identity of subject and object. The setting for the problem is therefore different from the Fragments in two respects. In avoiding his previous discussion of the self-destructive pathos of reason, he relinquishes that ground for establishing the God-man's transcendence of reason. Moreover, he creates an intensely polemical atmosphere wherein he reduces the dialectic of the mediation of subject and object to the mere objectivity of abstract thought. His intent is to make emphatic distinctions between the speculative Idealism of Plato and Hegel, the Socratic faith and Christian faith. Speculative thought mediates subjectivity into the objective idea and loses the former to abstraction. Socratic faith resists such mediation by reducing the eternal idea to objective uncertainty while maintaining an existing relationship toward it. With regard to Christianity, there is objective certainty of the absurdity of its object. Here all possibility for speculative activity is terminated because objective thought itself, operating with its own principles,

discovers the contradictoriness of the Christian's object of faith. The terms of the contradiction are not unknown to thought. The God is associated with an eternal that excludes time and historicity. Man is associated with time and historicity that excludes eternity.[149] Climacus' attack on speculation in the Postscript has led him to close off the speculative route to the Christian faith-object, not by grounding its transcendence in passion but by rooting its contradictoriness in the principles of reason itself.

The God-man, eternity-time paradox as described in the Postscript is a contradiction for thought. There is objective certainty of its contradictoriness. Climacus makes explicit the distinction between objective and subjective certainty.[150] Subjective certainty is an inner conviction that is grounded, not in the principles of objective thought, but in the passion of subjectivity itself. Objective certainty, on the other hand, is grounded in objective, rational principles which are abstract in as much as they are not pertinent to existence. Subjectivity, not objectivity, is connected with existence. Moreover, Climacus associates abstract, nonexistential thought with logic.[151] Objective certainty of absurdity can only be grounded in logical principles. Since the God-man is a contradiction that is repulsive to thought, its absurdity can only be grounded in the principle of noncontradiction.

Climacus' development of the meaning of the absolute paradox in both the Fragments and the Postscript includes the element of sin. Ordinarily any discussion of sin would appear to fall within a theological domain that would remain immune to the encroachments of philosophical or purely rational determinations. Yet Climacus in his polemic with speculative thought is led to discuss the rational implications of sin. The Hegelians had reduced sin to a necessary, immanent moment in the dialectical development of the Idea. Sin is merely an anticipatory moment of truth. Here sin takes on the negative character

of error which is intrinsically directed toward truth and in this sense, sin is commensurable with its opposite toward which it is necessarily propelled. Against this notion, Climacus contends that sin is the mark of the incommensurability between man, the sinner, and God. Sin is the ground of the qualitative difference between man and God. It accounts for the radical contradictoriness of the figure of the God-man. Yet in order to prevent speculation's sublation of the God-man contradiction, Climacus in the Postscript meets speculation on its own ground. He holds that this incommensurability, grounded in sin, is revealed in thought and for thought as a logical contradiction. "The evasion by which speculative philosophy attempts to recollect itself out of existence has been made impossible."[152]

When, in the face of the objective certainty of the Christ absurdity, Christ is "held fast in the passion of inwardness," there is faith. Faith is the subjective appropriation of an object which when contemplated by objective thought is discovered to be a logical self-contradiction. From the point of view of thought, Christian faith is directly opposed to "reason".

Climacus' discussion of faith in the Postscript does allow a sense in which faith can be considered to transcend reason. Although, from the point of view of objective thought, faith is opposed to reason, reason, objective thought, objective knowledge have nothing to do with faith. "Christianity is not a matter of knowledge."[153] Faith is an act of subjectivity and only subjectivity is dialectically referable to existence. Since objective thought or reason has nothing to do with existence, the affirmations and negations of such thought do not affirm or deny anything of existence. Consequently, although thought claims that Christ is a logical contradiction which reason cannot logically accept, thought itself cannot make any judgment -- affirmative or negative -- on the possibilities for Christ's truth in existence. The

truth of Christ's existence -- or nonexistence -- is affirmed not in thought which is existentially impotent but in subjectivity which is adequate for a grasp of existence. When existence, in this sense, transcends thought, it is legitimate to say that faith transcends reason. Reason's opposition to faith loses its sting as an indictment against faith when it is agreed that thought has no real existential reference. From this point of view it is more precise to say that faith transcends reason rather than opposes it.

If the contradictions discovered and rejected in objective thought are rendered impotent by the discontinuity between thought and existence, the question emerges: Why does Climacus stress the objective certainty of absurdity as a distinguishing feature of the Christian act of faith? Emphasis on objective contradiction clearly indicates that the intent of Climacus' description of the Christian act of faith is polemical. It is directed against both Greek and German Idealism which, in Kierkegaard's view, produces an inauthentic objective reflection. It generates the sublation of Christian, subjective existence in objective thought. The objective contradiction prevents this form of reflection and opens up the possibility for the authentic reflective disclosure of subjectivity in faith.

The Function of Objective Thought and Authentic Reflection in Two Separate Definitions of Faith

This dissertation opened with the introduction of three definitions of faith proposed by Kierkegaard. One of them explicitly uses the term, reflection: "faith is immediateness after reflection". It is now possible to determine if the reflection implied in the definition, "objective certainty of absurdity held fast in the passion of inwardness" is similar to the reflection operative in faith described as, "immediateness after reflection".

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both descriptions appears similar in as much as thought mediates the first existential immediacy. The mediating function of thought in both cases effects the differentiation of subjectivity which is originally indistinguishable in sensuous immediacy. For both definitions, objective thought produces the polarity of the thinking subject and existing actuality. In so far as objective thought reveals subjectivity, it meets a minimal requirement for authentic reflection. The simple fact of objective thought, implied in both descriptions, effects an authentic reflection.

The subjectivity that is disclosed by objective thought in the two definitions is at first a subjectivity that is ensconced in thought. Thought is itself objective in as much as the principles that ground thought are in-themselves valid and thereby compel and measure subjectivity. The definition that includes "objective certainty of absurdity" disallows the objective coercion of subjectivity with regard to the Christian's object of faith. Thus the thinking subjectivity that is unveiled in the simple act of objective thought becomes more deeply reflected. That is, the reflectivity of thought that revealed a subjectivity immersed in thought now discloses the possibility of a subjectivity that transcends objective thought. The possibility of a more profoundly reflected subjectivity is fulfilled in the act of faith which goes beyond thought and is in opposition to it. Faith's grasp of a contradiction which is certified by objective thought as absurd effects the disclosure of a subjectivity that transcends the first immediacy, opposes objective thought and is thereby a highly authentic movement of reflection.

Faith briefly described as "immediacy after reflection" contains no such reference to the objective verification of absurdity. Nonetheless objective thought functions in such a way that a highly authentic reflection is achieved.

The phrase, "immediateness after reflection," implies two immediacies:

a first immediacy and the "new" or second immediacy which comes after reflection. Reflectivity is a function of objective thought. The simple act of thought mediates the first immediacy and distinguishes subjectivity. Here the reflectivity of thought is similar to that implied in Climacus' definition. Thought, in mediating the first immediacy, distinguishes subjectivity precisely as thinking subject.

Subjectivity then becomes more deeply reflected by transcending the thought determinations that at first disclosed it. But the disengagement of subjectivity from objective thought does not necessarily occur in the face of objective certainty of absurdity. What is discovered in the reflection that takes place between the two immediacies is that thought itself cannot resolve existential problematics -- thought is incommensurable with existence. The discontinuity of thought and existence suggests the possibility that subjectivity is not inextricably interwoven with thought. Indeed if the existence of first immediacy that was mediated by thought is to be reinstated anew and if thought is impotent in the face of existence then only a subjectivity that is distanced from thought is equal to the task. In faith, which is an existential act, a subjectivity is disclosed that transcends both the first immediacy and objective thought. In both definitions of faith, the function of objective thought contributes to a profound disclosure of subjectivity and a highly authentic movement of reflection.

It is clear that the feature that distinguishes the two definitions of faith is the objective certainty of absurdity. Climacus' description comprises a double function for objective thought in the reflectivity of faith: thought is incommensurable with existence and thought exhibits that Christianity's faith object is an objective contradiction. In the second definition, the need for a new immediacy after reflection in order to grasp existence is

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suggested by the thesis that thought is incommensurable with existence. Thought's function of exhibiting Christianity's object as contradiction separates the two descriptions.

This difference does not mean that the two definitions are in conflict nor even that they are essentially varient. We have seen that Climacus' stress on objective certainty of absurdity is a polemical reaction to Hegelianism which, to his mind, attempted to render the Christ figure rationally and objectively coherent. But although the faith object is at first described by Climacus in sternly objective terms, the reflective relationship of subjectivity to objectivity is fundamentally the same in both definitions. Both imply that the faith consciousness is constituted through the sui generis activity of subjectivity with objectivity in the dialectical reflectivity of their incommensurability.

The External Reflection of Objective Qualitative Contradiction

The polemical posture of Climacus has led him to define the act of Christian faith in such a way that faith's reflectivity is external to an objective, qualitative contradiction. On the one side, a contradiction is established by objective thought using the principles of objective thought. Subjectivity has not created or structured the contradiction and is not constituted as one of its terms. The contradiction stands outside subjectivity and in this sense is external to it. On the other side, there emerges a subjectivity that is confronted by the objective contradiction. The contradiction does not of itself evoke the disclosure of subjectivity in the faith act; it simply allows for the possibility that subjectivity can be sui generis in its act of religion. The autonomy exercised by the faith consciousness further highlights the externality of subjectivity to its object when the latter is conceptually exhibited.

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For Climacus, subjectivity's relationship to objectivity in the act of faith is an external reflectivity of objective qualitative contradiction.

Climacus' definition of the act of faith is not intended by Kierkegaard to be his final position. We have seen that this pseudonym is not a Christian: "The undersigned, Johannes Climacus who has written this book, does not give himself out to be a Christian; he is completely taken up with the thought how difficult it must be to be a Christian."[154] As an outsider, Climacus takes on the detached role of the humorist. "The humorist constantly . . . sets the God idea into conjunction with other things and evokes the contradiction -- but he does not maintain a relationship to God in terms of religious passion."[155]

Climacus "evokes the contradiction" but his own subjectivity remains untouched by it. It is not then surprising that the reflectivity implied by his definition is external to the contradiction. But this can hardly be Kierkegaard's final articulation of the act of faith.

> Climacus is not a Christian but one who is reflecting on Christianity. His objective approach, although necessary for an intellectual discussion, cannot avoid distorting a reality which is per se subjective. Kierkegaard, therefore does not want this exposition to be considered as an adequate account of his innermost experience."[156]

When Kierkegaard formulates his "innermost experience" he expresses it not as an external reflectivity of qualitative contradiction but as an internal reflectivity of qualitative incommensurables. This task is undertaken by the pseudonymous Anti-Climacus, the Christian par excellence.

CHAPTER IV

REFLECTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE INTERNAL REFLECTIVITY OF QUALITATIVE INCOMMENSURABLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

"BY RELATING ITSELF TO ITS OWN SELF AND BY WILLING TO BE ITSELF THE SELF IS GROUNDED TRANSPARENTLY IN THE POWER WHICH CONSTITUTED IT"

The description of the act of faith offered by Climacus focuses on an objective contradiction. Since neither term of this contradiction includes the self, the self is external to the contradiction. In so far as the contradiction is considered without regard to the self, the latter is externally reflected from it.

Kierkegaard and his pseudonyms also describe consciousness in terms of contradiction, one of whose poles is the self. The basic contradiction constituting consciousness here is the self and its not-self -- the self and its other. For Kierkegaard, these terms are incommensurable. The tension constituting consciousness is generated by their relation to one another in the dialectic of collision. Although the relationships that develop between the poles are always characterized by collision, their reflectivity will be called internal because the self is one of the poles.

There are two discernible dialectical levels within which consciousness is described as the tension of the self-other polarity. On a "lower" level, the self is dialectically related to its finite other; on a second, "higher", level, the self is dialectically related to an absolutely other. Within each dialectic, there are two movements of reflection. The first reflection is a movement of disengagement of the self from its other and it is this reflection

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that reveals the incommensurability of the self-other polarity. Both lower and higher dialectics include the first reflection of separation. The incommensurability between both self-finite other and self-absolutely other is disclosed in this reflective movement. Taking an opposite direction, the second reflection is one of engagement, or the "bending back again" of the self with its other. Similar to the first reflection, it also occurs within the lower and higher dialectics. The second reflection expresses the relationship of appropriating engagement of the self with its incommensurable finite and absolutely other.

When Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus describes the act of faith in terms of the internal reflection of incommensurables, he includes both reflections in both lower and higher dialectics. In the moment of faith, the reflections of disengagement and engagement are effected simultaneously in both dialectics. Any dialectical imbalance within the double reflection in the lower dialectic manifests a disorientation in the double reflection of the higher dialectic. The converse is also true. When such misproportion or asymmetry occurs, consciousness is in a condition other than faith. From the perspective of the description offered by the paradigmatic Christian, Anti-Climacus, irony, resignation, dread and despair can be seen as incomplete forms of the fully effected double reflections in higher and lower dialectics. In so far as they are truncated, they are disoriented forms of consciousness. However from the vantage point of faith, their incompleteness allows them to be seen as preparatory stages which can be passed through or surpassed in the Christian act of faith wherein the fullness of reflection is effected in higher and lower dialectics.

Kierkegaard's pseudonyms describe several postures of consciousness according to the ways in which the internal reflection of qualitative incommensurables takes place. Consciousness is constituted as resignation,

dread, despair or faith depending upon the manner in which self and other are internally reflected. For Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus, the proper reflection of these incommensurables in the Christian act of faith places consciousness at the peak of its intensity. It is the reflectivity involved in this faith act which is our prime concern. Nevertheless, Anti-Climacus' description of faith represents Kierkegaard's mature thinking on this theme -- his statement has evolved through the thinking of previous pseudonyms. Several of these describe special postures of consciousness using a dialectical model similar to that from which the reflectivity of the faith act is expressed. We will, therefore, trace the development of the reflection of internal incommensurables in the consciousnesses constituted in resignation, dread and despair as a preparation for the description of faith offered by Anti-Climacus.

The Resigned Consciousness

Incommensurability and First Reflection in Resignation

Resignation is the self's release of the temporal.[1] It is infinite in the sense that it "lets go" not merely particular finite determinations but all of the finite.[2] As such it is the annulment of the finite other in the lower dialectic. There is a striking resemblance between the consciousness constituted in resignation and the ironic consciousness.

> Irony and humor reflect also upon themselves, and therefore belong within the sphere of the infinite resignation, their elasticity is due to the fact that the individual is incommensurable with reality.[3]

Both resignation and irony are self-conscious. For consciousness to be conscious of itself as self, it must be conscious of the other as other. Resignation as self-consciousness implies that the duality of self and other is established.

Like irony, resignation emphasizes the contradiction between self and other through the nihilation of that other. This negation is not fundamentally

achieved by thought but rather through passion. Resignation is primarily a passionate movement,[4] and the pathos is expressed in decision. In this respect, resignation is equivalent to irony -- both are attained through choice. As it is true for irony, so it is true for resignation that the ability to choose and to choose negatively indicates that the discontinuity between self and other is very firmly fixed. Both the resigned and the ironic consciousnesses are so constituted that they emphatically bear witness to the incommensurability of the self and the other.

With the loss of the other, the self is freed from its positive demands and both resignation and irony attain the peace and rest of ataraxy.[5] Paralleling irony, resignation's "letting go" of the other makes the individual sufficient to himself.[6] When that other takes the form of all the concrete determinations of space and time, then its destruction through resignation characterizes the self-sufficiency of the self as, "eternal". If these concrete determinations are considered as finite, then the self as freed from them may be called, "infinite". When the self-sufficiency of the self is referred to as, "individual", and the other as, "reality", it is valid to say in regard to the resigned consciousness that, "the individual is incommensurable with reality."[7] Resignation passionately makes the first reflective movement that disengages self from other and delineates the incommensurability between self and other.

Double Reflection and the Contradiction Constituting the Resigned Consciousness

Although irony is similar to infinite resignation in that the former falls within the sphere of the latter, the resigned consciousness becomes especially intensified in the contradiction that emerges in the second reflection. The movement of second reflection occurs when the "Knight of infinite

resignation" entertains the act of faith as a thought possibility. Johannes de Silentio, the pseudonymous author of Fear and Trembling and a self proclaimed knight of infinite resignation, understands infinite resignation to be an essential prerequisite for faith.[8] He admittedly is not a believer. For an unbeliever to proclaim that infinite resignation is a prerequisite for faith indicates that in some sense he has already surpassed resignation. The sense in which he has surpassed his own lived consciousness is in thought. In this he is not unlike Climacus who discussed the Christian act and object of faith from a point outside a consciousness constituted in faith. But there is a difference. Climacus, in the manner of an ironist, remains indifferent to his discussion. Johannes de Silentio who has lost the finite other through his infinite resignation envisions the act of faith as promising the reinstatement of the finite. One who has resigned the finite other and sees the act of faith as the dissolution of that epochē looks toward the act of faith with a longing for the finite.

Desire for the finite distinguishes the second reflection of resignation from that of irony. The ironic consciousness is preserved in the steadfastness of its will to negate its other and its thought activity is directed against the positive, objective thought determinants that would make demands on its individuality. Its second reflection is the relation of negation. In contrast, the resigned consciousness entertains in thought the possibility of reconciliation with its negated other. In the first reflection, it establishes the incommensurability, the irreconcilability of its infinite vacuous self and its concrete other. It nonetheless longs for, "bends back again" on that concrete other. It wishes to find continuity in its chosen discontinuity, commensurability in its incommensurability. The self whose freedom is characterized as, "freedom from" the other wants to maintain the freedom

in unity with that other. The reflectivity that accomplished resignation's release from the world seeks to reflect itself back into the world. This is the internal, double reflection of mutually exclusive contradiction that intensifies and potentiates the resigned consciousness.

As long as consciousness is resigned, it cannot doubly reflect the poles of the mutually exclusive contradiction. It can entertain the second reflection in thought but when it remains resigned it does not choose to make the second movement. Only by a reconstitution of the self through choice can the double reflectivity of those colliding polarities be sustained.

The Dreadful Consciousness: Internal Reflection of the Dreaming Spirit

Absence of Explicit Reflection in Dread

The dreadful consciousness described by Vigilius Haufniensis in The Concept of Dread is also controlled by the internal reflection of incommensurables. Within dread, there is a movement of separation and engagement -- first and second reflections -- in both lower and higher dialectics. Central to the double reflection inherent in dread is the phenomenon of freedom which dread discloses. Haufniensis' insight is that dread announces the presence of freedom which is constitutive of the self and which manifests the first reflective movement of the self from the finite other. Moreover the "freedom from" revealed in the first reflection is not ungrounded and in that sense autonomous but rather has its independence justified in relation to God, the absolutely other. Thus the first reflective movement in the lower dialectic is referred to and incorporated within the reflectivity of the higher dialectic. Furthermore, Haufniensis does not entirely neglect the second movement of reflective engagement in the lower dialectic. When he describes the growing intensity of the dreadful consciousness in terms of the re-engagement of the

self with its environment, he appears to anticipate Anti-Climacus' more sophisticated articulation of the lower dialectic's double reflection in The Sickness unto Death. In dread, however, the full double reflection within both dialectics which is required for Christian faith is lacking and the movements of reflection submerged or "trammeled". Dread, therefore, may announce the moment of faith but it is not itself that religious act.

Dread is a specifically human phenomenon that not only comes before decision but can also precede any form of explicit self-consciousness. It can occur in the innocence which is an ignorance of the self and concomitantly an unawareness of a distinguishable other. "In his innocence man is not determined as spirit but is soulishly determined in immediate unity with his natural condition."[9] Spirit is the synthesis of soul and body.[10] When the spirit is present in the state of immediate unity of soul and body, it does not reflect itself on itself and consequently does not explicitly reflect itself from its other.

It is the lack of the other as object that distinguishes dread from fear. Fear always has a definable object; dread has not.[11] It can have no object because its state of consciousness is such that it does not explicitly distinguish itself from its other. The level of semimuted consciousness in which dread emerges is not reflective enough to have a distinguishable object because it has not yet posited itself as a self.

Since the self-other contradiction is not present in dread, dread is not an explicitly constituted consciousness. Without the initial development of contradiction there can be no real first reflection of self from other. As a result freedom as "freedom from" is wanting. In the absence of this first reflectivity, it would appear that there can be no clearly established incommensurability. Obviously a second reflection which relates polarities

is precluded by the lack of discernible terms. Yet the dreadful consciousness is consciousness and as such there must be some form of contradiction and reflection.

Although the self of dread is, "in immediate unity with its natural condition," there is still a movement of spirit within this immediacy. The difference between an explicitly reflected self-consciousness and the spirit's movement in a state of immediacy is analogous to the distinction between the state of wakefulness and dreaming. "When awake, the difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, it is a nothing vaguely hinted at."[12] Awakened or dreaming spirit must be present in every man because, if at any point, spirit was absolutely lacking, he could never develop into a man and would cease to be such.[13] Dread occurs in the dreaming spirit; dread is the dreaming spirit. But dreaming is not the stillness of death; it is a stirring that anticipates wakefulness. Between the muteness of absolutely undistinguishing immediacy and the explicit reflectivity of self and other, there lies an intermediate state wherein the spirit vaguely stirs itself. It is here that dread is located.

Dread and Freedom

The first subtle stirring of spirit is its movement to unambiguously posit itself as spirit[14] and this is achieved by becoming self-transparent. Spirit becomes lucid to itself by relating itself to itself, that is, by reflecting upon itself and thereby distinguishing itself from its other. Self-relation or self-reflection is an expression for freedom.[15] However dread is not yet the spirit's self-reflection constituting its freedom; it is only the possibility of freedom. When freedom itself is considered as possibility, then dread is "freedom's reality as possibility for possibility."[16] In so far as pure possibility is vacuous, the self of dread is without concrete

content and without a discernible other. Yet, as possibility for possibility, dread is the possibility of the possibility of every concretion.

> Dread is at the same time the most egoistic thing, and no concrete expression of freedom is so egoistic as is the possibility of every concretion. This again is the overwhelming experience which determines the individual's ambiguous relation, both sympathetic and antipathetic. In dread there is the egoistic infinity of possibility, which does not tempt as a definite choice, but alarms (aengster) and fascinates with its sweet anxiety (Beaengstelse).[17]

The dialectic of possibility is the fullness of its nothingness, the nothingness of its fullness. Possibility, as possibility, is vacuous but as infinite "possibility for", it is infinitely full of content. But that fullness again is nothing since it is, after all, simply "the possibility". Thus dread has no object and the self in dread is nothing. Nonetheless the dialectic of dread parallels the dialectic of possibility. The self's relation to itself as possibility or freedom is "sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy."[18] In dread, there is, in a single experience, the sympathetic enticement of being everything and the antipathetic repulsion of being nothing.

The Spontaneity of Spirit Movement in Dread:
The Implications of this Movement

The first movement of the spirit in its immediate unity with soul and body is too unemphatic to make a breach with that immediacy. Yet it is a movement and its direction is toward itself -- it is a self-reflective movement. Unlike the movement of first reflection that delivers the viable contradiction of self and finite other, the first arousal of spirit in dread is effected without the presence of a finite other and consequently that movement does not receive its impetus from that other.[19] Gestating spirit comes to birth through an internal spontaneity. The movement of dread is a thrust of the self by itself toward itself and without reference to a finite other.

That the first stirring of spirit is toward itself and without advertence

to a finite other, clearly implies that there is an incommensurability between the self and its finite other. The dreadful consciousness itself does not explicitly reside within that incommensurability because it is not emphatically reflected from its finite other and cannot enter into conscious dialectical interplay with it. Consequently, the incommensurability that is implied in dread is without the dialectical tension of contradiction that is explicit in irony and resignation. Nevertheless, the fact that the somnambulation of spirit is self-directed and is not aimed at the finite other nor prompted in its early development by it, is a clear anticipation of the discontinuity between self and its finite other. Because the self in dread is not concerned with the finite other and is not regulated by the thing, its self-movement toward itself vaguely anticipates the "infinity" of the self as distinguished from the finitude of its other. The "noumenal" dimension of the self which transcends the closedness of the phenomenal thing is announced by dread. Although dread does not willfully negate that other, the implication in dread is that the self transcends its finite other by being incommensurable and discontinuous with it. Dread anticipates a first reflection of incommensurability wherein the self, as infinite, qualitatively transcends the finitude of its other.

When Vigilius Haufniensis claims that the self's movement in dread is by itself toward itself and further affirms that, "freedom is not free in itself but trammeled, not by necessity but in itself,"[20] he is in effect adding a new dimension to the meaning of freedom and to the self. It is true that the meaning of freedom implied in the experience of dread is a "freedom from" in the sense that the self transcends the finite other. "Freedom from" is also implied in the meaning of possibility since "possibility for" implies "distance from". But now there is the added note that freedom contains

within itself its own telos. The initial reflection of the self upon itself is neither influenced nor directed by an external, finite other and the original development of the transparency of the self to itself takes place according to its own internal workings. Freedom first appears in man as trammeled and its movement toward self-clarification takes place according to the impulse it receives from within. It is self-generative. Freedom now takes on the characteristic of causa sui.[21]

The discontinuity between self and finite other as well as the causa sui of freedom produces a further implication. If the movement of self-reflection in dread is entirely divorced from the finite other, it would appear that there is neither a strict causal nexus between self and finite other nor a dialectical relationship between these terms. Moreover, if this intrinsic spontaneity of the self's movement is sustained throughout the self's development, it would follow that the history of the self's growth could be described neither through a linear nor a dialectical analysis of the self's manifestations. If the history of the self's evolution is entirely encased within the self, a dialectical description of consciousness-development in terms of the contradiction between self and finite other would be irrelevant.

It is true that Kierkegaard rejects the thesis that freedom and, concomitantly, the self, can be causally explained by freedom's disclosures.[22] But he does not disallow a description of consciousness in terms of the contradiction between self and other. Kierkegaard's Haufniensis bestows the characteristic of causa sui upon the self especially when his thought is directed to the relationship between the self and the absolutely other, the God. When seeking the ground of human freedom in an absolutely other, Haufniensis does not emphasize the self's constitution with the finite other.

Freedom's Causa Sui and the Absolutely Other

When Kierkegaard's pseudonymn claims that freedom is causa sui, it is not his intent to totally encapsulize the self and thereby endorse a type of solipsized humanism. This becomes especially clear in his analysis of the religious genius. "By turning inwardly he discovers freedom."[23] The freedom discerned by the religious genius is not a finite freedom; it is "not freedom to do this or that in the world."[24] On the contrary, the freedom the religious genius discovers in self-reflection is disengaged from the finite other and thus discontinuous with special concrete content. That which the religious genius discerns is "freedom to know of himself that he is freedom."[25] It at first appears that the causa sui of infinite freedom entirely isolates the religious genius, but this is not the position of Haufniensis. "The first thing he does is to turn towards himself. . . . For by the fact that he turns towards himself he turns eo ipso towards God."[26]

The feature that distinguishes the self-reflection of religious inwardness is the experience of guilt. "In turning towards himself," the religious genius "discovers guilt."[27] The realization of guilt is the actuation of a God-relationship. "If the finite spirit would see God it must begin by being guilty."[28] Since the self-reflection of the religious genius divorces him from all finite determinations, the guilt he discovers is, like freedom, not finite. The infinite guilt consciousness "is not a fear of being thought guilty . . . but fear of being guilty."[29] Consciousness of infinite guilt is an indication of a God-relation because this experience is not directed toward an external finitude nor is it occasioned by an externality. "Guilt never has an external occasion."[30] It is guilt before God.

For the religious genius, "freedom is his bliss".[31] But in the same degree that he discovers freedom, does the dread of guilt in the condition

of possibility impend over him.[32] Only guilt can deprive the religious genius of his cherished freedom.[33] The implication is that guilt and freedom are incompatible. Haufniensis does not hesitate to explicitly affirm that "the opposite of freedom is guilt."[34] "When necessity is conceived as the opposite of freedom, then freedom is being viewed under an intellectual category."[35] That is, freedom is conceived as an object for thought rather than as an essential constituent of subjectivity. Nonetheless there appears to be an irreconcilable contradiction present when Haufniensis maintains on the one hand that freedom and guilt are mutually exclusive and, on the other, that freedom "projects guilt in the possibility and also posits it by itself."[36] To say that freedom is the opposite of guilt, and to simultaneously affirm that freedom is the condition of the possibility and actuality of guilt, appears to be an untenable contradiction.

The contradiction is resolved when it is seen that here there are two discernible meanings assigned to freedom. Freedom is the condition of the possibility of guilt because without freedom there can be no guilt. Since guilt has no external occasion, only the inward activity of the subjectivity of human freedom can posit it. This meaning of human freedom refers to the unconditioned human creativity that conditions all that flows from it. Human creativity is the matrix of all activity and meaning and is, in that sense, free. This meaning of freedom is similar to the meaning, causa sui. Freedom is cause of itself and all that is generated by it.

When it is asserted that the opposite of freedom is guilt, freedom's meaning acquires another nuance. It now becomes a value laden word that has its ground in a specific God-relation. Guilt is an expression for a God-relation that is negative. It does not destroy the God-relation in the sense that the God to which one is related falls completely outside consciousness.

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In order for infinite guilt to be, that guilt must be before God. Yet guilt expresses a distance from God; it is a specific form of alienation from God. Freedom also expresses a God-relation but its relation is positive. Human freedom which is a relation of the self to itself is also a relation towards God. Human freedom which is freedom before God is the expression for a reconciled God-relation. The self is reconciled with itself and with God when its freedom discloses the freedom of God as its ground. In this sense, freedom, both human and divine is the good. "The good is freedom."[37] When the self is truly free, it reveals divine freedom, is reconciled with itself in God and is good. "the good of course signifies to it the reintegration of freedom, redemption, salvation."[38] Self-reflection is the good when it places the self in harmonious relation with God, the good. Therefore freedom and guilt are both expressions for God-relation. Because the former signifies reconciliation and the latter denotes alienation, "the opposite of freedom is guilt."

The formula for dread, antipathetic sympathy, when applied to this notion of freedom, goes beyond the simple dialectic of possibility and concretion. Dread is still freedom's possibility before itself, but its meaning can now be enlarged with the expanded notion of freedom. Freedom is the expression for reconciliation with its ground, God, and dread is thereby sympathetic. Guilt expresses the distance from God and thus dread is antipathetic. The alernatives of either freedom or guilt existing as possibilities for decision define dread as sympathetic antipathy.[39]

It now becomes clear that self-reflection has a dual polarity and implies several meanings of freedom. The poles on either side of the self are the finite other and God, the absolutely other. Since the first movement of dread appears entirely separated from the finite other, self-reflection brings the meaning of causa sui to freedom. When the finite other comes into view, the

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incommensurability anticipated by the causa sui of freedom adds the note of "freedom from" the finite other to the meaning of freedom. In this case, self-reflection away from the finite other places the self within the possibility of a relation with the absolutely other, God. When the self as freedom grounds itself in God, the meaning of freedom becomes reconciliation. Or better, when the self in relating itself to its own self relates itself toward God, human freedom finds its foundation in harmonious relation with God. Self-reflection which anticipates reflection from the finite other is a return to the self as freedom which, in turn, reflects upon the absolutely other.

Solidification of the Epochē in The Concept of Dread

Throughout much of the discussion of self-reflection in The Concept of Dread, the epochē of the finite other develops with great rigidity. The implied incommensurability between self and finite other as the condition of the possibility of a God-relation is so heavily emphasized that in many places finitude is eliminated from having any positive part in the development of the religious consciousness.

> It must be constantly remembered that according to my terminology one cannot be shut up in God or in the good, for this kind of reserve is precisely the utmost expansion. The more definitely conscience is in this way developed in a man, the more he is expanded, even though in other respects he shuts himself off from the whole world.[40]

Despite this emphasis, Haufniensis is not unaware of the problem of the epochē: "to explain how my religious existence comes into relation with and expresses itself in my outward situation, that is the problem."[41] The pseudonym clearly recognizes that the development of religious reflection is truncated if the epochē is not removed.

> The fault of the Middle Ages was not the religious reflection but that men came to a stop too soon. Here reappears the question of repetition, that is to say, the question in what measure an individual after having begun the religious reflection can get himself back again whole from head to toe. In the Middle Ages they broke off too abruptly.[42]

The description of the religious genius leaves the epochē intact. Haufniensis raises the problem for his religious genius. "Whether he will ever get to the point of turning outwards, remains a subsequent question."[43] It is a question that The Concept of Dread does not fully answer, but it is not entirely ignored.

The Epochē and Concretion in Dread

Haufniensis treats concretion under the heading, "Freedom Lost Pneumatically". Here he refers to a self-consciousness which is so concrete that no author -- not the most consummate delineator of character -- has ever been able to describe such a thing, although such a thing is what every man is."[44] It at first appears that Haufniensis is about to take up the problem of the relation of consciousness to its finite other. However, he makes it clear that this is not the direction he intends to take when he affirms that "the most concrete content consciousness can have is consciousness of itself."[45]

In this discussion, Haufniensis distinguishes an authentic self-reflection from an inauthentic self-reflection. The index for the distinction is concreteness: authentic reflection is concrete while inauthentic reflection is not. That which is not concrete is abstract. Inauthentic self-reflection occurs when that reflection generates a self that is the "pure self-consciousness."[46] This form of self-awareness results when the self, having reflected itself from its finite other, merely contemplates the empty abstract notion of itself.[47] For Haufniensis, this "abstract subjectivity is just as uncertain and just as much lacking in inwardness as is the abstract objectivity."[48] The self that speculatively contemplates itself is just as vacuous as the self that indifferently beholds an object; indeed this self contemplates itself as object. Consequently the inwardness that is won in reflecting itself from the immediacy of the finite other is lost in directing and exhausting itself in the pure, abstract, objective notion of the self.

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The measure of the concreteness of consciousness is its immediacy. "Immediacy is also the immediacy of inwardness."[49] This appears to negate the meaning of inwardness that Haufniensis had earlier affirmed. If inwardness is accomplished through a reflection from finite immediacy then the expression, "the immediacy of inwardness", appears to be a contradiction. However, when Haufniensis refers to "the immediacy of inwardness", he is neither stating that inwardness is had in the first immediacy of finiteness nor is he addressing the problem of a return to finite immediacy after consciousness has been established in reflecting itself from the first immediacy. The immediacy that is expressed in this phrase refers to an immediacy that occurs after the reflection from finite immediacy. Haufniensis is referring to the posture of consciousness after it has been reflected from first immediacy.

A reflection from finite immediacy delivers up a self that transcends finitude. The self, in this reflection, dwells in the experience of its infinitude, its eternality . Haufniensis' attention is directed to the authentic pursual of this experience. He agrees that such experience may be allowed to vaporize, "pneumatically". The shock of the experience of the self's eternal dimension can be tranquillized through the evanescence of abstraction. An alternative to this tranquillization is the passionate concern for the validation of the self's eternality. It is just this passionate concern that is referred to as the concreteness of immediacy. In this discussion, the pseudonym is not occupied with the meaning of freedom as freedom from -- that meaning is presupposed. His attention is directed to allowing the experience of disengagement from finitude to reflect itself inwardly toward its transcendent ground. Haufniensis' discussion of"concreteness" in The Concept of Dread does not clarify the role of the finite other in the constitution of the dreadful consciousness. This theme does arise most pointedly in his claim that the nothing which is the object of dread becomes more and more a something.

The Influence of the Finite Other in the Developing Consciousness in Dread

When Haufniensis insists that the object of dread is nothing, the implication is that the movement of the spirit in dread is a self-movement toward itself and is not produced in association with a finite other. The dreadful self which is not a clarified self is the submerged consciousness of itself as freedom or as guilt. Clarification of the self as freedom or as guilt is the impulse of the spirit's initial movement. Therefore the dialectic of dread is the tension provided by the possibility of freedom when this possibility simultaneously includes the possibility of guilt. The possibility of freedom or guilt is the possibility of being a fully constituted self, but to be fully constituted as freedom or as guilt depends on a relationship to God, the absolutely other. Haufniensis' explication of dread is essentially a description of the self's constitution in conjunction with the absolutely other. However, the dialectic of possibility in dread may be directed toward the finite other as well as the absolutely other.

The dialectic of possibility, when directed toward the absolutely other, is congruous with the meaning of freedom as reconciliation. Freedom reconciled before God may mean that the self's independence is dependent on the absolutely other -- the self's disengagement from God is its engagement with God. This opposing double movement is present in the dialectic of possibility. "Possibility for" implies "distance from", and so the meaning of possibility carries with it disengagement from other. Yet possibility is not possibility unless it is directed toward the other. When the other is the absolutely other, the dialectic of possibility is the dialectic of the self's constitution with its absolutely other.

The dialectic of possibility also occurs between the self and the finite other. Possibility for finite concretion implies disengagement from the finite.

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Haufniensis' thought turns toward this lower dialectic when he affirms that "the nothing which is the object of dread becomes, as it were, more and more a something."[50] What is at stake here is the constitution of consciousness through the relationship of the self and the finite other which dread has announced as incommensurable. The discussion centers around the problem of sin and Haufniensis approaches it through the question: "How must consciousness be structured so that sin may be possible?"[51]

The "something" which is the nothing of dread is "a complex of presentiments which reflect themselves in themselves, coming nearer and nearer to the individual, notwithstanding that in dread they signify again essentially nothing, not, however, be it noted, a nothing with which the individual has nothing to do, but a nothing in lively communication with the ignorance of innocence."[52] One of the ingredients of this "complex of presentiments" is the individual's "historical situation", his "historical environment".[53] The fact is that the historical individual is this definite person situated in a certain place at a specifiable time and subjected to the developed, cultural influences of his environment. If the mores of that environment proclaim that the sensuous is sinfulness, then, "this general knowledge bestows upon dread a 'more'."[54]

The sinfulness that is externally proclaimed is still nothing for the dreadful consciousness. Sin can only be posited by the qualitative leap of consciousness which does not erupt as long as there is dread. In effect, Haufniensis' claim is that the historical situation, environmental and educational finitudes are never in themselves clothed with the quality of sin. Sin is a subjective act of consciousness. For dread, the qualitative act that renders these finite determinants sinful becomes more and more possible as they fall within the periphery of consciousness. Thus freedom's possibility

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before itself becomes more and more possible. Given the exclusive opposition between freedom and guilt, the loss of freedom by freedom also becomes more possible as these finite, "quantitative" determinants encroach upon consciousness.

With the increase of these finite "quantitative presentiments" comes an increase of dread, and along with the intensification of dread, comes an intensification of consciousness. As dread becomes more and more intense, it comes closer to erupting in the qualitative leap that explicitly posits consciousness in actualizing the distinction between the self and the finite other. In The Concept of Dread, the birth and development of the intensity of consciousness are articulated in terms of the colliding opposition between the incommensurables, self and finite other, only when this distinction is held in presentiment and predisposition. Anti-Climacus in The Sickness unto Death also formulates the self's development and constitution in terms of self and other but more directly and not simply with regard to predisposition.

The Despairing Consciousness

Reflection and Despair in the Lower Dialectic

Anti-Climacus claims that despair is sin and that the opposite of sin is faith.[55] In this sense, despair is the opposite of faith.[56] The pseudonymous Christian describes despair in terms of the disrelation between self and other in lower and higher dialectics. The disrelation becomes progressively more apparent as the reflection of the incommensurables in both dialectics deepens. Consciousness becomes more intensely "potentiated" as the incommensurables, self-other, are more profoundly reflected in disrelation. The actualization of despair's deepening consciousness-potentiation occurs in the act of faith. Faith is described in the same terms as despair but now as the proper relation of self-other effected by the double reflection in lower and higher dialectics. Our analysis will attempt to trace the development of consciousness, through

despair to faith, by bringing to the surface the double reflection of both dialectics implied throughout The Sickness unto Death.

Concrete Reflection and Self-Constitution

The dialectical relationship between the self and its other in the constitution and intensification of consciousness becomes more clearly exhibited in The Sickness unto Death and this is largely due to the way in which the pseudonymous Anti-Climacus describes the meaning of the "concrete". "To become oneself is to become concrete. But to become concrete means neither to become finite nor infinite, for that which is to become concrete is the synthesis."[57] Formerly, the term, "concrete", primarily carried the meaning of spatial, temporal determinants. Previously, concretion referred to only one pole of the synthesis constituting the self. The self was the alternate pole whose task it was to come into relation with the concrete. For Anti-Climacus, concretion means con-crescere, the "growing together" of the bipolar components into synthesis.

The "finite" and the "infinite" are the elements constituting the synthesized ego. The distinction between these terms is based on the incommensurability of factors within the total constitution of the self. Finitude, instead of concretion, becomes the term used to describe the spatial, temporal determinants of the self. These are considered limiting factors and are incommensurable with the infinite. Finitude expresses "the limiting factor, and the infinite is the expanding factor."[58]

The polarities of possibility and necessity parallel those of infinite and finite. Necessity, like finitude, refers to limitation.[59] The self "is a perfectly definite something, and so is the necessary."[60] Possibility, like infinitude, refers to the element of the self that transcends spatial, temporal limitation. In this sense, both infinitude and possibility carry the meaning

of "limitless".[61] To become a self means to become concrete and to become concrete means to become the synthesis of infinite-finite, possibility-necessity.

Selfhood is not thoroughly bestowed upon a passive recepient by an external power whether that force be conceived as divine or cultural. The self is won -- to become a self is the self's only task.[62] But this means that the terms of the synthesis as well as their synthetic concretion are not merely a boon but must be developed through struggle. Consequently the constitution and development of the self is describable in terms of the striving activity of the self within its own bipolar structure. "Accordingly, the development consists in moving away from oneself infinitely by the process of infinitizing oneself, and in returning to oneself infinitely by the process of finitizing."[63] In this statement Anti-Climacus, is dialectically expressing the need for the active establishment of and release from the epochē. These movements are essential to the birth and development of consciousness.

Consciousness is born in reflection and reflection denotes duality. Conversely there is no duality in pure immediacy and therefore neither reflection nor consciousness properly so called. Self-consciousness emerges in self-reflection; that is, the self in bending back on itself becomes, at once, conscious of itself, its other and the differentiation. On the one hand the self is disengaged from its other, its not-self. This is the movement of "infinitization". On the other hand, the disengaged self is a self only in virtue of its other. This is the movement of "finitization". The duality must be sustained in order for there to be self-consciousness at all. The other does not spontaneously evaporate once it has been discerned as alien. Thorough dissolution of the self's alien-being would destroy the duality required for both reflection and consciousness. The self's other is therefore an essential constituent of the self. The disengaged self intensely holds the other in its eye. It is an eye only by virtue of that which is not the eye

because if there is nothing to see, there can be no seeing. The disengaged self beholds its other. But the other is what the self is not -- the disengaged self is what it is not. It is just this dialectical tension that constitutes consciousness. Unlike Hegel, Kierkegaard's Anti-Climacus affirms the incommensurability of the polarities comprising consciousness. For him, the distance of difference between the self and the other is qualitative rather than quantitative and this heightens the tension constituting consciousness.

The dialectical polarity between disengaged self and infinite other is responsible for the development of consciousness as well as its birth. The more deeply reflected consciousness is, the more the duality is underlined. The more the self disengages itself from its other, the more clearly it recognizes its "eternality" and the incommensurability between itself, as disengaged, and its other. As the distance "from" widens, the self becomes more "infinitized", and the epochē, as one side of the expression for incommensurability, progressively hardens. Nonetheless consciousness is constituted by the reflection, by the duality and by the differentiation. Thus the other which continually falls away into incommensurability constantly comes close at hand. It becomes present as far away, approaches as distance and is found as lost. The progressive development of the self's transparency to itself is measurable by the way in which consciousness develops out of the polarities of the contradiction that constitutes consciousness.

Concrete Reflection and the Measure of Inauthentic Reflection

This description of the concretion of consciousness not only serves as a framework for the articulation of the forms of desapir, but also provides a new basis for the formulation of several types of inauthentic reflection.

Now authentic reflection is the dialectical concretion of the synthesis. In contrast, inauthentic reflection effects an imbalance of the polarities of the synthesis and concomitantly a destructuring of the self. Any infinitization of the self that undialectically loses the pole of finitude is inauthentic and classified as fantastical.[64] The imagination is the vehicle responsible for the fantastical infinitization of the self. "Imagination is the reflection of the process of infinitizing."[65] "The self is reflection, and imagination is reflection, it is the counterfeit presentment of the self, which is the possibility of the self."[66] The ability of the imagination to project infinite possibility without carrying with it the limitation of finite necessity accounts for its inauthentic reflection from finitude.

This form of inauthentic reflection is expressible in feeling, knowledge and will. "When feeling becomes fantastic, the self is simply volatilized more and more, at last becoming a sort of abstract sentimentality which is so inhuman that it does not apply to any person."[67] Knowledge becomes inauthentic when the more the self knows, the less it knows itself.[68] The will is reflectively fantastic when possibilities are so infinitized that the decisiveness which would plunge the self back into finitude is paralyzed.

On the other hand, when the self is properly reflected and concretized:

> the law for the development of the self with respect to knowledge, in so far as it is true that the self becomes itself, is this, that the increasing degree of knowledge corresponds with the degree of self-knowledge, that the more the self knows, the more it knows itself.[69]

The will is authentically reflected when,

> the more it is infinitized in purpose and resolution, the more present and contemporaneous with itself does it become in the small part of the task which can be realized at once, so that in being infinitized it returns in the strictest sense to its self, so that what is farthest from itself (when it is most infinitized in purpose and resolution) is in the same instant nearest to itself in accomplishing the infinitely small part of the task which can be done even today, even at this hour, even at this instant.[70]

Even the God-relationship is susceptible of an inauthentic reflection. A condition of the possibility of a God-relationship is a reflectivity wherein consciousness emerges as disengaged from its finite other. "The God-relationship infinitizes, but this may so carry a man away that it becomes an inebriation, it may seem to a man as though it were unendurable to exist before God -- for the reason that a man cannot return to himself, cannot become himself."[71] When the reflective distance between the self and its finite other, which is a requisite for a posture before God, fails to sustain the presence of that finite other, the religious reflection is characterized as inauthentic. From the perspective of Anti-Climacus, Haufniensis' portrayal of the religious genius who, in The Concept of Dread, attains a God-relationship through an inwardness that merely reflects away from the finite other, is fantastical. Similarly the ironic consciousness whose infinitizing disengagement was endorsed by Kierkegaard but whose absoluteness was repudiated by him would now be categorized as fantastical since it is without a finitizing movement. In general, Kierkegaard's previous authorship stressed the primacy of the disengaged self. Anti-Climacus focuses on the dialectical relationship between disengaged self and finite other in the progressive development of consciousness.

The Development of Consciousness through the Forms of Despair

The Relation between the Development of Consciousness and the Development of Despair

Anti-Climacus articulates the progressive development of consciousness through the dialectic of disengaged self and its finite other. His theme is despair but there is a direct proportion between the development of consciousness and the intensity of despair. "With every increase in the degree of consciousness, and in proportion to that increase, the intensity of despair, increases: the more consciousness, the more intense the despair."[72] The

dialectic of despair closely follows the contours of the dialectic of the disengaged self and its finite other.

Despair, like consciousness itself, is highly dialectical. It has an object when it is despair over something. When consciousness despairs over an object its relation to that object is a relation of loss and so the self is a self without its object. Therefore the self is discontinuous with its object and this expresses the incommensurability between the self and the other. Incommensurability is the distance of qualitative difference. Yet loss, distance, difference are only one pole of the dialectic of despair. The object is not so distant that it falls outside the consciousness of the infinitized self. Consciousness is not indifferent to the loss, to the distance. On the contrary, consciousness despairs. That which is lost remains close at hand; so close that it generates the consciousness crisis of despair. To despair at the distance is to bring to presence that which is at a distance. But, in the coming together, the distance is sustained and resists abrogation. Now when the terms of consciousness are disengaged self and finite other, the disengagement is an expression for discontinuity and incommensurability. Again the incommensurability implies the distance of difference. But that these incommensurables constitute consciousness, are, in fact, consciousness, is an expression for closeness, for unity. The dialectic of despair parallels the dialectic of disengaged self and finite other which are the terms constituting the concretely reflected consciousness.

The Dialectical Tension Constituting Consciousness in the Despair of Weakness

First Form of Despair. -- The despair of weakness is a despair at not willing to be oneself[73] which means that the self lacks the will to become synthetically concrete. A first form of this despair is over the finite pole of the concretion

which Anti-Climacus refers to as the "earthly" or "something earthly".[74] This form of despair "is pure immediacy, or else an immediacy which contains a quantitative reflection."[75]

Despair over immediacy takes place within a self which is constituted in immediacy.

> The immediate man (in so far as immediacy is to be found without any reflection) is merely soulishly determined, his self or he himself is a something included along with "the other" in the compass of the temporal and the worldly, and it has only an illusory appearance of possessing in it something eternal. Thus the self coheres immediately with the "other".[76]

Immediacy is an expression for an undialectical unity. The self, to be a self, must reflect polarities. When the self is totally exhausted in immediate determinations, it does not reflect and thereby does not discern duality. As a result, it does not recognize its self as distinct from its not-self, its other. "The immediate man does not recognize his self."[77] Properly speaking, "immediacy has no self."[78]

The Reflection Constituting the Self of Immediacy. -- In his discussion of the reflection constituting the immediate self, Anti-Climacus makes explicit the important distinction between thought and reflection which remained implicit and covert through several of his earlier pseudonyms. He allots a reflection to the immediate man but it is a "quantitative reflection". If a consciousness, plunged into immediacy, is capable of reflection while remaining in the immediacy, then this reflection cannot be re-flection. That is, it does not "bend back". Quantitative reflection does not distance the self from immediacy because it occurs only within the univocacy of immediacy and does not deliver up a disengaged self. The meaning of quantitiative reflection is clearly not equivalent to re-flection. Quantitative reflection refers to activity within the category of immediacy. It denotes a thought process or passion that is located within and is fully conditioned by immediate determinants; it refers to a quantitative

"more or less" within the specific quality of immediacy. Although Anti-Climacus does not use the phrase "qualitative reflection", such an expression adequately points up the difference between reflection and re-flection. Unlike quantitative reflection, re-flection distinguishes a difference in quality between the self and its other.

This form of consciousness comes to despair, not through a movement of reflection, but through determinations of immediacy.

> Now then there happens, befalls (falls upon) this immediate self something which brings it to despair; in no other way can this come about, since the self has no reflection in itself, that which brings it to despair must come from without and the despair is merely passive.[79]

The immediate consciousness, as long as it remains within immediacy, can despair only over the immediate. Despair descends upon this consciousness when even a single finite determination of this self is lost. This despair is "over something earthly", but it is also despair over the self which is identified with the earthly.

It is clear that this form of despair is not found within a consciousness which, through reflection, has established itself as incongruent with its other and whose task it is to relate itself to that incommensurable without however dissolving the difference. Despair over the finite does not come from a self that has disengaged itself from the finite and concomitantly seeks a return to it. Such dialectical tension is absent here. There is, at best, merely the quantitative tension developed by quantitative reflection. Since the unreflected self is submerged in the world and is therefore a victim of finite, objective determinations, its despair is not generated from within but is externally provoked. It is therefore denominated as "passive" and as "weakness". Passive despair is the lowest form because the tension of contradiction which heightens consciousness is absent.

Second Form of Despair -- Duality emerges, the contradiction becomes more clearly delineated and consciousness more intense, when there is "a certain degree of self-reflection."[80]

> With this certain degree of self-reflection begins the act of discrimination whereby the self becomes aware of itself as something essentially different from the environment, from externalities and their effect upon it. But this is only to a certain degree.[81]

This self is constituted in reflecting itself, not from the finite other as a whole, but from certain elements within finitude. Consequently the self "has an obscure conception that there may even be something eternal in the self",[82] but it has not yet attained the self-transparency that is achieved in making "a breach with immediacy as a whole."[83] This self,

> has no consciousness of a self which is gained by the infinite abstraction from everything outward, this naked, abstract self (in contrast to the clothed self of immediacy) which is the first form of the infinite self and the forward impulse in the whole process whereby a self infinitely accepts its actual self with all its difficulties and advantages.[84]

The implication here is that the self, in order to be fully conscious of eternality, must first totally reflect itself from the finite other of immediacy. There must be an absolute "freedom from" serving as a prelude to the later concretization of the self with its other. Because the self has only a limited degree of self-reflection, it fails to make this prerequisite, total breach. Consequently there is only a vague consciousness of the qualitative distinction between self and other. The epochē is not universally established and so the contradiction is not firm. Nonetheless this self is reflective and consciousness is postured in a special form of despair.

The self, with some degree of self-reflection and some consciousness of its differentiation from its other, finds that among the finite determinants from which it has distanced itself, there are some to which it cannot effect a return.[85] The first reflection of distance is incomplete and a selective epochē is

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established resulting in the experience of a limited "freedom from". Unlike the ironist, the freedom attained through the bracketing does not produce ataraxy. On the contrary, the self recognizes that these suspended determinants are its other. It attempts a second reflection in order to attain synthesis[86] but fails because the self's eternality, glimpsed in its limited degree of self-reflection, is offended by the finitude of these determinations. The finite other is lost and the self is not concrete. It does not will to be the concretization of incommensurables. Yet in the loss, the self maintains a relationship toward that which is lost. The relationship is the contradiction that the loss of these finite determinations is present to the self and constitutes its consciousness. This contradictory relationship is its despair.

As the contradiction becomes clearer, both despair and the consciousness born of the contradiction become more highly potentiated.[87] In this second form of despair, the contradiction is limited and only dimly outlined; the self is obscurely related to itself, merely self-translucent. Despair is present but is not at a maximum of intensity. The intensity of consciousness and, concomitantly, of despair increases when self-reflection accomplishes a distance from the finite other as a whole.

Third Form of Despair. -- The self becomes more reflectively viable in universal despair over the finite other.

> The self first increases infinitely the actual loss, and then it despairs over the earthly in toto. But so soon as this distinction (between despairing over the earthly and over something earthly) is essentially affirmed there is also an essential advance made in the consciousness of the self.[88]

When the self, with infinite passion transforms the particular into the earthly "in toto", and reflects, the self becomes totally disengaged and the first reflection is complete. The self can no longer find itself within some immediate determinants while bracketing only one or several others. The

epochē now becomes universal. Since the self is in full consciousness of its incommensurability with its other, it is fully aware of its eternality in contrast with its finite other -- it experiences itself as essentially eternal. As in the ironic consciousness, this self is without content because it has, in its reflection, distanced itself from its finite other. The disengaged self is "the naked, abstract self".

Despite the distance effected by reflection, the self unlike the ironist is not indifferent to the other from which it has severed itself. It despairs over the finite other which is lost through incommensurability. Because the self does not despair over that which it regards as non-essential, to despair over the loss is to attach essentiality to that which is lost. Yet through reflection from that other, the self has become transparent to itself as fundamentally eternal. The self is, on the one hand, conscious of its essentiality as free from the other, while on the other hand, in its despair over the other, it recognizes the essentiality of its other. Thus the self is caught in an unresolved dichotomy and this contradiction further potentiates both consciousness and despair.

The self does not move toward the resolution of this contradiction by grounding itself in a God-relation. Realizing its fundamentally eternal character, the self despairs over its weakness in attributing essentiality to finitude.[89] In this sense, its despair is about the eternal and over itself [90] in so far as the self, established as eternal, attributes essentiality to the finite. Such despair regards the eternal as the true self. Its finite other is considered as the false self which is nonetheless despairingly regarded by the true self as essential.

This kind of despair is peculiar to introversion.[91] Conscious of its eternal validity, the self has contempt for finite immediacy[92] and is inclined

to turn in on itself. Yet it concedes that finite immediacy is inescapable. An introversion that considers the inevitability of finite relationships as unfortunate is reminiscent of the external reflection of incommensurables performed by the Unhappy Consciousness described by Hegel. The decisive difference between the despair of introversion and the Unhappy Consciousness is that the latter grounds its experience of eternality in a God-relation.

The first three forms of despair represent the despair of weakness. In each there is despair at not willing to be oneself. Although each successive form is more active than its preceding form, all are dominated by the passivity of withdrawal from self-concretization.

The Dialectical Tension Constituting Consciousness in the Despair of Defiance

The despair of defiance is the "despair of willing despairingly to be oneself"[93] and it is an active form of despair.

The despair of weakness is transformed into defiant despair when consciousness becomes aware of why it is in despair. "If despair thus becomes conscious of the reason why it does not want to be itself, then the case is altered, then defiance is present, for then it is precisely because of this a man is despairingly determined to be himself."[94]

The self does not want to be its concrete self because it has found itself as a self in freedom from the finite other. It takes the delight of self-possession in the eternality which, through reflection it has discovered itself to be. Its consciousness of its eternal validity has placed it over against its finite other and therefore it does not will to be itself in concretion with its incommensurable other. When the self becomes conscious of this reason for its not willing to be itself, its posture toward the finite other is drastically altered. With regard to finite content, the self, savoring its

experience of eternality, becomes aggressive for the preservation of its eternal self. In its relation to the finite other, after the reflection from that other, the self now wills to be itself in the name of and for the sake of the eternality which is its reflective self-experience.

Without content, the self is vacuous. "This infinite self, however, is really only the abstractest form, the abstractest possibility of the self."[95] The self as reflected from all positive content nonetheless is conscious of the inescapability, the essentiality of the finite other. The self, allured by the infinite possibility produced by its freedom from particular content, is inextricably involved in content. Possibility is always possibility for content. Yet in order to maintain the essentiality of its freedom from the finite other, the self is not willing to passively accept the finite self it is. On the contrary: "The self despairingly wills to dispose of itself or to create itself, to make itself the self it wills to be, distinguishing in the concrete self what it will and what it will not accept."[96] This is the activity of defiant despair.

There is also an ineluctable passive element within the despair of defiance which, together with its activity, generates the tension of its consciousness. In willing to be the self it wants to be, the defiant self stumbles upon certain finite elements within its total constitution from which it cannot fully reflect.[97] That is, although the self has fully reflected itself from its finite other and thereby distinguishes its qualitative difference from that other, it nevertheless recognizes that the infinite possibility that is opened up by the incommensurability cannot escape certain limitations of finitude. This is the passive element of its despair.

After its reflection, in its attempt to re-create itself in its finite other, the self is offended by one or some of these limitations from which

it can neither abstract nor accept with the passivity of resignation. Since it cannot abrogate these finite restrictions, it wills to reconstitute itself in spite of them.[98] These limitations are not the self it wills to be. Yet it cannot and moreover, will not, let them go. The boundary that is rejected is defiantly accepted. It is this contradiction that further potentiates consciousness and despair.

The dialectic of this form of despair can now be expressed in terms of reflection. The first reflection is complete and establishes the qualitative incommensurability between self and finite other. The second reflection attempts to mediate these incommensurables by and for the sake of the eternal dimension of the self and in spite of the finite other. There are elements within the finite that are both objectionable and inescapable. These repulsive factors are not accepted with resigned passivity. Their acceptance is active, that is, it is a defiant reception. But acceptance, because it is defiant, is a form of rejection. This kind of repudiation is for the sake of the eternal dimension of the disengaged self and conditioned by it. Since its disapproving acceptance is basically a resistance to finitude, the attempt at a second reflection of concretization neither mediates the incommensurables nor fundamentally holds them fast. The second reflection is not radically effected; the self is not concrete and consciousness falls into the despairing contradiction of defiant acceptance -- rejecting acceptance.

This form of despair is demoniacal. "The demonic despair is the most potentiated form of the despair which despairingly wills to be itself."[99] Yet, because "despair is more intense, salvation is in a certain sense nearer."[100]

The foregoing forms of despair, each of which represents an ascending potentiation of consciousness, are articulated by Anti-Climacus according to a human perspecitve. "The gradations in the consciousness of the self with which

we have hitherto been employed are within the definition of the human self, or the self whose measure is man."[101] The dialectical reflectivity of self and finite other -- the developing tension of the self as reflected from its other and entering into relation with that other -- is left unresolved when the analysis falls "within the definition of the human self." That dialectic is the expression of despair at not willing to be a concretized self and despair at willing to be such. The internal reflectivity of qualitative incommensurables, although progressively intensifying consciousness, fails to attain a full concretization of the self within the lower dialectic.

A new dimension is added to the development of consciousness when the self is viewed as, "directly in the sight of God."[102] The progressive potentiation of consciousness through the dialectic of collision between self and finite other is first referred to a God-relation and later to a Christ-relation. "Despair is potentiated in proportion to consciousness of self; but the self is potentiated in the ratio of the measure proposed for the self and infinitely potentiated when God is the measure."[103] When God and the God-man are introduced to the relationships between self and finite other, the higher dialectic is brought to bear on the lower with a resulting augmentation of the tension embodying consciousness.

Reflection and Despair in the Higher Dialectic

The Concept of God and the Intensification of Consciousness

Consciousness reaches a new level of intensity when the self is, "before God, or with the conception of God."[104] The content of that conception determines the posture of consciousness when consciousness enters into relation with it. God is conceived as the origin of the self and as such he is the Power that fundamentally constitutes the self.[105] Moreover the origin of the self is considered its measure and goal.[106] Unlike the sphere of the unfree, the

measure and goal of man is qualitatively different from him[107] and that difference in quality is absolute. Yet, "the measure for the self always is that in the face of which it is a self."[108] God is the self's absolutely other. The content of the conception of God as viewed by the consciousness standing before God is that he is the absolutely other, origin, measure and goal of the self.

For the consciousness with the conception of God as its constituting principle, the self-finite other synthesis is derived. Derivation from implies dependence upon;[109] the self depends upon its origin for the way it fundamentally is. In despair, the self-experience of the developing consciousness is that it is fundamentally a composite of incommensurables which it will not hold together. Because everything ought to be the way it most primitively is, the self ought to be the dialectical relation of incommensurables. Every disrelation in this relation between self and finite other means that before God, as constituted by God, the self is not what it ought to be and so every such disrelation is sin. "Sin is: before God in despair not to will to be oneself, or before God in despair to will to be oneself."[110] With the conception of God, consciousness becomes aware that the disrelationship in the dialectical relation between self and finite other is grounded in a disrelation with its absolutely other, God. The conception of God thereby intensifies the contradiction that constitutes the despairing consciousness in the lower dialectic.

When the self enters into relation with the content of its conception of God, consciousness can be described in terms of a contradiction within the higher dialectic. There are two factors within the conception of God that generate the tension of this contradiction.

The self conceives the God with which it establishes relation as the "Power" and as absolutely different. God is the Power that creates the self.

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But that creation is not conceived as a single act that is accomplished once and terminated. Such a conception would imply that God is fundamentally external. That is, before the act and when the act is completed God stands outside the creation. God is not to be regarded as something external in this sense.[111] The conception of God as the originating Power contains within it the meaning that the self is essentially and continuously constituted by God. The self is not a self and cannot be a self without God and therefore it is derived and dependent. Its derivation from and dependence upon God are expressions for engagement, presence, similarity and commensurability with this source.

The second factor within the self's conception of God which generates the tension of consciousness is that God is absolutely different. Between God and the self, there is an absolute, qualitative difference[112] -- God is absolutely other than the self. This is an expression for mutual independence, disengagement, distance, dissimilarity and incommensurability.

In its relation with God, the self views itself as, at once, totally dependent and totally independent of God. The self is essentially commensurable with its origin and yet essentially incommensurable because that origin is absolutely other. The self is continuously engaged with and simultaneously disengaged from God. It is, at once, within an intimate presence of God and at an abysmal distance from him. God <u>is</u> the self's absolutely other -- the self is constituted by its not-self, its absolutely other. This is the contradiction constituting consciousness in the dialectic of collision between God and the self -- the higher dialectic. To a significant degree, it parallels the contradiction between the self and the world, that is, between self and finite other in the lower dialectic. When this contradiction is entertained by the despairing consciousness, its consciousness is said to be "potentiated".

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The Final Forms of Despair: Offense

The final forms of despair are controlled by the dialectic of the self and its absolutely other. Each form becomes progressively more aware of the contradiction involved in the relationship between the self and the supremely other. Since consciousness is constituted by contradiction, consciousness itself becomes more highly potentiated as the contradiction becomes clarified.

Each form of despair before God and despair before Christ is a form of offense. Regulated by the contradiction of self and absolutely other, offense is a condition of consciousness governed by the higher dialectic. One of the poles of the contradiction is the absolutely other which implies irrevocable distance, distinction and absence; while the other term is a self revealing the absolutely other's profound intimacy, similarity and presence by regarding itself as essentially constituted by it. Offense is the posture of consciousness which recognizes this contradiction but cannot sustain it by holding it fast. It attempts to resolve it by rejecting a pole, thereby releasing the tension of the polarity.

Despair over Sin

Despair is despair at willing and not willing to be a concretized self. When this despair is before God, it is sin. A higher degree of despair is despair over sin which is a form of offense that rejects repentance and grace.[113] Grace is an expression for reconciliation, nearness, similarity -- for presence. This self has a conception of God as its absolutely other and therefore of absolute distance. For this consciousness, grace discloses the contradiction of the similarity of the absolutely other, the nearness of the faraway God. This consciousness is offended at the approach of the absolutely other, rejects grace, disrelates the incommensurables and so despairs over its sin.

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The disrelation disclosed by offense in the higher dialectic reverberates through the lower dialectic. Since ordinary despair is an unwillingness to hold together the self-finite other contradiction, despair over sin is despair over despair which is to say that it is, before God, a despair over balancing the contradiction in the lower dialectic. One condition of the possibility of despair over the incommensurability of self-finite other is the conception of God who offers grace and this implies that repentance and grace dissolve despair; that is, they reconcile the contradiction in the lower dialectic. However, the acceptance of grace involves the appropriation of another contradiction, namely, that the absolutely other than the self is consanguine with it. This intimacy of the self with God is rejected. Consequently the higher dialectic is broken and the self remains within the various forms of the disrelated contradiction of self and finite other.

Consciousness, in despair over sin, is more highly potentiated than in the foregoing forms of despair because the contradiction is further clarified in two discernible ways. The concept of God deepens the eternality of the self's consciousness of itself which is effected in the first reflection of the lower dialectic. "When the self as this definite individual is conscious of existing before God, only then is it the infinite self."[114] The qualitative difference between self and finite other of the lower dialectic becomes more pronounced since the pole of the self's eternality discovered in the first reflection is referred to God. Thus the contradictory relation and disrelation of these incommensurables are further clarified and consciousness is more profoundly intensified.

The contradiction is also clarified for consciousness in the higher dialectic. Acceptance of grace through repentance is equivalent to approving the absolutely other as the self's other. Rejection of grace presumes that

this contradiction was clarified for consciousness as its possibility.

Despair before Christ

Content of the Conception of Christ. -- The self is further potentiated when the self is with a conception of Christ or is, "a self face to face with Christ."[115] For consciousness, the content of this conception is that God, "for the sake of this self let Himself to be born, became man, suffered, died."[116] Also included in this conception is that through Christ, "God offers reconciliation in the forgiveness of sins."[117]

The dialectic of the self's constitution in this form of despair is similar to the preceding form, with the important exception that God, through Christ, initiates the approach to man. Because God actively pursues man in becoming man, it becomes explicit, "for the first time in Christ that God is man's goal and measure."[118] Since Christ is God and man, and actively offers reconciliation in the form of forgiveness of sin, the Christ figure proclaims the intimacy of God and man. The absolutely other than man is like man -- the totally other than the self is essentially the self. The advent of Christ makes it clearer to consciousness that God who is absolute other is indeed constitutive of the self -- that the absolutely not-self is the self. The contradiction is further clarified and consciousness additionally intensified.

When consciousness is offended at this contradiction, it attempts to resolve it by repudiating the approach of the absolutely other by rejecting reconciliation through the forgiveness of sin. Sin is, before God, in willing and not willing to be the concretization of the incommensurables, self and finite other. These terms, were found to be incommensurable through the progressive reflection of self from the finite other. The consciousness which is before a God who is absolutely other is, by the fact of its being absolutely other, also reflected from it. The self and the absolutely other are incommensurable as

well as the self and the finite other. Offering reconciliation through the forgiveness of sin is equivalent to an invitation to resolve the double dialectic: self-finite other, self-absolutely other. Before Christ, the self rejects the overture initiated by the Christ. It does not hold fast to the contradiction but is offended at the approach of the absolutely other, is affronted by the nearness of the faraway God. The higher dialectic is shattered and the lower dialectic falls into contradictory disrelationship -- the self despairs and sins.

Final Form of Despair: The Explicit Denial of the Christian Paradox. -- The final form of despair is the "positive form."[119]

> It declares that Christianity is a falsehood and a lie, it denies Christ (that He existed and that He is what He claimed to be) either docetically or rationalistically, so that Christ either does not become a particular man except apparently, or He becomes only a particular man, so that He either becomes docetically, poetry and mythology which make no claim to reality, or rationalistically, a reality which makes no claim to be divine.[120]

This last form of despair explicitly denies that Christ existed or that the Christ that existed as man was also God. Unlike the previous form of despair that rejected the forgiveness of sin but did not deny sin or explicitly negate Christ's God-claim, this form positively denies the paradox. "In this denial of Christ as the paradox there is naturally implied the denial of everything Christian: sin, the forgiveness of sins, etc."[121]

This type of despair is a form of offense which "is the highest potentiation of sin"[122] and concomitantly the highest potentiation of consciousness because in it the contradiction embodying consciousness is most clarified. This consciousness has a conception of God as absolutely other than the self and also as the self's essential constituent. Moreover, it stands before Christ. Its conception of Christ is that God has become man and hence for the first time it is manifest that God, the absolutely other, is the self's measure and

goal.[123] Christ reinforces the contradiction constituting the self by actively bringing the absolutely other close to man. The Christ figure witnesses that the self is indeed constituted by the absolutely other. Thus consciousness has a most clarified conception of itself in terms of contradiction. The self is a self only in and through its not-self, that is, in and through its absolutely other.

The contradictions present in this form of despair are similar to those in the preceding form. However that species of despair rejected the nearness of the absolutely other implied in grace and repentance without denying God's distance; while this form negates the distance between the totally other and the self by denying Christ's God-claim. When Anti-Climacus argues that this latter is the highest potentiation of sin and the highest potentiation of consciousness, the implication is that a more clarified consciousness of contradiction is requisite for the defiant denial that Christ was God than for the rejection of the absolutely other's approach through repentance and grace.

Denial of the Paradox as Offense at Contradiction. -- Consciousness is offended by this contradiction and aggressively denies that Christ is God. In the denial, consciousness, with this transparent concept of the self, defiantly negates the God-man. It attempts to resolve the contradiction constituting the self by nihilating the pole of the absolutely other as it is manifested in Christ and so it falls into the various forms of contradictory disrelation in the lower dialectic. It despairs and sins.

Reflection and the Sinful Consciousness

It now becomes plain that Anti-Climacus' discussion of sin is controlled throughout by a latent meaning of reflection. Indeed reflection is an essential constitutent of sin. To sin is, to be offended and thus to despair at willing and not willing to be a concretized self within higher and lower dialectics.

In sin, the self despairs at willing and not willing to "grow together" with its finite other and in this synthesis to simultaneously "grow together" with its absolutely other. Reflection is the expression for both concretizations.

Concretization is the growing together of incommensurables which is a function of reflection in both lower and higher dialectics. In the lower dialectic, where there is no explicit reference to the absolutely other, reflection is the "bending back" from immediate unity with environment or world. The destruction of immediate unity is the development of duality which announces the presence of reflection. For Anti-Climacus, the duality represents mutual disengagement, discontinuity or incommensurability and in this first movement of reflection a viable self emerges. In the incommensurable duality, the self distinguishes itself from what is not itself. The early movement of reflection is a separating movement that begins to delineate the poles of incommensurability and contradiction, thereby allowing for the emergence of self-consciousness. Reflection is the condition of the possibility of incommensurable duality which, in turn, is a prerequisite for self-consciousness.

The reflective movement of distinction and duality is a movement of separation and is not yet a thrust toward synthesis. For synthetic concretion a second reflection is necessary -- the "growing together" of the incommensurables that have been delineated through the first reflection. Here the self that is incommensurably distinguished from the not-self recognizes that that other is precisely <u>its</u> other. Through the self's awareness that it is constituted with its other, it enters into essential relationship with it and this is the reflective alliance of concretization. It is the "bending back again" upon an already effected divergency.

Since the movement of the first reflection separates and the second reflection unites without undoing the work of the first, the double reflection is a

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colliding contradictory movement.

Consciousness is constituted in the contradictory double movement of reflection. Because both reflective elements in the double movement admit of degrees, consciousness varies in intensity. The first reflection gives birth to a more or less viable self-consciousness depending on how thoroughly the self distinguishes itself from its other. Only when the reflection is total, is the distinction clarified, the incommensurability firmly fixed and consciousness fully born.

The second reflection intensifies or develops consciousness because it relates the incommensurables that emerge in the first reflection and it also admits of degrees. Variety in the intensity of consciousness within the second reflection is determined by the degree of cleavage produced by the separating activity of the first reflection. If the first reflection is total and the diversity thoroughly defined, the task of the second reflection, which is to bend back again upon the terms delivered in the first reflection, is clarified. Thus the consciousness which develops out of the second reflection is most intense when the first reflection is complete and less intense when the contradiction produced in the first reflection is less.

The gradations of consciousness are not determined simply by the degree of incommensurability that is related in the second reflection. Even when the first reflection is total, consciousness can make further disclosures within the second reflection. Although consciousness may be fully born in the first reflection, the way in which the second reflection is attempted and effected produces the several postures of consciousness and the calibrations of despair. Reflection not only gives birth to consciousness but it is also responsible for its growth in intensity or its progressive development.

If both the first and second reflections are total and fully effected,

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the contradiction is held fast, or held in "equilibrium", consciousness is most intense and most authentic. If the second reflection mollifies or nihilates either pole produced by the first reflection, or if the first reflection is not complete, consciousness is in some form of contradictory disrelation. This accounts for the various forms of despair. The way in which the double reflection is effected determines the authenticity or inauthenticity of consciousness.

Concretization also refers to the higher dialectic between the self and the absolutely other. Again concretization is the "growing together" of terms whose mutual irreducibility is a function of reflection. That which generates the first reflection of incommensurability or separation in the higher dialectic is the conception of God as the absolutely other, while the second reflection of concretization is accounted for by a conception of God as the power that continuously constitutes the self. Together the movements of the first and second reflections, of separation and union, are contradictory. When both reflections are complete and held fast, consciousness is most intense, most transparent to itself and most authentic. When either reflection is incomplete, the higher forms of despair emerge and all despair becomes sin.

"Sin is: before God in despair not to will to be oneself, or before God in despair to will to be oneself."[124] The self referred to here is the concretized self which is now related to the higher as well as the lower dialectic. Both finite and absolutely other are reflected in the self's concreteness after they have been discerned as qualitatively different from the self in the first reflection. The self is essentially constituted by its incommensurable finite other on the one side and its absolutely other on the other. God and the world have their point of intersection within the self and any disrelation in either element of the concretized incommensurability of this relation reflects itself in the other. "The disrelationship of despair

is not a simple disrelationship but a disrelationship in a relation which relates itself to its own self and is constituted by another, so that the disrelationship in that self-relation reflects itself infinitely in the relation to the Power which constituted it."[125] Since disrelation, which is a faulting within the double reflection, is despair and sin, the sinful consciousness is properly described as inauthentic reflection. Disrelation within the internal, double reflectivity of qualitative incommensurables in both dialectics is despair and sin

Reflection and the Definition of Faith in The Sickness unto Death

The relation of reflection to the believing consciousness is virtually contained in the description of the sinful consciousness since the basic activity of reflection in both is similar. That is, in both cases there is a movement of distinction and a movement of likeness -- a separating and a uniting. Yet there is a decisive difference within these reflective movements that prompts Anti-Climacus to declare that "the opposite of sin is faith."[126]

In sin, the double reflection is not completely effected. This does not mean that the sinful consciousness is not reflective enough to see the contradictions constituting itself. The sinful consciousness is nonetheless a consciousness and since all consciousness is contradiction, the sinful consciousness particularly in its highest stages, is reflected. On the levels of the lower and the higher dialectic it progressively becomes aware of the contradictions that constitute the self, but it will not hold them fast. That is, it will not fully effect the second reflective movement of concretization. It cannot, in interest (inter-esse), live between the polarities it has discovered itself to be and so falls into the new contradiction of not being the self it sees itself to be. This form of the contradiction is despair and it is included

in the second part of the formula for sin: "in despair to will to be oneself."[127] To despairingly will to be oneself is to be the self one chooses to be which is not the self one recognizes oneself to be.

The definition of faith is the reversal of the definition of sin. "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."[128] The "self" referred to in the phrase, "by relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself," is the self with its finite other. This is the fully concretized self of the lower dialectic. It is implied therefore that the double reflection has been fully effected within the lower dialectic between self and finite other. The self has reflected itself from the finite other and the incommensurability is established. In "relating itself to its own self", it relates the polarities that emerged in the first movement of reflection. In "willing to be itself", the second movement of reflection is fully effected. The incommensurables, self and finite other, become the self and its other. The contradiction within the lower dialectic is held fast.

The self that is willing to be itself with its finite other also wills to be with its absolutely other -- the "Power which constituted" the self. The absolutely other precisely as other reflects from the self; yet it constitutes the self as a self. The constituting Power is at once reflected from and reflected back to the self with the result that the double reflection within the higher dialectic is fully effected and the contradiction held fast. Thus the self in willing to be itself is the fully reflected, concretized self. As such it is "transparently" grounded in the Power. This lucidity of the self to itself in the Power is faith. A fully effected double reflection within the higher and lower dialectics unites these dialectics and describes the posture of the believing consciousness.

Reflection and the Freedom of the Self in Faith

We have seen that the self is authentically constituted when it is in concretion with its finite other. So when Kierkegaard's pseudonym proclaims that "the self is freedom",[129] it is implied that the authentically free self is the self-with-its-other. But this does not mean that the self is free in immediate unity with the finite because Anti-Climacus has classified this as unreflected and unconscious despair. Nor can it be said that authentic freedom emerges in the first reflection that generates the polarities required for consciousness since this reflection merely distinguishes self and finite other but does not express the self-with-its-other. The "freedom from" the other attained by the self in the first reflection, though necessary for the viable birth of the self, is not authentic freedom. A double reflection in the lower dialectic is indispensable for the constitution of an authentic self and for freedom.

Because the self as the colliding synthesis of self and finite other is derived from the Power,[130] that Power is both an essential constituent of the self and qualitatively different from it. Qualitative difference is an expression for absolutely other and both denote disengagement from the self. The absolutely other, precisely as other, is reflected from the self. Reflection as disengagement means mutual independence. The first reflection of separation in the higher dialectic delivers a self that is free from the Power. But the self is not a self, and concomitantly not free, unless it is with its absolutely other. Thus the "freedom from" effected in this first reflection, though necessary to denote a Power that is absolutely other, is not of itself authentic freedom. A double reflection in the higher dialectic is necessary for the constitution of an authentic self and for freedom.

Dialectic of Freedom and the Reflectivity of Higher and Lower Dialectics

The self is a self when it is with its absolutely other in the recognition that it is essentially constituted by that other. Since it is grounded in the absolutely other, the self is derived. "This formula [i.e., that the self is constituted by another] is the expression for the total dependence of the relation (the self namely)."[131] Since the self that is wholly dependent is the self with its finite other, these incommensurables depend upon a God-relation for their concretization. "The self cannot of itself attain and remain in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only by relating itself to that Power which constituted the whole relation."[132] The double reflection within the lower dialectic is only possible through dependence upon the absolutely other constituting Power. But "absolutely other" is an expression for independence. To say that the self is dependent on an absolutely other is to assert that the self is dependent on that from which it is independent. This is exactly the expression for the double reflection in the higher dialectic. It also enunciates the dialectic of human and divine freedom.

The self is freedom. But authentic selfhood is accomplished through concretization with finite and absolutely other.

Only when the double movements required for the concretization of incommensurables have been made is the self both authentic and free. Therefore authentic freedom cannot simply mean freedom from the finite other nor freedom from the absolutely other. Yet "freedom from" is a necessary movement in self-constitution. The proper meaning of freedom can only be dialectically expressed: the self is most itself and thereby most independent when it is dependent upon the Power. This expression is controlled by the self's being constituted by a Power that is absolutely other.

The dialectic of the Power and human freedom is portrayed, somewhat

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lyrically, but nonetheless effectively, in the Journals.

> The greatest good which can be done to any being, greater than any end to which it can be created, is to make it free. In order to be able to do that omnipotence is necessary. That will sound curious, since of all things omnipotence, so at least it would seem, should make things dependent. But if we rightly consider omnipotence, then clearly it must have the quality of so taking itself back in the very manifestation of its all-powerfulness that the results of this act of the omnipotent can be independent. That is why one man cannot make another man quite free, because the one who has the power is imprisoned in it and consequently always has a false relation to him whom he wishes to free. That is why there is finite self-love in all finite power (talent and so forth). Omnipotence alone can take itself back while giving, and this relation is nothing else but the independence of the recipient. God's omnipotence is therefore his goodness. For goodness means to give absolutely, yet in such a way that by taking oneself back one makes the recipient independent. From finite power comes only dependence, and omnipotence alone can make something independent, can create something out of nothing which endures of itself, because omnipotence is always taking itself back. [133]

It is due to this relationship between the self and the Power which is the absolutely other pole constituting the self that the self is "a relation which relates itself to its own self, and in relating itself to its own self relates itself to another."[134] In faith, the more the self discloses its independence, the more it discloses its dependence upon the constituting Power. The more there is of God, the more there is of self; the more self, the more God.[135]

The expression, "the self relates itself to itself", means freedom.[136] Freedom is human in the sense that the self in relating to itself does not immediately, linearly and undialectically relate to the absolutely other. In relating itself to itself, it is free from the absolutely other; "free" to align the incommensurables constituting itself. This deployment of the incommensurables is accomplished through decision -- the self may decide despairingly to will to be itself or not to will to be itself. Since it is based on the undialectical "freedom from", this decision is not authentically free and is sinful. On the other hand, the self may decide to resign itself

in faith to the incommensurability of the self-finite other. If the resignation is accomplished in faith it includes recognition of, through submission to, the absolutely other, as the Power constituting the self. In this active decision of surrender, the first reflection of "freedom from" is dialectically completed by the second reflection of concretization. The decision discloses the Power -- human freedom is grounded in omnipotence. Consequently this decision is free and constitutes the self as a self and as freedom.

The meaning of authentic freedom is now transparent. It is the doubly reflective concretization of higher and lower dialectics effected by the decision to believe. Freedom is fundamentally a dialectical reconciliation of God, self and world. The meaning of free choice or free decision also becomes clearer: a decision is free in choosing the freedom so described. The essentiality of reflection and freedom to Anti-Climacus' description of faith is now revealed: "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it."[137]

Reflection and Faith Described as Immediacy after Reflection

"Faith is immediateness after reflection."[138] This definition of faith appears as a Journal entry dated May 11, 1848. The Sickness unto Death was completed by May 13 of the same year.[139] The Journal's description parallels the definition of The Sickness unto Death.

The central terms comprising this brief definition are "immediacy" and "reflection". These terms are frequently employed by Kierkegaard throughout his works to articulate, not only the experience of faith, but also many other problematics and postures of consciousness.[140] Although the terms, immediacy and reflection, are not confined to a specific formulation of a determinate content, they do express a consistent meaning.

The terms, immediacy and reflection, have a relational meaning. The immediate is that which is not mediated by another. In this sense, the immediate conveys spontaneity because the impulse is not evoked by or through an other. Since whatever is not generated by another is self-given, the immediate expresses spontaneity and self-givenness. The mediation of immediacy is effected by reflection: "Reflection is the destroying angel of immediacy."[141] The terms are in a relation of contrast; the immediate is not mediated -- reflection mediates immediacy. This contrast is a difference of incommensurability because there is a qualitative difference between that which is immediate and that which is reflected. It is just this incommensurability that sets Kierkegaard's dialectic apart from the Hegelian dialectic of mediation.

Hegel had already made the distinction between immediacy and reflection but, for him, every immediacy is a reflected or mediated immediacy.

> The ego, or becoming in general, this process of mediating is, because of its being simple, just immediacy coming to be, and is immediacy itself. We misconceive therefore the nature of reason if we exclude reflection or mediation from ultimate truth.[142]

For Hegel, every immediacy immanently contains its own negative moment in as much as every immediacy is reflected and anticipates reflection. Kierkegaard clearly understands that the function assigned by Hegel to reflection in relation with immediacy results in an immanental movement within either immediacy or mediacy. "The annulment of immediacy is therefore an immanent movement within immediacy, or it is an immanent movement in an opposite direction within mediacy, by which mediacy presupposes immediacy."[143] Kierkegaard opposes this position by maintaining that "immediacy is not annulled by mediacy, but when mediacy emerges it has that same instant annulled immediacy."[144] Having established the distinction of incommensurability between immediacy and reflection, Kierkegaard can, and often does, employ these terms in his description of a whole range of existential phenomena and this description can now adequately

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express dialectical collision rather than dialectical mediation.

Kierkegaard, with some detail, explicates the act of faith as an immediacy after reflection in Either/Or and in Stages on Life's Way. In the chapter from Either/Or entitled, "Aesthetic Validity of Marriage,"[145] the development of this definition is remarkably similar to that in Stages on Life's Way. The discussion of this theme is however more elaborate in the latter work. Here Kierkegaard outlines and virtually resolves the problems contained within this definition. We shall see that the description of faith as immediacy after reflection can be understood in the same terms as the definition in The Sickness unto Death -- that is, as a double reflection in lower and higher dialectics.

The problem of the relation of immediacy to reflection is stated by the pseudonymn, Frater Taciturnus.

> The signal is given for the question most difficile, which comprises all in one: how immediacy is to come back again (or whether the fact that immediacy is abolished for the individual signifies that he does not exist at all), what difference there is between this immediacy and an earlier one, what is lost by it and what is gained, what it is that the first immediacy can do which the second dare not do, what it is that first immediacy loves which the second dare not love, what is the certainty of the first immediacy which the second does not possess, etc., for this is a very prolix subject.[146]

The expression, "immediacy after reflection,"[147] implies that there are two immediacies: a first immediacy and an immediacy after reflection. The first immediacy refers to undialectical unity.[148] It can apply to a self plunged into its environment[149] or to a self in the immediacy of an aesthetical experience such as first love.[150]

The reflection that comes betweeen the two immediacies is an "infinite reflection."[151] This reflection is "infinitely higher than immediacy."[152] It reflects the self, not from this or that particular immediacy, but from all finite immediacy. As such, it effects the thorough dualizing of immediacy

because in it, the self becomes aware of itself in becoming aware of its other precisely as other. This is the reflective movement of separation and disengagement of the self from its finite other. Disengagement is an expression for "freedom from". "In the infinite reflection freedom is won."[153]

The reflective movement, although a polarizing movement, does not inhibit a return to immediacy. That from which the self is distanced can be held fast, can be grasped in unity. When immediacy is reflected from and yet held fast, immediacy becomes transparent to itself. "But if a man can do it, then he knows also that the infinite reflection is not something heterogeneous to him but is the transparency of immediacy to itself."[154] The lucidity of immediacy to itself is the second immediacy of faith. It is, after the infinite reflection, a return of the self to immediacy that effects its transformation into a new or second immediacy. This return is not accomplished -- in the Hegelian fashion -- through an immanent self-mediating power of infinite reflection which would render the lower dialectic autonomous.

In order for immediacy to be held fast in the infinite reflection, for immediacy to become transparent to itself in the infinite reflection and thereby become a new immediacy, a third term is required. That term is God. In the infinite reflection, "immediacy relates itself to itself in the idea. But the phrase, 'in the idea', denotes a God-relationship."[155] The lower dialectic cannot be sustained or transformed without being incorporated within the higher dialectic.

It is now possible to see the similarity between this definition of faith and that of The Sickness unto Death. The first immediacy is dualized by a first reflection. The terms of the duality can be held fast only in establishing a God-relationship; that is, the polarity can be held in union, reflectively concretized, only by being grounded in God. The God-relationship, or the

reflecting upon God allows immediacy to become transparent to itself. This is the new, second immediacy, the immediacy after reflection. The movement of second immediacy is similar to that of the second reflection. It is the self, grounded in God, concretely reflecting upon that from which it had reflected from. Although the higher dialectic is not fully explicated in Stages on Life's Way, the double movement of reflection controls the entire definition of faith. "In order to hold the problem fast one must continually perform double movements."[156] The double movement of reflection regulates not only the definition of faith in The Sickness unto Death but also its description as "immediacy after reflection". Both are governed by the double, internal reflectivity of qualitative incommensurables in the higher and lower dialectics.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Reflection and the Relation between the Three Definitions of Faith

The central question raised in the Introduction to the dissertation concerned the relation between the three definitions of faith with regard to the meaning of reflection. The three definitions referred to there are: 1) "Absurdity, held fast in the passion of inwardness." 2) "Immediateness after reflection." 3) "By relating itself to its own self and by willing to be itself, the self is grounded transparently in the Power which constituted it." We will refer to the above enumeration in comparing these three descriptions.

The second and third definitions have already been compared.[1] A brief review here will suffice. The second and third definitions both describe the believing consciousness as the internal reflection of the qualitative incommensurables, self and other. Both imply this reflection in the lower and higher dialectics -- self and finite other, self and absolutely other. In both, there is implied a re-flection or "bending back" that effects incommensurable duality and a second movement of re-flection that holds fast the established contradiction. For both definitions, these two movements of reflection are implied in lower and higher dialectics. When the double movement of reflection is effected in higher and lower dialectics, the faith-consciousness is described.

The second definition, immediacy after reflection, is a simplified version of the third. The latter is a more elaborately prepared and more fully articulated description of the consciousness postured in Christian faith. However,

the function of reflection in faith, implied in both, is similar.

The third definition, that offered by Anti-Climacus, describes faith as the internal reflection of incommensurables in lower and higher dialectics. Since the first definition, authored by Climacus, describes faith as an external reflection and does not delineate the double reflection in lower and higher dialectics, it is essentially different from that of his anti-pseudonym.

Climacus' definition depicts an external reflection because, unlike the second and third definitions where the faith consciousness is described as the tension of the self-other contradiction, the contradiction Climacus expresses does not include the self as a term. Climacus' contradiction is the absurd, the eternal-temporal, the absolute-finite, the God-man. Only after the nature of this contradiction has been articulated and differentiated from the Socratic contradiction as well as from the Hegelian mediated contradiction, is the self placed in a faith-relation to it. The contradiction which constitutes the object of faith does not itself describe the contradiction which constitutes consciousness in faith. Climacus describes faith as an external reflection.

Climacus' formulation of the nature of the contradiction comprising the absurd, and the unique character of this contradiction in contrast with the Socratic and Hegelian contradictions relies on a specific kind of thought activity. The principles underlying the thought that discovers this contradiction are identity and contradiction. The contradiction, the thought process that discovers it and the principles underlying this thought movement are all external to the self in faith. That is, the self that thinks the contradiction does not necessarily hold it fast -- does not inevitably believe it. It is possible for the self to reject or to remain indifferent to the contradiction which its thought discovers. The ironist is a subjectivity that follows such a path. In thinking objective contradiction, he effects a first reflection of separation from his finite other and remains external to it. Climacus,

himself, in describing the requirement for the act of Christian faith appears in this respect, to function as an ironist. Using objective thought determinations, he describes the objective contradiction and characterizes it as absurd. From the perspective of the ironic consciousness it is not objectively digestible; it is objectively repulsive. But it is precisely "passionate", "inward" adherence to this contradiction that describes the faith act. The contradiction that the ironist evades, the Christian subjectively appropriates.

For Climacus, some form of irony appears prerequisite for Christianity's act of religion. Like the ironist, the Christian must at least effect the first reflection of separation from his finite other. Moreover, both think objective contradiction employing similar thought determinations and principles of thought. Contradiction is not appropriated by irony and the ironic subjectivity is preserved in the first reflection of separation. Contradiction is passionately appropriated by the Christian. Through his adherence to the absurd, the Christian, who is reflected from his finite other, enters into the higher dialectic, self and absolutely other. In so far as Climacus' definition implies the requirement of a first reflection from the finite other, it is similar to the second and third definitions which also require this reflection. In as much as the description of the contradiction, the absurd, does not describe the contradiction constituting the faith-consciousness, the first definition differs from the second and third.

The character of the contradiction, the absurd, further underlines the externality of the reflection in Climacus' definition. "The absurd is the object of faith."[2] When the self passionately adheres to this object, the latter becomes the self's other. This appears to be a description of faith as the internal reflection of the qualitative incommensurables, self-other or self-absolutely other. But viewed from the objective side, the object which

is to be the self's other, is a nonobject because the other of the self in faith, for Climacus, is the objective contradiction, the absurd. It is an objective contradiction because, using principles of objective thought, it can be shown with certainty to be a contradiction. But a logical contradiction is, for logic, nonsense. The poles of such contradiction cannot be thought in synthesis because thought is ruled by the principle of contradiction which abhors self-contradiction. The absurd, the God-man, is not an object for thought. It is a logical nonobject.

The contradiction, the absurd, is similarly not an historical object · or better, it is not an object for a rational historical consciousness.[3] The proper organ for a grasp of historical existence is not rational thought which precludes the possibility for existing contradiction in history. Only faith can grasp historical events without excluding the contradictions required for transcendence in history. The coming into historical existence by the eternal cannot then be an object for rational, historical thought. In this sense, the absurd is not an historical object.

The object of faith is objectively neither a logical nor an historical object. Objectively the other of the self, the absurd, is no other. Climacus' definition cannot describe the internal reflection of the self and its other because, for the rational, nonbelieving Climacus, the self's other is not other.

It is only in the effected act of faith itself that the absurd becomes an other, becomes the self's other, becomes the "object" of faith.[4] That which is rationally a nonobject becomes an object for me in the act of faith. A "religious object" cannot pre-exist the subjective passionate act of faith -- it is neither "religious" nor an "object" until it is a manifestation of an act of subjectivity. The religious object is the objectification of an act of subjectivity which alone can account for it as such. For Climacus, even when an

act of subjectivity manifests a religious object, the latter cannot be objectively sustained. That is, rational objective analysis of this object will again disclose its nonobjectivity and make a new demand on the activity of subjectivity to sustain it. Thus, in Climacus, the entire burden of the act of faith falls to the side of subjectivity and its creativity. This is thoroughly in keeping with Climacus' major thesis that subjectivity is truth. But it prevents the speculative, non-Christian, Climacus from fully describing the effected act of faith in terms of the internal reflectivity of self-other, self-absolutely other, in the lower and higher dialectics as is done by the Christian, Anti-Climacus.

The second and third definitions of faith imply the entire double reflection in the lower and higher dialectics. The first definition, that is offered by Climacus, involves the first reflection of separation in the lower dialectic and explicitly concerns itself only with the reflectivity of the higher dialectic. Climacus' definition does not refer to the second reflection of unifying collision in the lower dialectic. In the second definition, that reflective return to the disengaged finite other is denoted by the phrase, "immediacy after reflection." In the third definition, Anti-Climacus refers to the second reflection in the lower dialectic in the phrase, "willing to be oneself" -- that is, willing to be the self with its incommensurable finite other.

It has been explained that the phrase, immediacy after reflection, implies two immediacies. The immediacy after reflection is a second immediacy which presupposes a first immediacy. The first immediacy is the unmediated, unreflected, sensuous immediacy; it has not effected the first reflection of separation in the lower dialectic where the self and other emerge as incommensurables. The second immediacy is a new return to immediacy and implies that all the contradictory movements of reflection in higher and lower dialectics have

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been effected and held fast. The second immediacy now becomes the finite other which is reflected as incommensurable with the self but which is held fast by the self and grounded in the reflectivity of the higher dialectic. Thus the term, "immediacy", as well as, "new immediacy" are functions of the incommensurables self and other in higher and lower dialectics. The third definition, although not explicitly using the term, immediacy, similarly describes the entire double movement in both dialectics. They are both, unlike the first definition, internally reflected.

The term, immediacy, cannot be equivalently applied to the first and second definition. In the latter, it is a function of the internal reflection of self and other while the former definition describes faith as externally reflected. However, there is a sense in which immediacy is applicable to Climacus' definition. Immediacy refers to that which is unmediated and the unmediated is not generated by another. Immediacy does not find its reason for being in another -- it does not have its explanation outside itself. The activity of immediacy is thus spontaneous, sui generis or causa sui. These characteristics describe the activity of the passion of faith. The passionate movement of subjectivity in the act of faith is not motivated or generated by the self's other. The "object" of faith is not an object that is grounded in principles that coerce the affirmation of subjectivity. On the contrary, the "object" of faith is objectively a nonobject. Thus the act of faith does not have its explanation in its object or in another. It is self-explanatory, spontaneous and immediate. But its immediacy is not the unmediated sensuous, first immediacy. That immediacy has already been broken by the first reflection of separation; nor is it here a return to the first immediacy as a finite other. It is rather the unmediated immediacy of freedom's passion in the act of faith.

The first definition differs from the other two by exclusively focusing on the reflectivity of the higher dialectic -- it implies the double reflection in the upper dialectic. The first movement is the reflection of separation. Separation of the self from its "object" is highlighted by the absurdity of that object. The self as a thinking rational self can have no consanguinity with such contradiction and so the distance of incommensurability is implied between a rational self and the absurd. A self which is rationally repulsed by the contradiction is reflected from it. This is a first reflection of separation in the higher dialectic.

A second reflection of colliding unification is also implied in the higher dialectic. The absurd is "held fast in the passion of inwardness." This is an expression for the colliding relation of the incommensurables that were discovered in the first reflection.

All three definitions imply a double reflection in the higher dialectic. However, the contradictions that generate the double movement in Climacus' definition are not similar to those that effect the reflective movement in Anti-Climacus' definition. For the latter, it is a special concept of God and concept of Christ that suggest the contradictory movements. In Anti-Climacus, the concept of God as the absolute Power, the omnipotent, constitutes the self's other as the absolutely other. This is the first reflection of separation in the higher dialectic. Yet it is that very concept of the Power that also suggests the second reflection of colliding unification of these incommensurables. The Power is the origin of the self, constitutes the self and this implies intimate likeness. In Anti-Climacus, faith is the expression for the holding fast of this contradiction. The coming to be of the God in Christ simply accentuates the contradiction. In Christ, the absolutely other as the self's other is made manifest.

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Climacus does not employ these forms of contradiction in the reflectivity of the higher dialectic. His definition does not imply that the Christ-figure contains a dreadful contradiction that is at once attractive as well as repulsive. His description contains no reference to Christ as the unique manifestation that the absolutely other, the Power, (reflection of separation) is indeed the self's constituting other (reflection of unification). On the contrary, Climacus underlines the objective repulsiveness of the contradiction (reflection of separation) and makes its subjective appropriation (reflection of unification) the requirement for faith.

Unlike the definition of Anti-Climacus, the double reflective movement of the higher dialectic in Climacus' definition lends itself to division into two discernible categories: objective thought which is separative and subjective passion which is unifying. This division is, no doubt, a product of his polemical intent. Against the forms of gnosticism, he wants to illustrate that the Christian contradiction is not a matter for the affirmation or mediation of objective thought. Rather, it is solely the business of subjectivity which transcends thought in so far as its manifestations cannot be assimilated by thought. Climacus' emphasis is that the bond between the self and Christ is not objective thought; it is subjective passion.

The similarities and differences between the first definition and the two others in terms of the double reflection in higher and lower dialectics now become clearer. The second and third definitions imply the complete internal double reflection in higher and lower dialectics. The first definition is externally reflected. However, in comparing it with the other definitions, Climacus' description of faith implies the first reflection of separation in the lower dialectic. It also implies a double reflection of separation and unification in the higher dialectic. Yet, the terms of contradiction describing the double reflection here are not similar to those used by the Christian

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Anti-Climacus. The difference can be ascribed to the non-Christian posture of Climacus and to his polemical intent. In his definition, Climacus does not concern himself with the second reflection of unification with the finite other in the lower dialectic. Unlike Anti-Climacus, he does not ground the contradictory movements of reflection in the lower dialectic in the holding fast of the contradictory movement of reflection in the higher dialectic.

In comparing the definitions of Climacus and Anti-Climacus, the question arises: Does the latter definition negate or supplement the former? These definitions represent two different perspectives on the same act of Christian faith. Because they are different perspectives, they need not conflict with one another -- one need not negate the other.

We have seen that Climacus stands outside Christian faith and attempts to discover what it means to be a Christian. His anlaysis of Christianity is speculative and culminates in the conclusion that the object of faith is most certainly not an object for cognition. The act of faith is the subjective appropriation of this "object" and creates it as an authentic religious object. Thus the nonbeliever who objectively analyzes the Christian's faith object finds it to be a nonobject and subsequently places subjectivity in a faith relation to this "object". This is the external reflectivity of the Climacean definition. It need not be repudiated by the formula of Anti-Climacus.

Anti-Climacus is a Christian. His definition discloses his posture of consciousness in Christian faith. As a believer the object of his faith is an object for him. He is not concerned with an objective analysis of the Christian's faith object because he is constituted in faith. That is, the reflectivity of his self with his incommensurable finite and absolutely other is the contradiction that constitutes him in faith. The faith act is internally reflected and described as such. But this does not deny the legitimacy of

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Climacus' externally reflected perspective. In no place does Anti-Climacus deny that the faith object he creates in faith's subjectivity is, for external objective thought, a contradiction and an absurdity. On the contrary, the highest form of despair according to Anti-Climacus is to be offended by and to reject the Christ contradiction. This form of despair denies that Christ is the God-man.

> It denies Christ (that He existed and that He is what he claimed to be) either docetically or rationalistically, so that Christ either does not become a particular man except apparently, or he becomes only a particular man, so that He either becomes docetically, poetry and mythology which make no claim to reality, or rationalistically, a reality which makes no claim to be divine.[5]

The act of faith described by Climacus is a prerequisite for the description proposed by Anti-Climacus. Unless Climacus' act of faith is effected, the faith "object" has no objectivity. It cannot serve as the self's other which together with the self, constitutes the tension of the internal reflection of incommensurables. On the other side, Anti-Climacus' definition completes Climacus' perspective. Once the faith act is effected and the self has its other, the entire double reflection of incommensurables in higher and lower dialectics is effected and can be described.

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NOTES

CHAPTER I

REFLECTION AS A DIALECTICAL EXPRESSION FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE RELATIONSHIPS OF THREE DEFINITIONS OF FAITH IN SØREN KIERKEGAARD

1. Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for my Work as an Author, ed. Benjamin Nelson, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1952), pp. 5-6.

2. See especially: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), pp. 44, 64, 131; Søren Kierkegaard, Repetition, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), p. 127; Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy, trans. David F. Swenson. Revised trans. Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 76, 101; Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 126; Søren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 159; Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 31, 189, 208, 384, 540. Hereafter referred to as Postscript. Søren Kierkegaard, The Present Age, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 67-68; Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 273; Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), pp. 171, 217, 247 note, 258, 260-262; Søren Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, trans. Walter Lowrie (London : Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 101; Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), pp. 36, 117; Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1959), pp. 362, 386, 387. Hereafter referred to as Journals, Dru.

3. Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 36.

4. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 290.

5. Ibid., 189.

6. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 273. Cf., Fragments, p. 101.

7. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 540. Italics in text.

8. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 76.

9. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 537. Cf. Fear and Trembling, p. 64.

10. Journals, Dru, p. 362. Parentheses in text.

11. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 384. Cf., Ibid., 208; Fear and Trembling, p. 31; The Sickness unto Death, p. 171.

12. This dispute is analyzed in Chapter III, pp. 127-138.

13. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 182. Italics in text.

14. Ibid., 188.

15. Ibid., 183.

16. Ibid., 188.

17. See, for example: Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 30, 37, 118, 182, 188, 259; Fear and Trembling, pp. 77, 130; The Concept of Dread, pp. 140-141; Journals, Dru, p. 368.

18. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 208. Italics in text.

19. See especially, Kierkegaard, Repetition, pp. 117-118.

20. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, pp. 57-58.

21. Chapter IV, pp. 143-157.

22. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 262. In 1848, before the completed manuscript for The Sickness unto Death was delivered to his publisher, Kierkegaard felt that this work was so dialectically rigorous that it inhibited a free and inspiring style. "This book has one difficulty; it is too dialectical, too rigid for me to be able to make it rhetorical, stirring, moving." Journals Dru, p. 240.

23. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 262.

24. Kierkegaard, Either/Or, 2 vols., trans. David Swenson and Lillian M. Swenson (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1959), I, pp. 63, 69-73, 83.

25. See especially: Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, p. 190. Cf., For Self-Examination, p. 101.

26. More importantly, as we shall soon see, the term, immediacy, is frequently used here in connection with "reflection". Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, pp. 184 ff.

27. See especially: Stages on Life's Way, p. 159 where "repetition" is described as a new immediacy; For Self-Examination, p. 101; Training in Christianity, p. 190.

28. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 58. Cf., Repetition, pp. 116, 118;

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Fragments, p. 101; Stages on Life's Way, p. 271; Postscript, p. 446 note; Works of Love, pp. 41, 339; Journals, Dru, pp. 38, 242-243.

29. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 58.

30. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, p. 41.

31. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 58.

32. Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination, p. 101. Cf., Training in Christianity, p. 190.

33. Kierkegaard, Repetition, p. 116.

34. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 271. Cf., Postscript, p. 235.

35. Kierkegaard, Journals, Dru, p. 240.

36. Ibid. Cf., Ibid., 239.

37. See especially, Postscript, pp. 101-106, 171-179, 388-390, 397.

38. For a sampling of this reference see, Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, I, pp. 177-178. Here reflection is directly linked with thought and thought process. See also, Stages on Life's Way, pp. 59, 123, 159, 227; The Concept of Dread, p. 126; Repetition, p. 93; Fear and Trembling, p. 53 note; Postscript, p. 537.

39. All three definitions appear within a span of less than three and one half years. The Postscript was published on February 27, 1846. The Journal entry containing the third definition is dated May 11, 1848. The Sickness unto Death, although completed in 1848, was published on July 30, 1849.

40. This association is particularly clear in Kierkegaard's, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, trans. T. H. Croxall (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). pp. 151-152. -- Hereafter referred to as Johannes Climacus -- and in the Postscript, p. 105. See also, Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 227.

41. Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 67-68. Cf., Ibid., pp. 71, 171, 173, 178 and Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, ed. Benjamin Nelson, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York : Harper and Brothers, 1962). pp. 42-43.

42. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 121.

43. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 171.

44. Ibid., 178.

45. Ibid., 68-70

46. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 147.

47. Ibid., 148.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. See especially, Ibid., 153.

51. Ibid., 150. Italics in text.

52. Ibid.

53. Ibid., 151. Italics in text.

54. Ibid., 136.

55. Ibid., 151. Cf. Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 117, note.

56. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 151.

57. Ibid., 150.

58. See Dupré, op. cit., p. 117.

59. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 152.

60. Ibid., 150.

61. Ibid., 151

62. Ibid.

63. Ibid.

64. Ibid., 153.

65. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 299, note.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid., 305. Cf., p. 96.

68. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 146.

69. Ibid., note.

70. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 172.

71. Dupré, op. cit., p. 116.

72. See, for example, Postscript, p. 106 where Kierkegaard makes reference to the relation of the Phenomenology to the rest of Hegel's works.

73. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 172. Cf., Ibid., 293, 298 note, 299 where this doctrine is attributed directly to Hegel.

74. Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 219.

75. Ibid.

76. Ibid., 220.

77. Ibid., 221.

78. Ibid., 229.

79. Ibid., 234.

80. Ibid.

81. Ibid., 227.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid., 201.

84. Ibid., 212.

85. Ibid., 274.

86. Ibid., 274-275.

87. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 335.

88. Ibid., 171-172.

89. Ibid., 173. Cf. Ibid., 33.

90. Ibid., 345.

91. In one of Kierkegaard's "edifying" works he explains how the activity of objective thought dialectically reflects the structure of consciousness which is fully constituted only through the passionate choice of subjectivity: "He reflects, he is higher than the fact of weighing, he chooses. Therefore we are justified in saying that the expression, to ponder, if only one insists on it, finally indicates the essential in human nature, its composition and its advantage. For in order to weigh there must be two magnitudes; hence the reflective man, merely in order to be able to weigh, must be so made up that he has two magnitudes. This is also the case; he is compounded of the temporal and the eternal. Temporal existence and eternity are in the spiritual sense the magnitudes which are to be weighed. But in order to reflect, the man again must himself be or have a third with respect to the two magnitudes. This is choice: he weighs, he reflects, he chooses." The Gospel of Suffering, trans. David F. Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1948), p. 119.

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92. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967), I, p. 352.

93. Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, p. 92

94. Ibid., 53, note. Italics in text.

95. Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, I, p. 329. Parentheses in text.

96. Georg W. F. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. W. H. Johnson and L. G. Struthers (2 vols.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1929), II, p. 20.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid., 26.

99. Ibid., 27.

100. Ibid. Parentheses are mine.

101. Ibid., 28. Italics in text.

102. Ibid.

103. Ibid., 29.

104. Ibid , 28. Italics in text.

105. Ibid., 43.

106. Ibid., 50. Italics in text.

107. Ibid., 33.

108. As the activity of essence is more progressively mediated, not into itself but into its manifesting expressions, the latter are termed, not show, but first appearance and then, actuality. Ibid., 17-18.

109. Ibid., 34.

110. Ibid.

111. Ibid., 52.

112. Ibid., 58.

113. Ibid., 59.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid., 60.

116. Ibid., 65.

117. Dupré, op. cit., p. 116.

118. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 189. Italics are mine.

119. Ibid., 19.

NOTES

CHAPTER II

REFLECTION AND SUBJECTIVITY: IRONY

Irony: A Central Component in Kierkegaard's Polemic with the Reflective Mediation of Reason

1. Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (2d. ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), p. 248.

2. Scepticism "signifies the act of dissolving all that is determinate and showing it in its nullity." Georg W. F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (3 vols.; London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1892-1894), II, p. 329.

3. Ibid., 328. Italics in text.

4. Ibid., 341.

5. "By Scepticism we must understand a specially constituted consciousness for which in some measure not only sensuous Being, but also Being for thought does not hold true." Ibid., 335.

6. Ibid., 371.

7. Ibid., 341.

8. Ibid., 365.

9. Ibid., 329-330.

10. Ibid., 333.

11. Ibid., 332.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid., 333.

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid., 341.

16. Ibid., 371.

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17. Ibid., 340.

18. Ibid., 330.

19. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 247.

20. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, II, p. 334.

21. Ibid., 335.

22. Ibid., 332.

23. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 249.

24. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, II, p. 343.

25. Ibid., 365.

26. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. 246.

27. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, II, p. 344.

28. Ibid., 330.

29. Kierkegaard's most explicit use of scepticism as a point of departure from Hegelianism comes in the Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy, trans. David F. Swenson. Revised trans. Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton Unviersity Press, 1962), pp. 101-103. Here he very closely parallels Hegel's discussion of Greek scepticism with its elements of epochē, ataraxy, decisiveness and certainty, and immediately uses this description as a starting point for a discussion of faith.

30. Kierkegaard quotes directly from Hegel's History of Philosophy on p. 190 and p. 279 of The Concept of Irony and also from the Philosophy of Right on p. 189 of the same work. Following Lee Capel, translator of The Concept of Irony, (p. 402, note 12) it appears that Kierkegaard has, at this early date, also done a study of The Phenomenology of Mind. For a survey of Kierkegaard's direct exposure to Hegel's works at the time of the Magister's dissertation as well as after its completion, see Niel's Thulstrup's commentary on Kierkegaard's Philosophical Fragments, pp. 177-179. James Collins places Kierkegaard's first direct reading of Hegel at the end of 1837 or the beginning of 1838. He claims that during the time of the dissertation's composition, Kierkegaard had direct exposure to Hegel's Lectures of Esthetics, History of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Right. James Collins, The Mind of Kierkegaard (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953), pp. 104-105. J. Bogen seems to have overlooked The Concept of Irony in claiming that Kierkegaard, in his works, refers by name to only the Logic and the Philosophy of Right. J. Bogen, "Remarks on the Kierkegaard-Hegel Controversy", Synthese (Bussum), XIII (1961), 373.

31. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: with Constant Reference to Socrates, trans. Lee M. Capel (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), p. 242. note. Parentheses in text. Hereafter referred to as The Concept of Irony.

32. Ibid., 341.

33. Ibid., 281.

34. Ibid., 234-235 note.

35. Ibid., 274.

36. Ibid., 278.

37. Ibid., 274.

38. Ibid., 234.

39. Ibid., 274.

40. Ibid., 267.

41. Ibid., 278.

42. Ibid., 174.

43. Ibid., 119.

44. Ibid., 279.

45. Ibid., 270.

46. Ibid., 233.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid., 274.

49. Ibid., 190.

50. Ibid., 176.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 234.

53. Ibid., 93 note.

54. Ibid., 183.

55. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, II, p. 330.

56. In this, Kierkegaard is aligned with Sextus Empiricus' explanation of the sceptical posture with regard to the finality of objective assertions. "'All things are false' asserts the falsity of itself as well as everything else, as does the formula 'nothing is true', so also the formula 'No more' asserts that itself, like all the rest, is 'No more (this than that),'

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and thus cancels itself along with the rest." Sextus Empiricus ed. T. E. Page, E. Capps, W. H. Rouse, trans. R. G. Bury (4 vols; London: Willian Heinemann, Ltd, 1933), Vol. I, p. 11. Cf. Ibid., p. 123. Kierkegaard's Climacus, referring to classical scepticism in the Fragments appears to reinforce the position implied in his dissertation. "In so far as he has recourse to dialectics in order to make the opposite of any conclusion seem equally probable, it is not on the foundation of these dialectical arguments that he sets up his scepticism. They are but outworks, human accomodations. He has no result, therefore, not even a negative result; for this would be to recognize the validity of knowledge. By an act of the will he resolves to keep himself under restraint and to refrain from every conclusion." Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 105.

57. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, pp. 192-193.

58. Three years later, 1844, Kierkegaard explicitly indicates his dissatisfaction with the total Hegelian view of Irony: "Thus irony has been explained as the negative. The first discoverer of this explanation was Hegel who, strangely enough, had no great sense for irony." Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 120.

59. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 339.

60. "Natur, Seele, Geschichte erscheinen bei Goethe, bei den Romantiker, bei Hegel also sichtbare Darstellungen der 'Idee.'" Wilhelm Anz, Kierkegaard und der deutsche Idealismus, (Tübingen : Mohr, 1956), p. 13.

61. "Die allgemeine Reflexion äussert sich als Ressentiment, als Nivellierung." Ibid., note.

62. "Die Idee wird hier verstanden als gestalthaft sichtbare Einheit des Endlichen und des Unendlichen." Ibid.

63. "With this certain degree of self-reflection begins the act of discrimination whereby the self becomes aware of itself as something essentially different from the environment, from externalities and their effect upon it." Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 188.

64. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, pp. 234-235. Parentheses in text.

65. It is significant that Marx makes a somewhat similar critique of the Hegelian dialectic claiming that the only task in Hegel is a mental, abstract labor having nothing to do with a dialectic of life which is conceived by Marx as praxis. On this theme see: Erhard Albrecht, "Marx' und Kierkegaards Hegelkritik," Festschrift: Ernst Block (Berlin: Verlag der Wissenshafter, 1955).

66. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, pp. 127-128.

67. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), 157.

68. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, I, p. 426. Cf. John Glenn Gray, Hegel's Hellenic Idea (New York: King's Crown Press, 1941), p. 62.

69. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 191.

70. Ibid., 190.

71. Ibid., 191.

72. Ibid., 335.

73. Ibid., 264.

74. Ibid., 266.

75. "Irony is absolutely unsocial." Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for my Work as an Author, ed. Benjamin Nelson, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 54.

76. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 287.

77. Ibid., 264.

78. William T. Harris, Hegel's Doctrine of Reflection (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1881), p. 26.

79. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 264.

80. Ibid., 264-265.

81. Ibid., 200.

82. Ibid., In this, Kierkegaard agrees with Hegel's interpretation and explicitly quotes Hegel's History of Philosophy: "Thus Socrates taught those with whom he associated to know that they knew nothing." Ibid., p. 199.

83. Ibid., 200.

84. Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 181.

85. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, II, p. 367.

86. Ibid., 368.

87. Socratic expressions such as, "I know that I do not know: and "know thyself" do not contain an objective intelligible content but simply mean "separate yourself from the 'other'". Ibid., p. 202.

88. Kierkegaard allots a meager reflection even to sensuous consciousness. Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, rev. Howard A. Johnson (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), II, pp. 43, 88.

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89. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 289. Cf. Ibid., 260.

90. Ibid., 337.

91. Ibid., 368.

92. Ibid., 340. Cf. Postscript, p. 448.

93. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 340.

94. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 169.

95. It is significant that the first of the fifteen theses connected with the dissertation that Kierkegaard proposes to publicly defend on September 29, 1841 is: Similitude Christum inter Socratem in Dissimilitudine praecipue est posita. Ibid., 348.

96. Quoted above, p. 50.

97. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, pp. 274-275.

98. Ibid., 341.

99. This is equivalent to a confirmation of the theory of Lee Capel, the translator of The Concept of Irony who has already made a strong case for the ironic posture of Kierkegaard in the writing of the dissertation. That is, that the form of this work is as ironical as its content. Ibid., pp. 7-38, 351-357.

100. Ibid., 332.

101. Ibid., 339.

102. Kierkegaard, Journals, Dru, p. 280.

103. Kierkegaard, The Point of View for my Work as an Author, pp. 5-6.

104. Kierkegaard, Journals, Dru, p. 258. Cf. p. 426.

105. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony, p. 336.

106. Kierkegaard, as the poet of religiousness or, as religious ironist, simulates, in his pseudonymous authorship, the irony of Socrates but with a religious ideal. His communication is not a direct transfer of information; it is not indoctrination. It has as its purpose the liberation of the reader in the freeing of him for possibilities among which, of course, is the decision for Christianity. The communication is consequently indirect, pseudonymous -- an existence communication. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard asserts that no one can do anyone any good, that is no one can directly free another. On the ironistic posture of Kierkegaard's pseudonymous production, see: Hermann Diem, Kierkegaard's Dialectic of Existence, trans. H. Knight (London: Oliver and Boyd, 1959), p. 41.

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107. We are now, with Kierkegaard, withdrawing from Hegel's meaning of "internal" reflection which is essentially the reflective mediation of contradiction. Our meaning of internal reflection no longer denotes mediation of polarities. It simply means that the self is included in the described contradiction.

NOTES

CHAPTER III

REFLECTION AND OBJECTIVE THOUGHT: THE EXTERNAL REFLECTION OF OBJECTIVE QUALITATIVE CONTRADICTION

1. Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 261. Hereafter referred to as Journals, Dru.

2. Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments or a Fragment of Philosophy, trans. David F. Swenson. Revised trans. Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), pp. 49-54. Hereafter referred to as Fragments. Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 25-47. Hereafter referred to as Postscript. Also see Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 125.

3. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 195.

4. Ibid., 197.

5. Ibid., 198.

6. Ibid., 204.

7. Ibid., 171, 173.

8. Ibid., 173.

9. Ibid. Four years later, 1850, Kierkegaard holds the same position: "That is to say, by reflection (Betragtning) I enter into the object (I become objective), but I go out or away from myself (I cease to be subjective)." Søren Kierkegaard, Training in Christianity, trans. with introduction and notes Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 228. Parentheses in text.

10. Valter Lindström, "The Problem of Objectivity and Subjectivity in Kierkegaard," trans. Niels Erik Enkvist. A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 235.

11. Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, udgivne af P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr og E. Torsting (København: Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1908-1948), II C 18, pp. 328-329. Hereafter referred to as Papirer. Number II C 18,

refers directly to Descartes' cogito and universal doubt.

12. Ronald Grimsley, "Kierkegaard and Descartes," Journal of the History of Philosophy, IV (January, 1966), 32.

13. Ibid., 31.

14. A Journal entry of 1842 quotes directly a sentence from Descartes' Discourse on Method. Søren Kierkegaard, Journal (extraits), traduis du danois par Knud Ferlov et Jean-J. Gateau (onzième édition : Paris: Gallimard, 1941-1960), IV A 1, p. 157. Hereafter referred to as Journal, Ferlov, to distinguish from Dru's translation.

15. Grimsley, op. cit., p. 34.

16. Kierkegaard, Journal, Ferlov, IV A 11. Cf. Papirer, IV C 34, p. 388 where Kierkegaard makes explicit reference to Leibniz' Theodicy.

17. Ronald Grimsley, "Kierkegaard and Leibniz," The Journal of the History of Ideas, XXVI (July, 1965), 383-384.

18. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 182.

19. Ibid., pp. 100-101. On the relationship of mathematics, logic and metaphysics to interested thinking see, Søren Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus or De Omnibus Dubitandum Est, trans. T. H. Croxall (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958), p. 152, note 2. Hereafter referred to as Johannes Climacus. On the differentiation between mathematical, metaphysical knowledge and ethical religious statements see, Johannes Climacus, pp. 134-135.

20. "La pensée finale de Lessing exposée dans l'Erziehung consiste donc en une réconciliation des données qu'avec Leibniz il avait primitivement opposées fortement l'une a l 'autre: vérités éternelles nécessaires -- vérités temporelles contingentes." Jacques Colette, "Kierkegaard et Lessing," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, XLIV (1960), 10. On Kierkegaard's heritage from Spinoza, see, Colette, Ibid., pp. 9-11. Lessing shows a marked Leibnizian influence in the former's, Lessing's Theological Writings, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1957), pp. 100, 55.

21. Kierkegaard, Papirer, V A 21, p. 12; V A 31, p. 15; V C 13, p. 379.

22. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 104.

23. Ibid., 104. Climacus gives a rather extensive treatment and makes comparatively frequent references to Jacobi in the Postscript, pp. 91-97 and pp. 65, 66, 224, 234. Kierkegaard also refers to Jacobi in Stages on Life's Way, p. 28.

24. It appears well established that Jacobi's position that faith is simple immediacy is the prime target of Fear and Trembling and The Concept of Dread. His central focus in these works is on Jacobi and not on Hegel. See Thulstrup's commentary on the Fragments, p. 230.

25. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 224.

26. "Der entschiedene Realist hingegen, der auf das Zeugniss seiner Sinne äussere Dinge unbezweifelt annimmt, diese Gewissheit als eine ursprüngliche Ueberzeugung betrachtet, und nicht anders denken kann, als dass auf diese Grunderfahrung aller Berstandesgebrauch zur Erkentniss der Aussenwelt sich gründen muss, ein solcher entschiedener Realist wie soll er dass Mittel benennen, wodurch ihn die Gewissheit äusserer Gegenstände, als von seiner Verstellung der selben unabhängig dasenender Dinge, zu Theil wird? Er hat nichts, worauf sein Urtheil sich stützen könnte, als die Sache selbst; nichts als das Factum, das die Dinge wirklich vor ihm stehen. Kann er sich mit einem schicklichern Worte, als dem Worte Offenbarung, hierüber ausdrücken." Friedrich H. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, Werke (6 vols.; Gerhard Fleischer, d. Jung, 1812-1825), II, 165-166.

27. René Descartes, Discourse on Method, Descartes' Philosophical Writings, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1952), p. 130.

28. Ibid., Meditations on First Philosophy, Meditation II, pp. 210-211.

29. Ibid. Meditation III, pp. 214, 215, 231.

30. Ibid. pp. 214-215.

31. In order to preserve the contingency of free events, Leibniz makes a rather tenuous distinction between the "absolute" necessity of eternal truths (those whose opposite implies contradiction) and the "accidental" necessity of contingent truths. The latter are determined by God's foreknowledge and based on the free choice of God. Gottfried W. Freiherr, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. George R. Montgomery (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1931), no. 13, pp. 19-20.

32. Horace W. B. Joseph, Lectures on the Philosophy of Leibniz (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1949), pp. 106-107.

33. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 68, note.

34. René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, op. cit., Synopsis, p. 195, Med. III, pp. 219, 231, Med. IV, p. 238.

35. René Descartes, op. cit., p. 240.

36. Ibid., 237.

37. "Wie können wir nach Gewissheit streben wenn uns Gewissheit nicht zum voraus schon bekannt ist; und wie kann sie uns bekannt sein, anders als durch etwas, das wir mit Gewissheit schon erkennen? Dieses führt zu dem Begriff einer unmittelbaren Gewissheit, welch nicht allein seiner Bewise dedarf, sondern schlechterdings alle Beweise ausschliesst, und einzig und allein die mit dem vorgestellten Dinge übereinstimmende Vorstellung selbst ist, (also ihren Grund in sich selbst hat). Die Uberzeugung durch Beweise ist eine Gewissheit aus der zweiten Hand; beruht auf Bergleichung, und kann nie recht sicher und vollkommen sein."

Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, Werke, IV, 210. This statement of the problem of certitude is strikingly similar to the way Climacus poses the problem of truth in the opening sentences of the Fragments, p. 11.

38. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, Werke, II, 263.

39. Jacobi, "Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung," Werke, III, 367-368.

40. Jacobi, David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, Werke, II, 10-11.

41. Ibid., 32.

42. Ibid., 65.

43. Ibid., 78. Cf. Ibid., "Jacobi an Fichte", III, 23 and "Ueber das Unternehmen des Kriticismus die Vernunft zu Verstande zu bringen," Ibid., III, 93.

44. Ibid., David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, II, 232.

45. Ibid., 4.

46. David Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Human Understanding (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1894), Section 5, Part 2, p. 48.

47. Ibid., Section 7, Part 1, p. 63.

48. Ibid., Section 6, pp. 57-58.

49. Ibid., Section 5, Part 2, p. 54.

50. Jacobi, Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, Werke, IV, 223.

51. Ibid., David Hume über den Glauben, oder Idealismus und Realismus, II, 144, 147, 148, 153, 156 ff.

52. Ibid., Ueber die Lehre des Spinoza in Briefen an Herrn Moses Mendelssohn, IV, 210.

53. "Mit dem eintreten der Zeit verwandeln sich die Begriffe von Grund und Folge in die Begriffe von Ursache und Wirkung. Wie aber die Wirkung aus der Ursache hervorgehe und beide mit einander auf eine nothwendige Weise verknüpft sind, erkennen wir nur dan, wenn wir von der sie von einander trennenden Zeit in der Reflexion abstrahiren, die Ursach in Grund (Subjekt) die Wirkung in blose Folge (Prädicat) verwandeln; und beides (Ursache und Wirkung) in einander fallen lassen können. So erklären wir z.B. einzelne und ganze Folgen von Handlungen eines Menschen, aus seiner beständigen Gemüths beschaffenheit, seinem unveränderlichen Charakter. Wo wir auf diese Weise nicht verfahren, in der

Betrachtung nicht die Zeit vertilgen können, da gelangen wir auch zu keiner Einsicht, sondern erwerben durch die Erfahrung blos, gleich den Thieren, Erwartung ähnlicher Fälle." Jacobi, "Von den Göttlichen Dingen und ihrer Offenbarung," Werke, III, 452.

54. Alexander Crawford, The Philosophy of F. H. Jacobi (Cornell Studies in Philosophy, no. 6; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1905), p. 31.

55. Jacobi, "Ueber die unzertrennlichkeit des Begriffes der Freiheit und Vorsehung von dem Begriffe der Vernunft," Werke, II, 314.

56. "Licht ist in meinem Herzen, aber so wie ich es in den Verstand bringen will, erlischt es. Welch von beiden Klarheiten ist die wahre? Die des Verstandes, die zwar feste Gestalten, aber hinter ihnen nur einen bodenlosen Ubgrund zeigt? Oder die des Herzens, welche zwar verheissend aufwärts leuchtet, aber bestimmtes Erkennen vermissen lässt? -- Kann der menschliche Geist Wahrheit ergreifen, wenn nicht in ihm jede beiden Klarheiten zu Einem Lichte sich vereinigen?" Jacobi, "Briefe an Verschiedene: An Johann Georg Hamann," Werke, I, 367.

57. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 173.

58. Ibid., 96.

59. Ibid., 170.

60. Ibid., 299. Cf. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 100, 101.

61. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 175.

62. Ibid., 71.

63. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 91.

64. Ibid., 99-100.

65. Ibid., 119.

66. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 172.

67. Ibid., 267.

68. Ibid., 377. Cf. Ibid., 281.

69. Ibid., 310.

70. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 119.

71. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 310, note.

72. Ibid.

73. Ibid., 102.

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74. Ibid., 540.

75. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 101.

76. Ibid., 90.

77. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 95.

78. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 68, note.

79. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 100.

80. Ibid., 104.

81. Ibid., 100. Italics in text.

82. Ibid.,

83. Ibid., 104.

84. Ibid., 101.

85. Ibid., 91.

86. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 75.

87. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 95.

88. Ibid., 120.

89. Ibid., 107. Climacus' note to this statement explains that such contradiction is not to be construed as the mediating, nonqualitative contradiction of Hegel's dialectic. Climacus clearly affirms a qualitative contradiction in history's coming into existence.

90. Ibid., 101.

91. "Faith must not rest content with unintelligibility; for precisely the relation to or repulsion from the unintelligible, the absurd, is the expression for the passion of faith." Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 540. Italics in text.

92. In the Postscript, Climacus underlines the need for objective uncertainty as a pole required for the authenticity of faith. Faith is here understood, not in the ordinary sense, (tro), nor in the eminent sense of Christian faith. It is the faith of Religiousness A, that is, the paradoxical relation of an individual to an eternal happiness. "The certainty of the faith which sustains a relationship to an eternal happiness is determined through its uncertainty. If I take the uncertainty away -- in order to get a still greater certainty -- then I do not get a believer in his humility, in fear and trembling, but I get an aesthetic coxcomb, a devil of a fellow, who wishes, speaking loosely, to fraternize with God, but who, speaking precisely, stands in no relation to God whatever. The uncertainty is the criterion, and the certainty without

the uncertainty is the criterion for the absence of a God-relationship." Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 707. Cf. Ibid., 453.

93. Ibid., 542-543.

94. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 131.

95. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 147. Italics in text.

96. Ibid., 148.

97. Ibid.

98. Ibid. Either/Or similarly structures the duality of reflected language and immediacy. Because "language involves reflection", (Either/Or, I, 68) "language cannot apprehend the immediate." Søren Kierkegaard, Either/Or, trans. David Swenson and Lillian Marvin Swenson, rev. trans. Howard A. Johnson (2 vols.; New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), I, 69.

99. See Chapter I, pp. 4-8

100. Kierkegaard, Johannes Climacus, p. 151.

101. Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard and Edna Hong (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 218.

102. German Idealism especially the Hegelian variety, can also, from Kierkegaard's point of view, be characterized as recollection. Hegel contends that all education is the re-collecting of the terms of past syntheses that have produced the present. The present is pregnant with the past. Hence all e-ducation, "leading out", is similarly a "collecting again" of the past. Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), pp. 88-92. Here the implication is that the truth of the present is immanent within its past. This closely parallels Climacus' description of Greek Idealism.

Kierkegaard, writing under the pseudonym, Constantine Constantius, differentiates recollection from repetition in his aesthetic work, Repetition. "Repetition and recollection are the same movement, only in opposite directions; for what is recollected has been, is repeated backward, whereas repetition properly so called is recollected fowards." (Repetition, p. 33.) Although both Constantius and Climacus employ the category of recollection, their intent is not similar. Climacus expressly uses the determination of recollection in order to distinguish the speculative, Platonic consciousness from the Socratic with an eye toward further distinguishing both of these from the faith-consciousness of the Christian through his explicit formula for the act of Christian faith. Although Constantius attributes recollection to the Greek consciousness, (Repetition, p. 90) it is not specifically articulated in relation to Platonic Idealism as differentiated from Socratic faith. Such a distinction, crucial for Climacus, is not coordinate with Constantius' purpose. Kierkegaard, through Constantius, is primarily thinking through his own relationship with Regina Olsen which, at the time of the writing had reached crisis proportions. Recollection here is at first an expression for Kierkegaard's

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own melancholy in his love-relationship. (See especially, Repetition, pp. 35-40) It subsequently serves as a point of departure for the distinction between the immanence of recollection and the transcendence of repetition which latter is associated with faith. (Repetition, p. 117) Hence, in Repetition, the Christian act of faith is not highlighted as distinct specifically from speculative, Platonic Idealism and the Socratic consciousness. Constantius, unlike Climacus, does not produce a specific formulation of the act of faith other than to locate faith in the category of repetition. Since we are concerned with a specific definition of faith, Climacus and not Constantius is pertinent for the explication of recollection.

103. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 11.

104. Another pseudonym holds the same position. "For recollection is ideality, but as such it involves effort and responsibility, which the indifferent act of memory does not involve. Recollection seeks to assert man's eternal continuity in life and to insure that his earthly existence shall be uno tenore, one breath, and capable of being expressed in one word." Søren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 28.

105. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 13.

106. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 184.

107. Ibid., 186.

108. Ibid., 182. Italics in text.

109. Ibid., 186.

110. Ibid., 188.

111. Ibid.

112. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 94.

113. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 189.

114. Ibid.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. E. D. Klemke, "Logicality versus Alogicality in the Christian Faith," The Journal of Religion, XXXVIII (April, 1958), 110. Parentheses in text.

118. Kierkegaard, Fragments, p. 222, note.

119. Herbert M. Garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 43.

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120. Theodor Haecker, Kierkegaard the Cripple, trans. C. Van O. Bruyn (New York: Philosophical Library, 1950), p. 22. For direct statements affirming the logical contradiction, see also: Ralph McInerny, "The Teleological Suspension of the Ethical," The Thomist, XX (July, 1957), 300; Hugh Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology: Schleiermacher to Barth (London: Nisbet and Co., 1937), pp. 246-247; Malcolm L. Diamond, "Kierkegaard and Apologetics," The Journal of Religion, IV (April, 1964), 125. For interpretations that clearly imply logical contradiction see: Syste Ube Zuidema, Kierkegaard, trans. D. H. Freeman, International Library of Philosophy and Theology, Modern Thinkers Series, (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1960), p. 34; John A. Mourant, "The Limitations of Religious Existentialism," International Philosophical Quarterly, I (September, 1961), 451; William Paul, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard and Modern Existentialism," The Review of Religion, XX (March, 1956), 150; Krishna Sen, "A comparative Study of the Concept of Faith of Stace, Dewey, Kierkegaard and St. Thomas Aquinas," The Philosophical Quarterly, Amlner, India, XXIX (July, 1956), 72; Edgar L. Allen, Kierkegaard: His Life and Thought (London: Stanley Nott, 1935), p. 192.

121. Diamond, op. cit., p. 131; Cf. Mackintosh, op. cit., p. 246; Garelick, op. cit., p. 29; John H. Thomas, Subjectivity and Paradox (New York: Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 172.

122. Robert E. Larsen, "Kierkegaard's Absolute Paradox," The Journal of Religion, XLII (January, 1962), 36.

123. See especially, Kierkegaard, For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourselves! trans. Walter Lowrie (London: Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 212.

124. Kierkegaard, Fragments, pp. 56-57.

125. Ibid., 46.

126. Ibid.

127. Ibid., 49.

128. Ibid. Italics in text.

129. Ibid., 50.

130. Ibid., 51, note.

131. Ibid., 55. This is "a static from of conception" rather than "dynamic" because to simply say "the absolutely different" is to be undialectical. The dialectical form is the dynamic, i. e. , the unlike becomes like, the God becomes man.

132. Ibid.

133. Ibid., 58.

134. Ibid.

135. Ibid., 56-57.

136. Kierkegaard, Postscript, pp. 169-172.

137. Ibid., 177, 178.

138. Ibid., 173-177.

139. Ibid., 177-178.

140. Ibid., 180-181.

141. Ibid., 180.

142. Ibid., 180-184.

143. Ibid., 182.

144. Ibid., 186.

145. Ibid.

146. Ibid., 188.

147. Ibid., 189.

148. Ibid., 188.

149. Ibid., 189. Although Climacus, in the Fragments, does not at all speak of objective certainty of absurdity, he does in places, refer to both terms of the contradiction constituting the absolute paradox. He implies that both terms have content. "As long as the Eternal and the historical are external to one another, the historical is merely an occasion" (Fragments, p. 75) "but the Paradox unites the contradictories, and is the historical made Eternal." (Fragments, p. 76) "No knowledge can have for its object the absurdity that the Eternal is the historical" (Fragments, p. 76) "Whatever can be essentially differentiated by time is eo ipso not the Absolute." (Fragments, p. 125) Cornelio Fabro in his "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard's Dialectic," trans. J. B. Mondin. A Kierkegaard Critique, ed. Howard A. Johnson and Neils Thulstrup (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1962), p. 167, concurs that in the Postscript, the terms of the essential paradox are eternity which he associates with immutability -- and time. "This is the essential paradox which is at the root of all the others -- God himself, eternal and immutable, 'changes,' so to speak, through the Incarnation of the Word, and enters time." Can there be a more evident infraction of the principles of reason than the affirmation that the eternal is in time?"

150. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 75.

151. Ibid., 99-101.

152. Ibid., 187. Cornelio Fabro argues that, in his maturity, Kierkegaard stresses faith's transcendence of reason rather than its opposition to it and that he allows for the "possibility of theological speculation, naturally in subordination to faith." (Fabro, op. cit., p. 177) But he does not at all deny that, in Kierkegaard, there is emphasis on the opposition of faith to reason and that this emphasis is a result of his polemic with speculation. Even in his maturity, Fabro affirms, Kierkegaard considers the absurd to have protective, negative value. "The formula of the Postscript and of the Journals of his maturity, according to which the fundamental relation between faith and reason consists in 'understanding that it is impossible to understand' has only a negative value." (Fabro, op. cit., p. 187). The absurdity of the Christian faith-object has negative value in that it prevents the unbeliever from pursuing an objective path to Christianity. "Kierkegaard, without ambiguity, defines his position, which may be summarized as follows: the object of faith is the absurd, the paradox, which is the inevitable cause of scandal, but only for whoever sees this object from the outside, i. e. , for him who has no faith." (Fabro, op. cit., p. 179). Such a one is Johannes Climacus himself.

153. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 192.

154. Kierkegaard, Postscript, p. 545.

155. Ibid., 451.

156. Louis Dupré, Kierkegaard as Theologian: The Dialectic of Christian Existence (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), p. 128. Italics in text. Cf. Herbert M. Garelick, The Anti-Christianity of Kierkegaard (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), p. 71. On Kierkegaard's dual perspectives effecting an emphasis on objective absurdity or on the subjectivity of faith see: Jean Wahl, A Short History of Existentialism, trans. F. Williams and S. Maron (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 7; Cornelio Fabro, op. cit., p. 179; John H. Thomas, op. cit., pp. 132-133.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

REFLECTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS: THE INTERNAL REFLECTIVITY OF QUALITATIVE INCOMMENSURABLES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

1. Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 33.
2. Ibid., 48.
3. Ibid., 62.
4. Ibid., 109.
5. Ibid., 56.
6. Ibid., 55.
7. Ibid., 62.
8. Ibid., 48.
9. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 37.
10. Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 146.
11. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 38.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., 39.
14. Ibid., 93.
15. Ibid., 45.
16. Ibid., 38.
17. Ibid., 55. Parentheses in text.
18. Ibid., 38. Italics in text.

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19. Ibid., 41. See also, Ibid., 42-43, 139, 140.

20. Ibid., 45.

21. Haufniensis' statement that, "freedom is infinite and does not arise out of anything", is equivalent to the expression, causa sui. Ibid., 100.

22. Søren Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments of A Fragment of Philosophy, trans. David F. Swenson and Howard V. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 93. Hereafter referred to as Philosophical Fragments.

23. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, p. 96.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid., 96-97.

26. Ibid., 96.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., 97.

30. Ibid., 98.

31. Ibid., 96.

32. Ibid., 97.

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 99.

38. Ibid., 106.

39. It is important to note that freedom and guilt, considered as possibilities within the prechoice of the dreadful consciousness, are not possible objects of choice. Freedom and guilt are not alternatives for the choice of a fully constituted consciousness that stands outside both. This is to conceive both freedom and guilt finitely. (The Concept of Dread, p. 100). The dreadful consciousness, in its innocence, is not yet a self. Since choice requires a self-consciousness which implies consciousness of its other, the dreadful consciousness does not choose. Yet it has a veiled consciousness that it is a self, that is, that it is free. It also dimly recognizes that its freedom carries with it the possibility of its being guilty. It remains for consciousness to break out of its dread and to

choose itself as freedom or as guilt. The essential choice is always the choice of the self and not the choice of a finite other: See also, Ibid., 45, 97.

40. Ibid., 119.
41. Ibid., 94.
42. Ibid., 95.
43. Ibid., 96.
44. Ibid., 128.
45. Ibid., 127.
46. Ibid., 127-128.
47. Ibid., 128
48. Ibid., 126.
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid., 55.
51. Ibid., 20.
52. Ibid., 55.
53. Ibid., 66.
54. Ibid.
55. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 213.
56. Ibid., 182.
57. Ibid., 162.
58. Ibid., 163.
59. Ibid., 169.
60. Ibid., 169-170.
61. Ibid., 163.
62. Ibid., 162.
63. Ibid., 162-163
64. Ibid., 163.

65. Ibid., 163-164.
66. Ibid., 164.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid., 164-165. Italics and parentheses in text.
71. Ibid., 165.
72. Ibid., 175.
73. Ibid., 182.
74. Ibid., 184.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid. Italics and parentheses in text.
77. Ibid., 187.
78. Ibid., 186.
79. Ibid., 184-185. Italics and parentheses in text.
80. Ibid., 188.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid. Parentheses in text.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid., 182.
88. Ibid., 194.
89. Ibid., 195.
90. Ibid., 194.
91. Ibid., 197.

92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., 200.
94. Ibid., 201.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid., 203.
98. Ibid., 204-205.
99. Ibid., 207.
100. Ibid., 196.
101. Ibid., 210
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid., 211
104. Ibid., 101. Italics in text.
105. Ibid., 147.
106. Ibid., 210.
107. Ibid., 210-211.
108. Ibid., 210.
109. Ibid., 147.
110. Ibid., 212.
111. Ibid., 211.
112. Ibid., 210. See also, Ibid., 252, 257, 258, 259.
113. Ibid., 240.
114. Ibid., 211.
115. Ibid., 244.
116. Ibid., 245-246.
117. Ibid., 245.
118. Ibid.

119. Ibid., 262.

120. Ibid. Parentheses in text.

121. Ibid.

122. Ibid.

123. Ibid., 245.

124. Ibid., 212.

125. Ibid., 147.

126. Ibid., 213. Italics in text.

127. Ibid., 147.

128. Ibid., 262.

129. Ibid., 162.

130. Ibid., 147.

131. Ibid. Parentheses in text.

132. Ibid.

133. Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 180. Parentheses in text. Hereafter referred to as Journals, Dru.

134. Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, p. 146.

135. Ibid., 211.

136. Ibid., 162.

137. Ibid., 262.

138. Kierkegaard, Journals, Dru, p. 239.

139. Ibid., 240.

140. The following is a sample of the themes which Kierkegaard articulates in terms of immediacy and reflection: The relation of music to linguistic expression, Either/Or, I, pp. 63, 68, 80; Grief, Either/Or, I, p. 169, ff.; The relation of erotic love to ethical determinations, Either/Or, II, pp. 30, 31, 48, cf. Stages of Life's Way, p. 376; Innocence, The Concept of Dread, pp. 33-34; Inwardness, The Concept of Dread, p. 126 and Postscript, p. 466 note; The relation of thought to existence, Johannes Climacus, pp. 147-151; Forms of despair, The Sickness unto Death, p. 158; Faith, Fear and Trembling, p. 92, 108, Either/Or, II, p. 48, Stages on Life's Way pp. 126, 142, 157, 376.

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141. Søren Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945), p. 155.

142. Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, trans. J. B. Baillie (2d ed. rev.; New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931), p. 94.

143. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, pp. 33-34.

144. Ibid., 33.

145. See especially, Kierkegaard, Either/Or, II, pp. 30-31 and p. 48.

146. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, pp. 435-436.

147. Kierkegaard, Journals, Dru, p. 240.

148. Kierkegaard, Stages on Life's Way, p. 335.

149. Ibid., 157.

150. Ibid., 126.

151. Ibid., 142.

152. Ibid., 376.

153. Ibid.

154. Ibid.

155. Ibid.

156. Ibid.

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NOTES

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

1. See Chapter IV, pp. 188-192.

2. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to the Philosophical Fragments, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 189. Hereafter referred to as Postscript.

3. See Chapter III, pp. 107-117.

4. "There is a 'how' which has this quality, that if it is truly given, then the 'what' is also given; and that is the 'how' of 'faith'. Here quite certainly, we have inwardness at its maximum proving to be objectivity once again. And this is an aspect of the principle of subjectivity which, so far as I know, has never before been presented or worked out." Søren Kierkegaard, The Journals of Kierkegaard, trans. Alexander Dru (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), p. 355. Italics in text.

5. Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954), p. 262. Parentheses in text.

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